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Since 1945, there has been a proliferation of armed groups in conflict theatres 
across the globe. Although these groups exist outside of the regular forces of States, 
they are in most instances supported and controlled by States. Despite this, the 
complicit support of States in the commission of international crimes by armed 
groups is not recognised under international law and the tests of control through 
which the conduct of individuals could be attributed to States are almost impossible 
to meet. This allows States to maintain compelling roles in international crimes 
committed by armed groups with impunity. Despite this, the role played by States in 
modern international conflict has received only intermittent attention in the 
literature. This thesis seeks to address this disparity by addressing the critical role of 
State support of armed groups in the commission of international crimes by 
challenging the existing tests of attribution of conduct to States under the present 
rules of international responsibility. 
Therefore this thesis asks whether there can be variation to the current tests 
for attribution of conduct of individuals who are members of non-State armed groups 
to States which provide support to them, by approaching the interpretation of 
“control” in a purposive, less literal manner. It argues this by analysing the 
limitations of the current law through selected case studies. It further examines 
alternative approaches in the fields of international human rights law and 
international criminal law, again through selected case studies with a view to 
determining whether they can assist in crafting more purposive approaches towards 
the determination of State control over armed groups. This will augment the current 
corpus of literature by suggesting improvements that can, hopefully, pass into the lex 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 The rationale for the study  
History is scored with violent episodes of armed conflict during which 
atrocities have often been committed on dramatic scales, marked by the number of 
both victims and perpetrators. These atrocities are usually perpetrated by members of 
a defined social, ethnic, political or religious group against individuals belonging to 
another defined group in one or more of these categories.1 The atrocities committed 
during the Second World War and those committed during the last decade of the 
twentieth century in the Balkans and Rwanda serve as examples of this, but they are 
by no means isolated.2 Unlike the atrocities committed during the Second World 
War, which were largely committed by organs of the State, the atrocities committed 
in the latter half of the twentieth century, for the most part, have been perpetrated by 
members of non-State armed groups. These armed groups by definition do not form 
part of the regular armed forces of a State, but nevertheless are availing themselves 
of some level of State support, which may either come from a third State, or from the 
State on whose territories the atrocities are committed.3  
                                                 
 
1
 There are several good works that discuss the proposition that international crimes are usually 
committed by members of particular social, ethnic, political, or religious groups against other groups. 
In this regard N Jain, Perpetrators and Accessories in International Criminal Law: Individual Modes 
of Responsibility for Collective Crimes (Hart 2014) 1-9, HC Kelman, ‘The Policy Context in 
International Crimes’ in H van der Wilt and A Nollkaemper (eds), System Criminality in 
International Law (Cambridge University Press 2009) 26–41, and M Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment 
and International Law (Cambridge University Press 2007) 23–46 provide good discussion on this. 
2
 Further examples of grave internecine conflicts during which mass atrocities were commit ted by 
armed groups against targeted political social, ethnic or religious groups occurred: Cambodia 1975–
1991 (for a history of this conflict see DP Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History Politics, War 
and Revolution since 1945 (Yale University Press 1992) 173-240); Sri Lanka 1995–2001 (for a 
history of the root causes of the conflict, dating back to the early 1970s, see J Spencer (ed), Sri Lanka: 
History and Roots of the Conflict (Taylor and Francis 2002) 227-240; Sierra Leone 1991–2002; see D 
Harris, Sierra Leone: A Political History (C Hurst 2013) 81-101; during the Congo Wars 1998–2002 
(see PN Okowa, ‘The Legal Dimension of a Protracted Conflict’ (2007) 77 British Yearbook of 
International Law 203, particularly 205-208). 
3
 One notable example of third State support occurred during the conflict between the Sandinistas and 
the Contra rebels in Nicaragua in 1986. Here, the USA provided a strong degree of logistical and 
tactical support to the Contra rebels, as discussed in Military and Paramilitary Activities In and 
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States)  (Judgment) ICJ Reports 1986, 14 (the “Nicaragua” 
case). This was also the case in the conflict in Bosnia–Herzegovina as Serbia provided administrative, 





This support is sometimes due to the fact that the supporting State and the 
leaders (and members) of the armed group share a common discriminatory ideology 
against another social, political or religious group that is based on a complex 
interaction of historical, sociological and psychological factors.4This thesis therefore 
focusses on the conflict situations in which there is a commission of international 
crimes by individuals belonging to non-State armed groups where these groups enjoy 
a significant degree of State support owing to a shared discriminatory ideology 
against another defined social, political or religious group. 
As the law stands, these individuals are personally responsible under the 
regime of individual criminal responsibility. However, over-reliance on individual or 
personal responsibility masks the important role that States play in international 
crimes through their motivation and support of armed groups. With the focus on the 
individual, at most the individual is punished and this is a deterrent aimed at warning 
others who may be similarly minded. It also takes the criminal leader or official 
away from management of official affairs with the hope that his removal will 
somehow suppress further international crimes from occurring. This is an almost 
naïve approach to a complex situation. Mass atrocities, for the most part, operate 
within the context of States and State support and to focus the thrust of responsibility 
on the individual is, without being hyperbolic, hopeless. The problem that remains 
with individual criminal responsibility is that another person can substitute the 
                                                                                                                                          
 
the Scorpions in different operations undertaken by these groups. This was discussed in Application of 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment) ICJ Reports 2007, 43 (the “Bosnian Genocide” 
case). An analysis of the legal effect of this level of support is considered in Chapter Four of this 
thesis. In distinction to this, an example of instances where the support came from the State on whose 
territories the atrocities were committed is the Colombian 51-year civil war. Here, Colombian State 
organs supported members of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (“FARC”). 
4
 The rationalisation of appropriate legal methods for determining responsibility for these systematic 
and widespread atrocities needed to consider the unique motivational factors that drive these offences. 
For a good discussion of the impact of these historic, social and psychological factors see M Drumbl, 
‘Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity’ (2005) 99 
Northwestern University Law Review 539; MJ Osiel, Making Sense of Mass Atrocity (Cambridge 
University Press 2009) 48-90; AJ Vetlesen, Evil and Human Agency: Understanding Collective 
Evildoing (Cambridge University Press 2005) 32; H Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the 
Banality of Evil (Viking Press 1963) 3-21; and Jain, Perpetrators and Accessories in International 




criminal’s place and the criminal system perpetuates like a hydra, when one head 
expires another rises to replace it. There must, as a necessity, be consideration of the 
indispensable role of the State responsibility regime as these crimes are collectively 
perpetrated and involve complex interactions among State actors. There is thus a 
useful role for the regime of State responsibility. However, even here the regime is 
limited. 
In the vast majority of situations in which mass atrocities are perpetrated by 
individuals affiliated to non-State armed groups, States maintain a role because these 
groups exist either because the supporting State created them, or because their very 
existence depends on the support of that State. The present thesis questions State 
responsibility in circumstances where that support is maintained where either (a) it is 
reasonably foreseeable that the armed group is likely to commit mass atrocities, or 
(b) State support continues to be given, even in circumstances where the group has 
previously committed atrocities. This, for instance, happened during the Balkan 
wars. The Trial Chambers at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) in both Krstić5 and Blagojević,6 found that “Bosnian Serb 
forces killed over seven thousand Bosnian Muslim men following the takeover of 
Srebrenica in 1995.”7 According to the Majority Decision in the Case Concerning 
the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro (the “Bosnian 
Genocide” case),8 even if there was no information available to the Belgrade 
authorities that a genocide was imminent, they could hardly have been unaware of its 
risks once Bosnian-Serb forces began an occupation in Srebrenica.9  
The thesis questions whether situations like this, where State support 
continues in circumstances where the commission of mass atrocities can be seen as 
                                                 
 
5
 Prosecutor v Radislav Krstić (Trial Judgment) IT-98-33-T, ICTY, 2 August 2001 paras 426-427. 
6
 Prosecutor v Blagojević and Jokic (Trial Judgment) IT-02-60-T, ICTY, 17 January 2005 para 643. 
7








imminent, could have or maybe even should have bearing on questions of attribution 
of conduct to the State.  
As is discussed in later chapters, the current approach by the International 
Court of Justice (“ICJ”) does not consider these questions or the impact that it has on 
assessing the interpretation of “direction” and “control” when considering whether 
conduct of individuals could be attributed to States under the customary rules 
reflected in Article 8 of the International Law Commission’s (“ILC”) Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (“ARSIWA”) so as to 
render that group a de facto State organ.10 It further does not consider these questions 
or the impact that it has on assessing the degree of support that is required to 
consider an armed group “completely dependent” on the State so as to render that 
armed group a de facto State organ under the customary rules reflected in Article 4 
ARSIWA.11 The present work moves from the observation that the approach used in 
considering the tests of attribution presently employed by the ICJ fail to reflect in 
full the role of the State in the commission of mass atrocities by members of non-
State armed groups. In other words, this thesis argues that these approaches do not 
ensure that States incur international responsibility in a manner which fully mirrors 
the actual role they play with regard to the commission of mass atrocities by 
members of non-State armed groups.  
This is due to the fact that the approach towards determining what constitutes 
“direction,” “control” and “complete dependence” appears to be very literal and does 
not consider the more insidious ways in which direction, control or creation of a 
relationship of dependence can be made. Sometimes a State can maintain a position 
                                                 
 
10
 The 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 53 UN GAOR 
Supp. (No. 10) at 43; UN Doc. A/56/83/2001.  
Article 8 ARSIWA (n 10) provides: “The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered 
an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the 
instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.”  
11
 Article 4 ARSIWA (n 10) provides: “1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act 
of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any 
other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character 
as an organ of the central Government or of a territorial unit of the State. 2. An organ includes any 





of omniscience in the development and sustenance of an armed group without formal 
power structures. The most typical examples of this occur where the supporting State 
and the paramilitary group share a common ethnic or religious identity and they are 
both vested in control over territory where there are competing group-based 
identities. This is explored in this thesis through the examination of the Serbian 
identity of the array of paramilitary groups that Serbia supported during the Balkan 
wars. There is that obedience to those who are seen as protecting the ethnic or 
religious group at whatever costs and thus questions of direction and control require 
a more nuanced or purposive approach towards its interpretation and application in 
the context of the present tests of attribution. 
Although in domestic legal systems questions of aid, assistance or support or 
joint participation fall under the umbrella of complicity or accessorial/accomplice 
liability, the same does not obtain in international law. The law on complicity as 
reflected under the principle proposed by the ILC in Article 16 ARSIWA on the 
basis of aid or assistance provided by a State is only in relation to the internationally 
wrongful act committed by another State.12 This exceptional basis of responsibility 
involves a form of complicity by one State in the internationally wrongful act of 
another, and thus does not involve questions of attribution of conduct. It is 
accordingly of little assistance for the purpose of the present enquiry insofar as the 
present thesis is focussed on identifying the extent to which State responsibility may 
arise as the result of provision of support to a non-State armed group.  
While this thesis in no way seeks to resurrect the debate over the notion of 
“State crimes,”13 it takes issue with the limited scope of responsibility for States that 
support non-State groups that either immediately commit atrocities or eventually 
commit atrocities, under the present approach of the international law of 
                                                 
 
12
 Article 16 ARSIWA (n 10) states: 
“A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by 
the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: 
(a) That State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and  
(b) The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.”  
13




responsibility. As the present rules on complicity in the international law of State 
responsibility are structured, State complicity can normally only arise in State-to-
State relationships as a result of the aid or assistance provided by one State to 
another in the commission of another State’s internationally wrongful act.14 This 
therefore normally precludes State responsibility as a consequence of complicity in 
the conduct of non-State actors as a matter of positive law. It thus has only a limited 
role to offer when addressing State responsibility for support of armed groups in the 
context of armed groups committing atrocities during armed conflict.15 Therefore, a 
more detailed examination is needed of the principles addressing direct attribution of 
individual conduct to States as it is these provisions that have the potential to act as a 
barrier to potential impunity for States significantly involved with armed groups who 
go on to commit atrocities. 
Consequently, this thesis advocates a more considered approach towards the 
questions of attribution of individual conduct to States, whereby States can be held 
directly responsible in international law for the conduct of non-State armed groups 
that go on to commit atrocities, due to the circumstances in which they have 
rendered support and the implications that this in turn has on the questions of 
attribution of conduct. This would require reconsideration of the current tests for 
attribution of conduct to States and suggestion of proposed modifications that can 
hopefully pass into the lex lata. 
Since international criminal law has considered the different ways in which 
individuals are found responsible for participation in complex, collectively 
perpetrated atrocities, this thesis examines whether some of the doctrines and legal 
tests deriving from international criminal law can be relied upon for a proposed 
variation of the considerations that are made in applying tests of attribution under the 
                                                 
 
14
 Article 16 ARSIWA (n 10); In Bosnian Genocide (n 3) 217 para 420, the ICJ expressed the view 
that Article 16 ARSIWA reflected customary international law). 
15
 Exceptionally, in Bosnian Genocide (n 3) 216-217 paras 419-420, the ICJ made reference to Article 
16 ARSIWA by analogy in the very specific context of interpreting and elucidating the notion of 
“complicity in genocide” under Article III(e) of the Genocide Convention for the purposes of 
assessing Serbia’s potential international responsibility as a result of the provision of aid or assistance 




law of State responsibility. This enquiry departs from the position that international 
criminal law has rigorously considered questions of allocation of criminal 
responsibility for participation in crimes of a “collective” nature in a sustained and 
detailed manner and this can inform the suggestion for modification of the tests for 
attribution advocated in this thesis.  
In addition, since international human rights courts have also tackled the 
different ways in which the State can be found responsible for the violation of human 
rights on the basis of attribution of conduct of individuals from paramilitary groups 
where the acts of these individuals fall under its jurisdiction, the approach towards 
determining “direction” or “control” and most significantly “complete dependence” 
under those tests of attribution are also examined during the course of this thesis. 
However, there are several issues that this proposed modification of the tests 
of attribution of conduct raises and these are identified in the next section. 
1.2 The issues raised in proposing a modification of the tests of 
attribution of conduct 
International criminal law and State responsibility fall under two distinct 
regimes in international law. Thus, suggesting a modification or variation of the tests 
of attribution of conduct will require an intersection or harmonisation between two 
separate areas of law. To apply the tests from one regime into another has been the 
subject of strong judicial16 and academic criticism.17 There are very few who accept 
the merits of such cross-fertilisation in the field of international law.18 International 
                                                 
 
16
 Bosnian Genocide (n 3) paras 405-407. 
17
 M Milanović, ‘State Responsibility for Genocide’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International 
Law 553, 602. 
18
 A Cassese, ‘The Nicaragua and Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment in Bosnia’ 
European Journal of International Law (2007) 18, 649 especially 665-668, and especially fn 17 
identifying his rebuttal to Milanović’s analysis cited at 17 and also referencing G Bartolini, ‘Il 
concetto di “controllo” sulle attività di individui quale presupposto della responsabilità dello Stato’, in 
M Spinedi, A Gianelli, and ML Alaimo (eds), La codifi cazione della responsabilità internazionale 
degli stati alla prova dei fatti (2006) 25–52 in support of his views on the relevance of tests from one 
regime to another and on the interaction between criminal law with international responsibility issues, 
see also R Arnold, ‘Command Responsibility: A Case Study of Alleged Violations of the Laws of 




criminal law, as most domestic criminal law systems, has a variety of mechanisms to 
deal with crimes involving multiple participants, and to ensure that the different roles 
played by individuals in the commission of the crime are reflected in the distinction 
between accessory to and perpetrators of crime, resulting in calibration of individual 
responsibility. However, international criminal law is only concerned with individual 
criminal responsibility and there is no jurisdictional basis rationae personae to deal 
with juridical actors, ie legal persons, including States and, accordingly, it does not 
have the jurisdiction or structural capacity to address the role of States in mass 
atrocities. Thus international criminal responsibility can only be addressed through 
individual agency as the individual is both the protagonist and victim of mass 
atrocities.19 
In addition to this, the current regime of State responsibility does not include 
the notion of “international crimes of State” or “State crimes”. The attempt to 
incorporate in the State responsibility regime rules which reflect the particularly 
serious nature of some violations of international law began during the tenure of 
Garcia-Amador as the International Law Commission’s Special Rapporteur on State 
Responsibility with the proposal for the incorporation of a provision on “State 
crimes”.20 This was reflected in Draft Article 19 of the Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.21 These developments 
were somewhat related to the ICJ’s recognition in its 1970 judgment in the 
Barcelona Traction case of the notion of obligations erga omnes, which the Court 
defined as those obligations which a State owes to the international community as a 
whole.22 According to the now famous dictum of the ICJ, 
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[w]hen a State admits into its territory foreign investments or foreign 
nationals, whether natural or juristic persons, it is bound to extend to them 
the protection of the law and assumes obligations concerning the treatment 
to be afforded them. These obligations, however, are neither absolute nor 
unqualified. In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between 
the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, 
and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic 
protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In 
view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have 
a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes…23 
Draft Article 19 attempted to translate this idea of erga omnes obligations into 
the regime of State responsibility, by creating the notion of “international crime” of 
States, defined as:  
[a]n internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a State of 
an international obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental 
interests of the international community that its breach is recognized as a 
crime by that community as whole constitutes an international crime.24 
However, as is well known, this provision did not survive the final reading. 
Despite the fact that there were those who felt that the erga omnes character of 
the norms should give effect to distinct consequences in the form of a separate and 
distinct regime of State responsibility for international crimes,25 a distinct regime of 
State responsibility for international crimes was never realised. 
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Before the ARSIWA were adopted in 2001, the ILC under Special Rapporteur 
James Crawford, reconsidered the issues of international crimes.26 It was agreed that 
Draft Article 19 would be excised, as there was a failure to agree as to what these 
penal consequences would be and how they would be implemented in practice. In the 
main, States took issue with punitive reparations being allowed under the State 
responsibility regime, as to some the very nature of the State responsibility regime 
was a sui generis (neither delictual nor criminal) system and the introduction of the 
notion of State crimes would confuse the notions of State interest with the principles 
of individual criminal responsibility.27 Instead, a compromise was reached so that, 
notwithstanding the deletion, there would be provisions that incorporated 
consequences for breach of erga omnes obligations and peremptory (jus cogens) 
norms of international law.28  
Thus, the ARSIWA instead reflected the particularly concerning nature of 
certain violations of international law by introducing a somewhat special regime for 
“serious breaches of obligations arising under peremptory norms of international 
law” as outlined in Article 40 ARSIWA.29 In relation to those serious breaches, 
Article 41 introduced further special consequences for third States, namely, the 
obligation to cooperate to bring about an end to the breach, the obligation not to 
render aid or assistance to the responsible State and the obligation not to recognise as 
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lawful any situation created by the breach.30 Furthermore, in parallel, the ARSIWA 
also created unique rights of invocation for breaches of this category of obligations. 
Article 48(1)(b)31 allows States not directly injured by the breach to have a right of 
standing if “the obligation breached is owed to the international community as a 
whole,”32 ie if the obligations are erga omnes. This special provision for invocation 
thus embeds the principle that the obligations owed under these norms are so 
important that all States maintain an interest in their protection.33 This is 
distinguishable from the right of standing created under Article 48(1)(a) in relation to 
obligations erga omnes partes, ie they apply to a group of States as, for instance, 
under a particular treaty.34 
The challenge here is that if State support is to be addressed, it can only be 
done through the regime of State responsibility and the question is how best can that 
regime offer up solutions to this apparent loophole for States on questions of 
responsibility for support of armed groups? The solution might be to determine if 
there is a junction point between the two regimes, a common ground they both share 
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and then determine the extent to which this ground can allow for a cross-fertilisation 
of legal tests or methods for the assigning of responsibility.  
Firstly, both regimes are premised on the basis of individual agency. With 
international crimes, individuals are personally responsible for their role in a mass 
atrocity based on the Kantian notion that individuals should be personally 
responsible for the actions they have voluntarily assumed.35 Notwithstanding that 
this individual responsibility is sometimes contextualised within a collective, this 
collective does not possess these qualities of moral agency and thus an individual is 
personally responsible for their role in the collective.36 While there are different 
theories that discuss agency in international law,37 since the State is a juridical 
person, the State responsibility regime is similarly premised on the basis of 
individual agency. Whereas in international criminal law an individual is responsible 
for his own criminal acts or omissions, the State as this juridical person is only 
responsible in law if the conduct of individuals can be attributed to it. The regimes of 
individual and State responsibility are thus similar, in so far as both are concerned 
with the assigning of responsibility based on the acts of individuals. 
Secondly, the two regimes are underscored by the Kantian approach towards 
morality. According to Kant, “actions are morally right by virtue of their motives, 
which must derive more from duty than from inclination.”38 This in turn gives the 
law a universality that can apply to all moral agents.39 This universality of moral 
duties was very evident in the creation of the different international criminal courts 
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and tribunals,40 but also in the creation of the Charter of the United Nations (“UN 
Charter”)41 and treaties such as the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (the “Genocide Convention”),42 and the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949.43 These examples are part of a wider treaty framework created 
after the Second World War that are underpinned by a communitarian approach 
towards achieving this Kantian notion of morality.44  
Thirdly, as is discussed in Chapter Two, this common ground is further 
supplemented by a bourgeoning body of academic commentary that advocates 
concurrent approaches towards the assigning of responsibility for mass atrocities 
between the two regimes.45 This is further supplemented by some key judicial views 
as to the openness of the regime of State responsibility to consideration of new 
approaches towards the question of attribution.46 While this is more substantially 
discussed later in this thesis, it is important to note that although the ICJ is interested 
in maintaining certainty and clarity in the interpretation and application of legal tests, 
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there is nevertheless some judicial opinion47 that supports fresh interpretations or 
suggested modifications of particular tests, thus this thesis can be contextualised 
here.  
Lastly, this proposed variation of the considerations that should be made 
during the application of the tests of attribution is necessary. At present, under the 
current law of State responsibility, the test for attribution of conduct of armed groups 
to a State is far less nuanced and arguably unable to reflect differentiated degrees of 
involvement by the State in the commission of mass atrocities. This is because the 
regime of State responsibility as currently reflected in the ARSIWA is limited 
because of the way in which the norms on attribution of conduct of non-State actors 
to States operate. In most situations involving international crimes, before conduct of 
individuals who are not organs of the State can be attributed to it, it must be proven 
that the individuals in question were either acting “on the instructions of or under the 
direction or control of [the] State in carrying out the conduct”48 or were in a 
relationship of complete dependence upon it.49 While this is straightforward when 
concerning heads of States or commanders as their conduct can be readily attributed, 
the tests are under-inclusive when it comes to attribution of conduct of other 
individuals. These tests of attribution do not adequately take account of the subtle 
and subversive roles States can play in contributing to the commission of 
international crimes by sponsoring or supporting armed groups who have committed 
or are likely to commit international crimes. This is because the tests for the 
attribution of conduct for the purpose of engaging the international responsibility of 
the State do not consider degrees of State involvement in mass atrocities in the same 
way the regime of individual criminal responsibility considers the roles of 
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individuals under the different modes of responsibility. Thus, the different roles a 
State can play are not calibrated in a similarly refined fashion according to the 
circumstances in which they render support to armed groups who do not form part of 
the regular forces of the supporting State. Modification of the way the tests of 
attribution of conduct to States can be approached, perhaps by considering the way 
in which tests used in international criminal law for assigning responsibility in cases 
of collective criminality are done, could achieve this more nuanced approach 
towards State responsibility for participation in international crimes. 
1.3 The research question  
It is against this background that the present thesis inquires whether there can 
be a variation to the current tests for attribution of conduct of individuals who are 
members of non-State armed groups to the State or States which provide support to 
them, by approaching the interpretation of “control” in a different manner. This 
thesis suggests that there are useful approaches from the international criminal courts 
and international human rights courts towards considering whether this concept can 
be interpreted in a more rigorous and less literal way.50 
The argument put forwards by this thesis is that this variation in the way 
control is considered or examined would go a long way to stemming the tide of State 
impunity for the support of armed groups in circumstances where the members of 
these groups either commit mass atrocities or are likely to do so.  
This is because international criminal law has defined different tests for 
assigning responsibility to individuals in circumstances where these individuals are 
not the physical perpetrators of the crime (ie they do not perform the physical act of 
the crime), but they nonetheless share a common purpose with them. This is 
particularly in the context of large-scale criminal enterprises. Although these tests 
are by no means perfect, they nonetheless identify the role of different individuals 
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who either exercise executive powers within the State and motivate the crimes, or 
alternatively encourage the commission of these crimes by providing financial and 
logistic assistance to the armed groups. In many ways, States also become involved 
in international crimes in a similar manner by either engineering the commission of 
international crimes through the dissemination of ideologies that motivate, assist and 
encourage the work of armed groups who later go on to commit international crimes 
or by providing crucial financial and logistic assistance to the armed groups which 
gives them the means to perpetrate the crimes.51 So too, in the international Human 
Rights Courts, the Courts have addressed the relationship between States and armed 
groups who commit serious violations of human rights norms by examining the 
effect of State support in the provision of arms, financial or logistic aid and the effect 
this had on rendering members of armed groups “State agents,” under the State’s 
territorial control.52 
Thus, in comparison the current rules of attribution in the law of State 
responsibility are far too under-inclusive as they fail to take into account the varied 
nature of the circumstances in which State involvement gives rise to responsibility. 
These States are not responsible in international law because the conduct of the 
individuals responsible for the crimes cannot be attributed to the States in question. 
This has two important consequences. Firstly, the State cannot be held to account for 
its role as such in the commission of the atrocities. Although in such situations it is 
possible that a State can be found responsible for violations of other obligations, 
such as the obligation to prevent or punish those responsible for committing 
international crimes,53 or the obligation not to intervene in the affairs of another 
State,54 this does not indicate the full impact of the supporting role the State plays 
and provides a loophole through which States can participate in mass atrocities and 
still remain beyond the reach of responsibility. Secondly, the fact that the State is not 
called upon to respond for the atrocities themselves implies that the special 
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consequences and remedies which the regime of State responsibility offers for 
particularly serious internationally wrongful acts simply cannot be accessed. 
With this in mind, since the State is a juridical abstract, the question of 
responsibility turns on the question of attribution. As an abstract entity, it could only 
be responsible to the extent that the acts of individuals committing international 
crimes could be attributed to it. This thesis, as noted before, enquires whether a case 
could be made for that subtle variation to the current tests for attribution of conduct 
of individuals who are members of non-State armed groups to the State or States 
which provide support to them, by approaching the interpretation of “direction,” 
“control” and “complete dependence” in a manner parallel to which international 
criminal courts and international human rights courts have addressed similar issues 
of interpretation.  
This is because the tests for the assigning of responsibility in international 
criminal law look towards the impact of the role of different individuals on the 
commission of a crime and critically address the nexus between these individuals 
and the crime itself. This inquiry examines whether the adoption of these tests will 
pave the way for a more rigorous analysis of the role of States in international crimes 
and thereby provide greater recognition of the participatory role of States in the 
commission of international crimes.  
So too, as noted earlier, since the international Human Rights Courts have 
addressed the relationship between States and armed groups who commit serious 
violations of human rights norms by examining the effect of State support in 
provision of arms, financial or logistic aid on the question of jurisdiction, those 
approaches might similarly pave the way for a more rigorous analysis of the role of 
States in these international crimes.55 
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Although there is a considerable body of literature56 that has emphasized the 
importance of creating a relationship between the two regimes of responsibility, 
particularly so that the regimes can mutually support each other with a view to 
addressing both State and non-State actors in international crimes, it addresses this 
regime interaction57 from the point of view of institution of parallel processes for 
responsibility and requests for relief. Thus far, there has been no sustained proposal 
that examines whether changes to the current model of attribution of conduct of 
individuals can be put forwards. This thesis thus seeks to make a further contribution 
to the existing body of literature, which is examined in Chapter Two, that advocates 
greater links and increased coordination between the regimes of individual and State 
responsibility. 
Proposals along the broad lines of those advocated in this thesis have also 
been put forwards in the context of judicial proceedings.58 This thesis thus seeks to 
fill this gap in the literature by examining the extent to which the existing tests for 
attribution of conduct to individuals ought to be expanded to incorporate 
consideration of State participation in mass atrocities committed by armed groups 
who receive substantial support from them. 
This thesis discusses and analyses whether these suggested variations can, in 
part, fill the lacuna existing in the current framework of international law whereby 
States escape the net of responsibility in circumstances where they had a clear 
participatory role in the collective perpetration of international crimes. The next 
sections establish the use of terms in this work, provide a discussion of the 
methodology used to present the thesis argument and finally provide a broad outline 
of the structure of the work. 
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1.4 Use of terms 
A number of key terms are used in this work, such as “international crimes,” 
“serious breaches of obligations arising under peremptory norms” and “mass 
atrocities.” The thesis also refers to “regimes of responsibility,” ie the regime of 
State responsibility, the regime of individual criminal responsibility, the human 
rights regime, modes of responsibility and “armed opposition groups”. This section 
explains the meaning of these terms in this work. 
International law has so far addressed questions of responsibility for 
participation in systemic, widespread and heinous acts by one defined social, 
political, ethnic or religious group against another from two perspectives: that of the 
individual perpetrator(s) and that of the State(s) which may be responsible for those 
atrocities. The relevant rules and principles concerning liability / responsibility for 
those acts are contained in two different “regimes of responsibility,” namely the 
regime concerning individual criminal responsibility (ie international criminal law) 
and that concerning the international responsibility of States for internationally 
wrongful acts (ie the law of State responsibility). Separate from this is another 
regime that addresses State responsibility for violations of obligations owed towards 
individuals under the jurisdiction of the Convention or Treaty that supports human 
rights protection. 
Within each regime, a specific term is used to describe conduct which amounts 
to mass atrocities. When they are being addressed through the regime relating to 
individual criminal responsibility, they are referred to as “international crimes”. In 
relation to the same acts or omissions that give rise to these international crimes, in 
the regime of State responsibility there may exist an internationally wrongful act 
committed by a State, which may amount to a “serious breach of obligations arising 
under peremptory norms.” Thus, when acts of genocide, crimes against humanity or 




referred to as “serious breaches of obligations arising under peremptory norms”.59 
Similarly, in the human rights regime, acts of genocide, crimes against humanity or 
war crimes may constitute a serious violation of human rights. Thus when they are 
being addressed under the human rights regime they are referred to in these terms. 
When discussed generally in the thesis, the acts in question (aggression, 
genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity) are sometimes referred to with a 
broad and non-legal term as “mass atrocities”. While the terms “international 
crimes” and “serious breaches of obligations arising under peremptory norms” are 
used in a specific legal context, ie when the legal test for determination of 
responsibility in a particular regime is being analysed, “mass atrocities” is used 
broadly in discussion when no specific regime is being analysed. 
The expression “international crimes” is used to refer to the “core crimes” under 
Article 5 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (the “ICC Statute”), 
namely, aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.60  
Within the specific regime of State responsibility, illicit conduct by States is 
termed an “internationally wrongful act”. In this sense, commission, complicity in, 
endorsement, encouragement and failure to prevent the commission of acts of 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity all amount to internationally 
wrongful acts.61 In addition to being an “ordinary” internationally wrongful act, 
                                                 
 
59
 There is a caveat to place here. While it is agreed that prohibitions against aggression, genocide and 
crimes against humanity are peremptory norms the same does not automatically apply to war crimes. 
In this regard see M Bassiouni, ‘Jus Cogens and Oblgatio Erga Omnes’ (1996) 59(4) Law and 
Contemporary Problems 63, 65 noting “With respect to the consequences of recognizing an 
international crime as jus cogens, the threshold question is whether such a status places obligations 
erga omnes upon states or merely gives them certain rights to proceed against perpetrators of such 
crimes.” 
60
 Article 5 Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 
July 2002) 2187 UNTS 3. 
61
 A de Hoogh, Obligations Erga Omnes and International Crimes: A Theoretical Inquiry into the 
Implementation and Enforcement of the International Responsibility of States  (Kluwer International 
1996) 60: “International crimes are just like peremptory norms, based on prohibitive primary rules of 
international law. Supporting views on this are also discussed in A Zimmerman and M Teichman 
‘State Responsibility for International Crimes’ in H van der Wilt and A Nollkaemper (eds), System 
Criminality in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2009) 298-299; and I Scobbie, 





these violations, as mentioned above, may be regarded as amounting to a “serious 
breach of obligations arising under peremptory norms of general international law”. 
Within the regime of individual responsibility, there are particular modes of 
participation through which responsibility could be assigned, eg joint criminal 
enterprise, co-perpetration, indirect perpetration, conspiracy or aiding and abetting. 
These are referred to as “modes of responsibility”. 
Lastly, the term “armed groups” refers to armed groups that do not form part of 
the regular forces of the State. 
1.5 Methodology 
As explained above, this thesis argues that, as currently defined in the 
jurisprudence of the ICJ, the generally accepted tests for attribution of conduct to 
States for the support of armed groups who go on to commit international crimes 
does not reflect the real role played by States in this context. While the thesis accepts 
that, under the current framework of responsibility, a State which supports armed 
groups can be held responsible for breach of other international obligations,62 it 
argues that this result is unsatisfactory, as it leads to a reduction or a minimisation of 
the true role of the State, which is not fully called to account for its role in the 
commission of serious breaches of obligations owed under existing peremptory 
norms. Thus, the methodology used seeks to analyse the extent to which the true role 
of the State can be better understood. 
This thesis adopts a traditional “legal scholarship” approach, insofar as it 
addresses the analysis of relevant case law, treaties, statutes, and engages with the 
relevant academic debate with a view to critically assessing the current status of the 
law and, as appropriate, then makes suggestions for modification of the legal 
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framework. However, the thesis, while in part relying on a positivist discussion of 
the lex lata, cannot simply pursue an exposition and analysis of this problem by 
relying solely on this approach to legal theory. 
Law, by its very nature, is a dynamic discipline that is constantly looking 
forwards as it reflects and responds to the socio-political environment in which it 
operates. An examination of whether particular shifts in policy might be able to 
remedy limitations under the current lex lata in reference to a particular issue has 
been a mainstay of legal development.63 Consequently, these proposed modifications 
to the current tests of attribution as prescribed by Articles 4 and 8 ARSIWA are part 
of that policy-oriented approach that seeks to determine enhanced accountability for 
the role of States in international crimes through support of armed groups.  
This policy-oriented approach towards these proposed modifications is not 
without precedent. Scholars of the “New Haven School,” most notably Laswell and 
McDougall in the 1960s,64 suggested a policy-oriented approach towards legal 
scholarship so as to 
improve the performance of decision processes themselves and enhance 
their capacity to achieve outcomes more consonant with human dignity. 
This necessarily involves a careful assessment and critique of current 
processes, institutions and practices…65 
The thesis thus critiques the current legal tests or practices for determination 
of attribution of conduct of individuals to States, so as to present a set of 
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recommendations to vary these tests so that they give fuller recognition to the true 
role of States in the commission of international crimes by armed groups.  
There have been examples in the jurisprudence of the ICJ where the Court 
took an interpretive stance and modified the approaches used in its past 
jurisprudence.66 Further, some jurists have expressed that the ICJ should be open to 
this process of critique and reform.67 It is on this basis that this thesis undertakes an 
analysis of the law with a view to suggesting improvements. 
In this regard, this thesis explores these suggestions through discussion of the 
jurisprudence of the ICJ in which the tests for attribution of conduct of groups are 
analysed. It discusses the seminal Decision in the Nicaragua case68 and subsequent 
Decisions in which the Court has addressed questions of attribution of conduct of 
private armed groups to the State, including the Bosnian Genocide case69 as well as 
the judgment of the Court in Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo (DRC v 
Uganda) (the “Armed Activities Congo” case).70 The thesis does not examine the 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Croatia v Serbia) (the “Croatian Genocide” case) as the Court 
specifically did not address the question of attribution of conduct to individuals in 
that case and thus it does not offer significant assistance to analysis of the research 
question. There is contemporary relevance to the material examined as these core 
cases are very recent. Nicaragua was decided in 1986, however the other cases have 
been decided in the last ten years.  
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The thesis also examines the jurisprudence of different international courts 
and tribunals with a view to identifying and analysing the different ways in which 
they have addressed questions of assigning responsibility to individuals in situations 
of collective participation. The cases that are examined have been selected as they 
are the core cases that have considered the modes of responsibility under analysis. 
The cases have been selected from the International Criminal Tribunal of the Former 
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”),71 the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (“ICTR”),72 
and the International Criminal Court (“ICC”)73 because the defining principles have 
been established in these Courts and Tribunals. Only passing reference is made to the 
internationalised (or hybrid) criminal courts and tribunals (for example, the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts in circumstances of Cambodia, “ECCC”,74 
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, “SCSL”75) just to note the circumstances 
where they have applied the jurisprudence of the aforementioned International 
Criminal Courts and Tribunals. Additionally, since the modes of responsibility 
applied by the international courts and tribunals derived from principles emanating 
out of the International Military Tribunal (“IMT”)76 and the Nuremberg Tribunals 
established under Control Council No. 10,77 some of those early Decisions are 
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looked at, in as much as they show the evolution of the concepts underpinning the 
modes of responsibility applied by the more contemporary International Criminal 
Courts and Tribunals. Thus the analysis of the modes of responsibility examines 
cases from the 1940’s onwards to current day. 
The modes of responsibility that have been examined with a view to 
suggesting approaches that can be useful in modifying the tests of attribution are 
Joint Criminal Enterprise (“JCE”), Co-perpetration and Indirect Perpetration.  
The cases looked at during the examination of the JCE mode are the Tadić 
Appeals case78, the Brdjanin Decisions from both the Trial Chamber and Appeals 
Chamber,79 the Kvočka Appeal80 and the Kronjelac Appeal81 and the Krstić Appeals 
Decision82 and the Stakić Trial Chamber Decision.83 The Tadić Appeals Decision 
was selected because it was the first case to formally discuss JCE as a mode of 
responsibility and it outlined three categories of participation under this mode. It is 
the defining case that other cases have elaborated upon in discussion of the 
parameters of this mode. The subsequent cases represent elaborations to the tests 
outlined in the Tadić Appeal and have been consistently applied in the jurisprudence 
of the ICTY, ICTR and the hybrid courts that pattern their constitutive instruments 
on the ICTY and ICTR as regards cases that address the determination of 
responsibility of individuals under the respective categories of JCE. They thus 
represent the approaches used by these Tribunals that can usefully inform suggested 
improvements to the current tests of attribution of individuals to States. 
The cases looked at for co-perpetration derive from both the ICTY and the 
ICC. Although co-perpetration was not applied in the jurisprudence of the ICTY or 
the ICTR, it was introduced into international criminal jurisprudence through the 
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Decision of the Stakić Trials Chamber.84 Thus this Decision is examined to discuss 
that early consideration of that mode. Thereafter both the Lubanga Pre-Trial 
Confirmation of the Charges Decision85 and the Lubanga Trial Chamber Decision86 
are examined as, to date, the two Decisions represent the most detailed consideration 
of co-perpetration in the jurisprudence of the ICC. With regard to indirect 
perpetration, the initial introduction of the doctrine into international criminal 
jurisprudence was in the jurisprudence of the ICTR in the Appeals Decision in the 
Gacumbitsi case.87 Thus the early approaches were outlined here. Thereafter the Pre-
Trial Confirmation of the Charges against Katanga and Chui88 as well as the Pre-
Trial Confirmation of the Charges against Kenyatta, Muthuara and Ali89 are 
examined, and these cases represent the defining approaches used by the ICC in 
establishing tests for determination of whether an individual can be found 
responsible under this mode. There is an extensive breadth of jurisprudence coming 
out of the different international courts and tribunals and these selected cases seeks 
to represent the core approaches that have been applied with consistency in the 
jurisprudence to date. 
In addition, the approaches from the human rights regime towards 
assessments of control for the purposes of establishing jurisdiction are examined. In 
this regard, there is also reference to selected jurisprudence from the European Court 
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of Human Rights (“ECtHR”)90 and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(“IACtHR”)91 with a view to analysing in a comparative manner how these different 
regimes address the question of apportioning responsibility to individuals who are 
involved, to a varying degree, in the commission of international crimes or violations 
of obligations arising under the jurisdiction of the respective Conventions. These two 
Courts have been selected because they have addressed issues of State responsibility 
in the context of State support of armed groups in their contemporary jurisprudence, 
ie cases from 1996 to 2007 and thus those key cases are examined. To this end, the 
ECtHR Decisions in Ilaşcu v Moldova and Russia (“Ilaşcu v Moldova”),92 as well as 
Loizidou v Turkey93 and Cyprus v Turkey94 are examined as they specifically address 
the questions of attribution in the context of State support for non-State entities. 
Similarly, the jurisprudence of the IACtHR has been examined through three cases. 
Although, as with the ECtHR, the attribution of the conduct of individuals to States 
has been undertaken in relation to establishment of jurisdiction, again the approaches 
of the Court in arriving at its conclusions are examined. Thus the cases that have 
been selected address these questions of attribution in relation to State control over 
armed groups. The cases looked at are the Paniagua Morales case,95 the Pueblo 
Massacre case96 and the Mapirpan Massacre case.97 In the next section a brief 
overview of the structure of this thesis so the context in which these cases are 
examined is presented. 
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1.6 Overview of structure 
After the present introductory chapter, the thesis is articulated into five 
substantive chapters. Chapter Two begins with a discussion of the separate regimes 
for determining State and individual responsibility and the rationale behind the 
distinction. That initial section sets the stage for the proposal for variation of the tests 
of attribution of conduct to States, by drawing attention to the current dichotomy in 
the law whereby each subject is found responsible under different regimes of 
responsibility. The chapter then briefly reviews the pitfalls of this distinction in 
addressing responsibility for international crimes, but more specifically international 
crimes committed by State agents and members of armed groups. It then discusses 
the existing literature which has tackled the issue of convergence between the two 
regimes of individual and State responsibility in the case of mass atrocities. It then 
moves on to discuss the current limitations of these proposals when it comes to 
addressing the role of States for support of groups whose members perpetrate 
international crimes.  
The chapters which follow then set out, define and analyse the proposal to 
vary the tests of attribution of conduct to a State. Chapter Three identifies the 
principles of attribution in the law of State responsibility as a preliminary step. It 
pays attention to the development of these principles in international law and 
analyses the potential bases for attribution of the conduct of individuals to States as 
codified in the ARSIWA.98 This chapter further discusses in detail the Decision of 
the ICJ in the Nicaragua case,99 the Bosnian Genocide case100 and the Armed 
Activities Congo case101 as regards the circumstances where armed groups can be 
considered to be de facto State organs and the conduct of its membership attributed 
to the sponsoring State. The chapter then discusses the limitations of the tests of 
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attribution under the current law of State responsibility in dealing with partisan State 
support of groups whose members later commit international crimes. It further 
questions whether the test should be varied so as to sufficiently recognise the impact 
the support has on the commission of international crimes. 
Chapter Four then considers the alternative approaches towards determining 
State responsibility for alleged violations to human rights on the basis of attribution 
of conduct of individuals to the State to those applied by the ICJ that have been 
discussed in international law so far. Chapter Four then considers the different 
circumstances in which armed groups have been considered to be de facto State 
organs, for instance in the ECtHR and the IACtHR. Although the questions of 
attribution of conduct in those instances were related to questions of “jurisdiction” 
for the purpose of applicability rationae personae of the relevant conventional 
obligations, the reasons for these Courts holding as they did in determining these 
armed groups were de facto State organs are examined. This is done with a view to 
assessing the distinction between their interpretation of the tests of “complete 
dependence” or “effective control”. Further to this, consideration of the scholarly 
criticisms of the perceived limitations of these proposals for variation of the tests of 
attribution being implemented into the jurisprudence of the ICJ is undertaken. 
Chapter Five explores the proposals for a variation of the tests of attribution 
of conduct from a different and more complex angle. It builds on the Dissenting 
Opinion of Vice President Al Khasawneh, where he noted that there were situations 
where State organs can direct or control other individuals in respect of committing 
international crimes where they were linked together by a common criminal 
purpose.102 This chapter thus looks at cases that have come out of the international 
criminal jurisprudence which have substantially discussed the approaches towards 
the assigning of responsibility under these modes where State organs were linked to 
the acts of different paramilitary groups not under their express line or chain of 
command through a common or shared plan. Although there are some obvious 
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modes through which this can be accomplished such as planning or instigation, these 
are not examined because they will not offer any useful comparative approaches to 
the proposals for variation of the test for attribution of conduct to individuals. This is 
because, in circumstances where a State agent planned, instigated or ordered 
international crimes to be committed by armed groups, proof of direction and control 
over the individuals who committed those crimes is readily established and thus 
attribution of the conduct of those individuals to the State will be possible. Similarly, 
two other modes, ordering and superior responsibility, as they refer to situations 
where there are express relationships for command or assertion of authority, are not 
further examined as they cannot offer any useful comparative purposes. However, 
there are three primary modes of responsibility through which State agents can direct 
or control the acts of armed groups and that is where there is a common criminal 
purpose as alluded to by Judge Al Khasawneh. The approaches used by the courts 
under these modes of responsibility can suggest subtle changes mutatis mutandis 
towards the interpretation of “direction” and “control” by the ICJ. In so doing this 
chapter thus fully develops the relevant considerations put forwards by Judges 
Mahiou and Al Khasawneh in their Dissenting Opinions in the Bosnian Genocide 
case.103  
Chapter Six concludes the thesis. It puts forwards the case for variation of the 
tests of attribution of conduct to States with the tests used in international criminal 
law and international human rights law for the purposes of determining individual 
liability for participation in international crimes. This proposal is tempered by a 
pragmatic discussion of the limitations of this thesis but nonetheless concludes with 
the argument it set out to complete. The extent to which the ICJ will be minded to 
implement the suggestions is the subject of a separate inquiry and will lead to further 
research into this most relevant area of increasing importance. This is because 
international laws continue to grapple with the emergence of this type of participant 
in international law, ie the armed group, and must look to determine which aspects of 
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the regime of State responsibility can be adapted or revisited to deal with 




Chapter Two: Literature Review: Existing Proposals for 
Coordination between the Two Regimes 
2.1 The rationale for coordination between the two regimes 
There are recent developments in the literature whereby commentators have 
identified that responsibility for mass atrocities cannot be addressed by focussing 
solely on the regime of individual responsibility.104 Thus, there have been proposals 
for a coordinated interaction between the separate regimes of individual and State 
responsibility in the academic commentary. These proposals aim to address the 
limitations created by the over-reliance on the principles of individual criminal 
responsibility to address responsibility for mass atrocities and suggest that the 
regime of State responsibility can provide a range of remedies that more effectively 
deals with the prevention and suppression of international crimes.105 
Notwithstanding this consideration of the benefits achieved from a coordinated 
approach to these questions of responsibility, a problem persists, as the current focus 
in the scholarly debates has been on the coordination of processes, as opposed to 
legal rules or tests for determining responsibility.  
As discussed in Chapter One, the current tests used by the ICJ for attributing 
the conduct of individuals to States is far too under-inclusive and fails to capture the 
critical role of States in the atrocities committed by armed groups they support. This 
chapter suggests that this lacuna can be filled by expanding the proposals for 
coordinated interaction between the two regimes beyond coordination of process, 
into coordination of methods or legal tests for the assigning of responsibility. The 
proposal in this thesis is to modify the test for attribution of individual conduct to 
States by drawing on the tests used in the individual criminal law regime to deal with 
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questions of collective participation. This chapter situates this proposal in the 
scholarly debates surrounding proposals for creating a relationship between the two 
regimes of responsibility. It firstly examines the limitations of each of the regimes of 
responsibility in addressing the role of State support in mass atrocities, which is the 
issue under consideration. Secondly, it examines the existing proposals which 
advocate a relationship between the two separate regimes of responsibility. Finally, it 
discusses the current limitations of these proposals as regards the issue under 
consideration, ie the responsibility of States for support of armed groups in the 
commission of international crimes and contextualises this thesis’s contributions to 
this wider body of literature.  
2.2 The limitations of the regimes of individual responsibility 
Many commentators have identified the problematic aspects that result from 
attempting to deal with responsibility for international crimes solely at the individual 
level.106 Among all of them is the criticism that this regime does not fully reflect the 
collective dimension involved in the commission of international crimes. This is 
because international crimes are not the product of random individual offenders but 
reflect systemic causes, “i.e. situations where collective entities such as States or 
organised armed groups order international crimes to be committed, or permit or 
tolerate the committing of international crimes.”107 Thus, the historic reliance on 
international trials of individuals does not fully reflect the collective or systemic 
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nature of international crimes or pay attention to the complex historic tensions that 
motivate this collective or systemic criminality.108 
International crimes do not represent the actions of criminal individuals 
acting in isolation, but instead represent criminal individual actions that are 
contextualised within the wider system of State-condoned criminality. As Vetlesen 
argues, there is an “internalisation of ideology,”109 so there is a “communal 
engagement with violence.”110 The problem is that the individual regime of 
responsibility is individually focussed. Moreover, it revolves around Western liberal 
notions of prosecution and sanction, which may not be the most effective means of 
addressing the communal element in these crimes. Several authors have critiqued the 
regime of individual responsibility on this basis, finding that the prosecution of 
individuals simply does not fully reflect the context of collective participation in 
which this crime occurred. Alison Danner and Jenny Martinez go even further and 
critique whether the scale of mass atrocities can even be properly redressed through 
legal methods, since: 
the idea of applying legal rules and standards to the complex and chaotic 
backdrop of contemporary armed conflicts and episodes of mass atrocity is 
a bold and some would say futile effort to fix individual responsibility for 
history’s violent march…111  
Mark Drumbl, in a similar manner, takes issue with the regime of individual 
responsibility. He writes that international crimes could not have been accomplished 
were it not for the participation of the masses and part of the riddle of international 
criminal justice is to devise a way in which the law can implicate the complicit 
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masses who are responsible even if not formally guilty.112 His suggestion for this is 
integrating the norm as we currently know it with norms from other regimes of 
responsibility.113  
Hans Kelman notes that these offences are usually part of State policy and 
whereas they are typically endemic to the autocratic security State, Western 
democracies are not invulnerable to it.114 Maurice Punch supports this view, finding 
in his work that individuals “become absorbed in the group and within its solidarity” 
so that acts they would never contemplate of doing as individuals they will do within 
the group.115 For these reasons they advocate the development of an improved 
system of accountability that addresses “system generated international crime, not 
only on the part of the individual at all levels of the system’s hierarchy but on the 
part of the system itself.”116  
The core of the problem is that which was intimated in Chapter One. While 
prosecution and incarceration of an individual may satisfy the strong “retributive 
impulses in the face of monstrous wickedness”117 after the Trial, all that will remain 
is an individual being made to serve a sentence. There is some measure of 
consideration being made for victim and prisoner rehabilitation and there is the 
catharsis offered by the narrative of the crime being given in court,118 but this is 
insufficient. 
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In addition to this, there are only so many prosecutions that can be 
undertaken and prosecutions are undertaken selectively. Robert Cryer writes that 
“State practice reveals a highly selective enforcement of international crimes,”119 and 
this is a “critique that has plagued international criminal tribunals from their 
inception to date.”120 Prosecutions at Nuremberg and Tokyo were criticised as being 
victor’s justice,121 the prosecutions at the ICTY and ICTR, though not victor’s 
justice, were nevertheless criticised as being selective on the basis of the temporal 
and territorial limits to its jurisdiction,122 while the “ICC’s writ does not run 
throughout the globe.”123 Thus prosecutions are reliant on political factors since 
States must agree to its jurisdiction under Article 12(3) ARSIWA and even where 
they have ratified, they can opt out of the war crimes jurisdiction for seven years 
under Article 12(4).124  
Even though the principle of universal jurisdiction exists, national 
jurisdictions approach application of the principle in a selective manner as well. 
Some of the cases in which the principles have been invoked so far have been at the 
instance of old colonial powers such as Belgium and Spain,125 or where national 
interests have been affected.126 Moreover, even if prosecutions were not selected, the 
sheer volume of offenders that are involved, would make it impossible to call them 
all to account before their national courts, let alone the international courts and 
tribunals. In this regard, Phoebe Okowa has noted that a significant portion of the 
adult population in the Rwanda conflict was implicated but their prosecutions were 
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neither realistic nor feasible,127 since estimates were that if each person were to face 
prosecution for the genocide, the trials would take over two hundred years to be 
completed.128 
Where selectivity is not at an issue there is a further issue identified in the 
literature. Prosecutions are impossible where immunities operate as a bar to further 
proceedings. According to Dapo Akande, history suggests that international crimes 
are the work of State agents.129 The issue here is that if a State agent is either a Head 
of State or serving Foreign Affairs Minister during the conflict, he will be immune 
from prosecution in the courts of a foreign territory by virtue of the office he 
holds,130 and it is unlikely that he, as a high-level member of society, will be 
prosecuted nationally. It is only if these individuals have agreed to the jurisdiction of 
the ICC (or other international criminal tribunal) that immunities will not operate as 
a bar to prosecution.131 Therefore, even if a State official has been complicit with 
members of armed groups who commit international crimes, unless his country is a 
State party to the ICC132 or another international court or tribunal, even if the 
member of the armed group is prosecuted, he may not be. 
There may be an even further issue. In long-term conflicts where there is 
repetitive commission of international crimes by multiple individuals on a long-term 
basis, it may be impossible to hold any one individual accountable. For instance, 
David Kretzmer writes that there has been illegal occupation of parts of Palestinian 
territory,133 since the end of the Six Day War in 1967. According to him, there has 
been an active pursuit by governments of the day since then to effect a policy of 
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settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.134 In these circumstances, 
individuals are clearly settling in response to overall policy objectives of the Israeli 
State and thus the connection between the individual commission of breaches of 
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Palestinian Territory135 
and the State instruction is blurred, and further the scale of participation in the 
settlements precludes the possibility of individual prosecutions.136  
In all these numerous instances discussed in the literature, the scope of 
prosecution is thus limited and if the regime of individual criminal responsibility is 
premised on this, it cannot address the participation of multiple actors acting 
together, especially where the scale of participation is significant. Moreover, if States 
are using individuals to carry out broader ideological objectives, even if attempts are 
made to prosecute them on whatever basis, they can be easily substituted. There is 
thus a need to look to the regime of State responsibility. 
2.3 The potentials and limitations of the regime of State 
responsibility 
The regime of State responsibility looks beyond prosecution and sanction and 
addresses the collective dimension in international crimes in a far more sophisticated 
manner and there are several strengths to the regime. Yet, nevertheless, even here 
there are limitations. 
By its very nature the regime of State responsibility has the capacity to 
address the collective dimension involved in the commission of international crimes 
as it locates the role of the State in the context of the alleged breach of obligations. 
Simon Olleson and James Crawford write that owing to the “historical development 
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of international law, its primary subjects are States.”137 Although there is limited 
involvement of individuals in the field of human rights and international criminal 
law, at the end of the day only States can bring claims against each other and this 
includes situations where they bring actions under the Mavrommatis principle.138 
Even then the cause is taken up on behalf of the State. Additionally, since the 
underlying concepts of attribution, breach, excuse and consequences are general in 
character,139 they are a constant. This suggests that question of responsibility thus 
addresses the collective dimension of mass atrocities, because the regime addresses 
the injury to the State as a whole and indivisible collective entity. 
Moreover, they write that where there is an internationally wrongful act, 
there are two sets of secondary obligations that arise by law – cessation and 
reparation – both of which are codified in Chapter I ARSIWA.140  
Additionally, these secondary obligations are forward-looking. Thus, if an 
order for reparation is made, it does not mean that once the reparation is made that 
the obligation ends.141 The responsible State must continue to observe the obligation 
and thus the responsible State, according to these commentators, often must support 
their future obligations by giving assurances as to cessation or non-repetition.142 
They also address that in some instances where compensation is not possible, as with 
the Srebrenica massacre, and the finding that there was a breach of the obligation to 
prevent genocide, a declaration of the breach may be sufficient as supportive 
remedies, for example, the order to Serbia to immediately offer up for transfer to the 
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ICTY individuals who were charged under that Statute, and who were still on 
Serbian territory.143 
These secondary obligations thus move well beyond the limitations of 
individual sentencing to address multiple areas for prevention and suppression of 
atrocities or breaches of international obligations as they will be considered under 
this regime. Okowa finds that this is not to be understated. According to her, 
it is the case that in cases of mass atrocities, criminal law processes are 
placed under considerable strain, making them in such cases a partial 
solution in a continuum of accountability processes. State responsibility 
either directly or for the acts of insurgents is an important part of that 
continuum. Moreover, reparation for loss of property, surrender of suspects, 
redressing unacceptable forms of property transfer, as well as the 
repatriation of missing persons and their remains are distinctly state 
obligations, enforceable through the medium of state responsibility even in 
situations where successful individual prosecutions have been carried 
out…144 
There is a further gain to the use of this regime to address mass atrocities 
committed by armed groups. In the context of this regime, prohibition of these 
atrocities are, as noted before, peremptory norms. Bearing in mind Olleson and 
Crawford’s observation that reparation duties remain forward-looking, the 
responsible State will have to monitor its activities. According to Okowa, this has an 
intrinsic value when addressing State support of armed groups. If a finding of 
responsibility is made and there are consequent orders for reparation, this can be 
further used as a “monitoring or policing tool”145 given the “frequency of 
government involvement in internal conflicts” and the threats to public order created 
by insurgent activity.146 This, to a greater extent, allows for more effective 
deterrence and suppression of breaches that give rise to international crimes. 
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Additionally, due to the special consequences which the modern law of State 
responsibility envisages for serious breaches of peremptory norms and obligations 
erga omnes,147 several authors advocate that there is an advantage to using the 
regime of State responsibility to address international crimes as opposed to 
maintaining a narrow concentration on individual criminal responsibility.148  
The rationale underscoring the proposals from commentators advocating that 
responsibility for international crimes might be better addressed through the State 
responsibility regime is thus heavily centred on accessing these remedies. However, 
in order to access these remedies, a right of invocation must be preliminarily 
established, and a substantial part of the literature discusses the different ways in 
which this can be achieved. Zimmerman and Teichman149 and Scobbie150 argue that 
the prohibitions against international crimes are peremptory norms, creating erga 
omnes obligations; thus the commission of international crimes in turn creates a right 
of standing for non-directly injured States.151 Non-injured States can thus invoke 
these remedies and this can work in some part to assist with prevention and 
suppression of these international crimes. Some writers, de Hoogh, White and 
Nollkaemper, for instance, have gone further to suggest that, in the case of a serious 
breach of this category of obligations, the United Nations Security Council may also 
have standing to invoke the responsibility of the wrongdoing State, thereby engaging 
the range of political responses available to the Security Council, independent of its 
mandate for the maintenance of peace and security and its powers under Chapter VII 
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of the UN Charter.152 This, according to some writers, allows for greater suppression 
of international crimes because States and the Security Council as the representative 
of the international community,153 can intervene to bring to an end these 
international crimes if they present a threat to peace.154 To put it differently, the 
regime offers a more communitarian approach towards obtaining remedies for 
international crimes.155 Furthermore, some writers suggested that the State 
responsibility regime also allows for interested States to coerce responsible States 
into performance of their obligations to make reparations, through both non-military 
and military countermeasures.156  
Critically some have noted that, with international crimes, exceptional use of 
force under the UN Charter is authorised.157 According to de Hoogh, for instance, 
unlike the prohibition on the territorial integrity or political independence of States, 
“the rule prohibiting the use of force to settle disputes does not constitute a 
peremptory norm”.158 His argument was that Articles 42 and 51 of the UN Charter 
allows for this. Therefore there can be an acceptable use of force. 
However, in cases where there is an unacceptable use of force, the matter can 
be taken to the ICJ, but, as he noted, the main obstacles to achieving these remedies 
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is that it is unlikely in most instances that the wrongdoing State responsible for the 
international crime, in the absence of special agreement or some form of forum 
prorogatum, will accept adjudication by the Court.159 Moreover, he suggests that the 
remedies might themselves be unjusticiable.160 For instance, non-repetition would 
necessarily involve change of government and initiating process against relevant 
individuals.161 Additionally, it may mean reorganisation of the State, police, armed 
forces and paramilitaries and the calling of elections. This may not be an area of 
organisation the Court can become involved in, but it is an area where the Security 
Council and the United Nations might be better placed to act.162  
Other writers also see the importance of political cooperation. Nigel White 
and Vera Gowland-Debbas, for instance, see the Security Council as an enforcement 
body for the State responsibility regime because they view the measures undertaken 
by the Security Council on behalf of the injured State as being part of the State 
responsibility mechanisms.163 This means that there may be need for greater politico-
legal cooperation to give effect to these remedies. 
Further limitations of the regime have also been identified. Some 
commentators note that the resort to State responsibility as a process of 
accountability could have the unintended consequence of creating collective guilt 
and a tarnishing of the innocent alongside the guilty. Tom Erskine, in discussing this 
objection, outlined that with collective accountability there may be an unfair laying 
of blame and punishment upon many for the misdeeds of a few.164 This reasoning, 
according to him, extends responsibility to all members of a group because of the 
shared aspect of identity that allows for those not directly party to a specific action to 
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be morally blamed for the criminal actions of the agents of the group.165 This critique 
of the process had garnered attention since the question was asked after the Second 
World War of whether the “German people are collectively responsible for the 
Holocaust.”166 This is guilt by association and it forfeits the traditions of due process 
and ultimately, has the potential to harm individuals in an attempt to punish or deal 
with the collective.167  
Avia Pasternak in part agreed with this. According to her, where a group is 
collectively sanctioned then there is some measure of distribution of collective 
punishment; however she opined that notwithstanding this, there may be ways in 
which the punishment, as she puts it, can be distributed such that disproportionate 
harm could be alleviated by justifying the degree of punishment based on the level of 
associative obligations born by the group member.168 Similarly, Drumbl speaks of a 
“crude-careful” approach whereby individual members could exclude themselves 
from membership of a group.169 This is distinguishable from the purely “crude” 
approach, according to Drumbl, which simply glosses over moral differentiations 
and excuses and thus has an indiscriminate reach, and it is this approach that veers 
into collective guilt.170  
However, apart from these suggested approaches to delimit responsibility as 
far as possible, it is important to note the framework in which the State responsibility 
regime aims to be used for the prevention or suppression of international crimes or as 
it is referred to in that regime serious breaches of peremptory norms. In the main, the 
remedies afforded by the regime aim to work towards prevention and suppression by 
triggering the special consequences that ensure cessation, non-repetition and 
obstructs a third State from cooperating to facilitate the serious breach. In this 
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regard, the remedies are not calculated to criminalise the innocent or tar an entire 
society with the stigma that attaches to criminalisation, but merely to identify the 
role of the State which through its agents have supported others in commission of 
international crimes and to prevent that role from being replayed by imposing limits 
on the collective capacity to commit international crimes.  
Moreover, there is a political aspect to punishing a State that avoids 
collective punishment against the whole of society.171 For instance, punishment 
could mean imposing limits on a State’s political and military capacity – such as the 
limits imposed on German rearmament in the Treaty of Versailles172 – or it could 
mean minor restrictions on sovereignty such as enforced no-fly zones, or monitored 
guarantees to minorities or international inspection regimes.173 Even if reparations 
are ordered, “given the fungible nature of money, reparations amount to 
replacements for other uses” that might be of greater assistance to taxpayers.174 At 
the more extreme level, it may involve institution of a regime change. Thus the 
argument that collective responsibility is guilt by association obscures what Isaacs 
argues is the true nature of the sanctions, which is to examine the best way in which 
members can justly be made to bear a share of responsibility.175 In this way, there is 
an intrinsically valuable role for the State responsibility regime to play in the wider 
issues of accountability for mass atrocities. The question however remains as to how 
this can be done. 
Against this are the further limitations imposed by the juridical nature of the 
State. Under the secondary rules of attribution, a State can only be responsible up to 
the point that the conduct of individuals can be attributed to it and these 
circumstances are set out in Chapter Three. Moreover, in the case of support or 
facilitation of crimes (discussed in Chapter Three), the relationship is between 
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States, so that assistance or facilitating an international wrong by a non-State actor 
will not render that assisting State responsible in international law.176 So the system 
is very tightly drawn.  
Due to the limitations of each of these regimes towards addressing 
responsibility for mass atrocities a body of literature has developed that addresses 
possible regime interaction with a view to eliminating the barriers created in each 
independent regime through greater coordination and harmonisation. 
2.4 Existing proposals for creating a relationship between the two 
separate regimes of international law 
The proposals for creating a relationship between the two independent 
regimes attempt to remedy some of the limitations of the individual-focussed 
international criminal law regime. In the main, they perceive an identifiable role for 
the State responsibility regime to provide a corrective to the narrow concentration on 
individual responsibility,177 by providing different tools that could more properly 
deal with the systemic nature of international crimes,178 and consequently capture the 
role of States in the commission of these crimes by armed groups who operate within 
the same system. 
Within these proposals, some academic commentators have gone further to 
identify certain doctrinal approaches within the individual criminal responsibility 
regime that could usefully be applied to address the problems of collective 
criminality because they offer “several leads to dealing with the problems of system 
criminality,”179 particularly as regards the use of common purpose liability doctrines 
from Anglo-American and German legal traditions,180 because these doctrines were 
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designed specifically to deal with collective criminal conduct. It is this suggestion 
that has influenced the proposal in this thesis for modification of the tests of 
attribution. Each of these areas of commentary are now discussed with a view to 
integrating the proposal of this thesis within the larger body of academic debates 
surrounding the questions of responsibility for international crimes. 
2.4.1 The systemic nature of international crimes – the Röling thesis 
The term systemic is used in this thesis consistently. The systemic nature and 
causes of international crimes have been a recurrent theme in discussions 
surrounding questions of responsibility after the Second World War.181 Initially a 
point of philosophical discourse by Hannah Arendt in her seminal work on the trial 
of Eichmann, her repeated questioning of whether the trial of Eichmann was simply 
a failure to recognise that he could only have been a criminal in these circumstances 
because he was the product of a criminal State,182 paying credence to the early notion 
that it was not individuals so much that were criminal but the State in which they 
operated. This notion of the “criminal State” was softened somewhat by the 
introduction of discussion as to the “systemic nature of international crimes.”  
This description of the nature of international crimes as “systemic,” however, 
was first introduced by Justice Röling in 1975.183 With it began a search for a more 
holistic approach to the question of international criminal accountability by 
addressing the root causes or motivations behind them. 
Justice Röling questioned whether all post-conflict prosecutions were the 
same. To this end, in discussing the criminal responsibility of individuals for war 
crimes, he made a distinction between war crimes that were incidental or committed 
by individuals “for personal or selfish reasons in disregard of national regulations 
and superior orders”184 from “crimes committed in the national interest, as a 
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consequence of a general policy or in accord with the official attitude; crimes 
committed to serve national military goals, or illegal means used in furtherance of 
victory.”185 According to him, the former group were examples of “individual 
criminality” while the latter were examples of “system criminality because they 
expressed the tendencies of the existing system.”186 He further opined that this type 
of criminality is the most “important kind of war criminality”187 because it did not 
result from individual criminality but depended on societal forces, the effect of 
which ranged from “direct orders, through official favour, to conspicuous 
indifference.”188 The crime, in other words is caused by the “structure of the 
situation and the system.”189 He found that while national authorities may prosecute 
their own soldiers, they do so to address individual criminality not system 
criminality.  
However, in contrast, when prosecutions are undertaken before enemy or 
international courts, these are in relation to system criminality because “governments 
order crimes to be committed, or encourage the commitment, or favour and permit or 
tolerate the committing of crimes.”190 Thus, in discussing the effectiveness of 
prosecutions to enforce deterrence in these circumstances, he critiqued whether the 
laws regulating the conduct of hostilities as it obtained then was sufficient to address 
the system of overall criminality in which the violations occurred. He concluded that 
the laws were insufficient and that the ultimate solution rested with humanity’s 
common efforts towards elimination of war itself.191  
Justice Röling’s thesis that a war crime “serves the system and is caused by 
the system”192 because “governments order crimes to be committed or encourage the 
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commitment, or favour and permit or tolerate the committing of crimes”193 continued 
in his writings directed towards implementation of changes in the then current laws 
of war.194 In his publications on this area, he suggested that broadly system 
criminality was best addressed through duties being imposed on States to comply 
with the laws of war.195  
In addition, even as early as 1975, he noted that there were more than one 
hundred civil wars and that the scope of international humanitarian laws did not 
legally create duties or obligations on rebel groups.196 However, Justice Röling 
found that this “asymmetry in the obligations was justifiable” since they did “not 
take away all the power from the weak,”197 and ultimately left some power available 
to unorganised groups to stage an uprising.198 In other words, in considering 
systemic criminality, it appears that Röling either did not contemplate the possibility 
that members of an armed group might, in the course of its struggle, commit 
international crimes or that there would be a State element to this in terms of 
fundamental support, or if he did, he found this an area of potential impunity 
tolerable in the given circumstances. It is important to note that at the time he was 
writing, the level of criminality perpetrated by armed groups in the context of 
conflict were not as substantial as they are today, as the face of conflict was 
different. 
2.4.2 Development of the Röling thesis among contemporary commentators 
The description and analysis of this systemic element in the commission of 
war crimes developed initially by Röling proved influential to a body of academic 
literature that has developed since 2010.  
Profoundly influenced by Röling’s thesis, André Nollkaemper has been 
writing extensively on the topic and has sought to develop the discussion that 
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international crimes and not only war crimes maintain this distinguishable systemic 
element. In a 2010 article, Nollkaemper delimited his discussion of this thesis by 
noting that the involvement of States in international crimes does not mean that a 
State commits an international crime, since that concept of State crimes does not 
exist in positive international law.199 However, he discussed that there are “a variety 
of ways in which a wrongful act by a state can involve international crimes,” for 
instance, when they fail to prevent or punish individual perpetrators as held in the 
ICJ’s Decision in Bosnian Genocide.200 He goes further to note that during the 
Balkan wars in the 1990s, both States and organised groups maintained dominant 
roles in the atrocities committed and that this was also observed in the international 
crimes occurring in Darfur in Sudan.201 
In discussing the Balkan wars and the so-called “war on terror” post-9/11 
specifically, Nollkaemper wrote compellingly of circumstances in which the State 
furthered international crimes. According to him, 
In situations where state authorities consider that the security of the state is 
under severe threat or fear they may lose power, when they have powerful 
apparatus at their disposal charged with protecting the security of the state, 
and when they have identified groups that are defined as enemies of the 
state, collective entities themselves can turn into actors that commit or 
further the commission of international crimes. This was what happened, for 
instance, in relation to the criminal acts orchestrated or supported by 
Belgrade during the Balkan wars and also what happened during the Bush 
administration in response to the war on terror…202 
He further noted that international crimes maintained that systemic nature 
because the crimes are “systematic” in that it is part of a plan or policy that remains 
even if the individual authors of the crimes are removed, and it is this plan or policy 
that routinizes acts of violence and gives them either an express condonation through 
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legislation that perhaps will systemize discriminatory policies or allow for torture in 
particular situations.203 He cited an even more dangerous aspect of this systemic 
nature whereby governments remain impassive and systematically acquiesce while 
individuals commit international crimes to further the objectives of the State.204 This 
occurred, for instance, in Rwanda where governmental acquiescence to widespread 
commission of international crimes by citizens in churches, schools and among 
neighbours was met with chilling lack of response by the police or army because the 
State itself motivated the hateful rage that spawned these terrible acts.205 It could also 
be argued that Nollkaemper’s thesis is further evidenced by the subsequent events of 
the Balkan wars. Here, while paramilitary groups effected the massacre at 
Srebrenica, there was impassive and systematic acquiescence of the Serbian State in 
the face of these groups eliminating non-Serbs from the self-proclaimed Serbian 
Republic of Bosnia–Herzegovina. 
In sum, Nollkaemper acknowledged that the concept of a “State crime” does 
not exist. However, both States and organised groups have had dominant roles in 
international crimes. The concept of “systematic crime” therefore emerged, because 
even though aware of international crimes, States remained impassive or acquiesced 
to them.  
According to Nollkaemper, even further recognition of the systemic nature of 
international crimes is also evident in the definitions of some of the crimes 
themselves.206 For instance, under the Rome Statute Article 1(7) crimes against 
humanity refers to an exhaustive list of inhumane acts ranging from murder to 
apartheid that is committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed at 
the population.207 Critically, under Article 7(2) the clause “attack directed against 
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any civilian population” refers to multiple commissions of acts described in Article 
7(1) that are directed “against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance 
of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.”208 So too with war crimes, 
under Article 8(1) of the same instrument, the Court has jurisdiction where the 
crimes are committed as “part of a plan or policy or as part of a large scale 
commission of such crimes.”209 Although genocide does not specifically retain the 
widespread or systematic requirement, it is hard to see how the elements of the 
offence could be made out without some level of State involvement.210 According to 
Nollkaemper, although, in theory, a lone genocidaire may be theoretically possible, 
genocide as such does not seem possible without the involvement of a wider 
collectivity.211 Nollkaemper is not isolated in this opinion. Other commentators, both 
academic212 and judicial,213 have similarly noted the clear role for States in these 
crimes.  
Herbert Kelman in expressing similar views wrote that the 
“essence of international crimes, such as war crimes and crimes against 
humanity… is that they are generally not ordinary crimes but crimes of 
obedience: crimes that take place not in opposition to the authorities, but 
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under explicit instructions from the authorities to engage in these acts, or in 
an environment in which such acts are implicitly sponsored, expected or at 
least tolerated by the authorities…”214 
He, like Nollkaemper and Judge Röling, drew that critical distinction 
between these crimes and “crimes committed in violation of the expectations and 
instructions of authority.”215 The former have to be understood in the context of the 
“policy process” that gave rise to them so that either the acts are caused or justified 
by the explicit or implicit orders from superiors because the criminal action is 
supported by the authority structure in place.216 According to Kelman, the actual 
systemic causes cannot be addressed simply through the traditional individual-
focussed prosecution and sanction models, although this is contrary to the dominant 
response by the international community to deal with atrocities since the Second 
World War.217 Here he advocates that the better approach would be to address the 
systemic cause of international crimes through the State responsibility regime.  
This point has been taken further by other academic commentators as well. 
Drumbl,218 Osiel,219 Luban220 and Goldhagen221 see the systemic influence of the 
State on international crimes from a policy level. To them, it is the State that 
establishes policies of discrimination and hate mongering, and this impacts on the 
citizenry. They, like Kelman, refer to this as “collective obedience.”222  
This notion is by no means new. In the immediate aftermath of the Second 
World War, Raphael Lemkin, in lobbying for an international treaty to deal 
specifically with genocide, commented on the absolute willingness of the German 
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citizenry to give effect to the policies propounded by Hitler as leader of the Third 
Reich.223 
Often when there is the systemic element the citizenry becomes malleable 
and there are what Drumbl describes as “punitive dilemmas” as 
the border between victim and victimizers is not always firm… In episodic 
bouts of mass atrocity, victims may in fact become victimizers; persecuted 
individuals or groups may in turn persecute their persecutors or innocent 
third parties...224 
What remains key in these international crimes is that the individual 
perpetrators are not fundamental to the commission of the international crimes per 
se, but are mere cogs in a lager criminal system, so that they can be replaced and the 
commission of these crimes remain supported.225 In sum, these commentators 
suggest that reliance on individual prosecutions is reductive because it shifts 
attention away from the systemic motivation or cause of the crime. They thus make a 
morally convincing argument that justifies turning to the State responsibility regime 
to address responsibility for international crimes because they see the State as the 
criminal system that supports international crimes.  
2.5 The Major categories of interaction between State and 
individual regimes of responsibility in addressing support of 
armed groups 
There is a further thread in the commentary that discusses different ways in 
which the two regimes could interact with each other with a view to addressing State 
support of armed groups involved in mass atrocities. The interaction can occur if the 
State and the groups with which they associate can be seen as a common criminal 
organisation. Alternatively, the State can be seen to be existing in a corporate 
structure with these groups. Another way of viewing the relationship between the 
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State and group, or individuals in the group, is through the interaction of their 
processes, whereby a finding of responsibility in one regime supports a finding in the 
other as a form of “parasitic” liability, or alternatively responsibility is assigned 
separately in different regimes based on common facts. 
2.5.1 The State as a criminal organisation  
For the most part, the means by which widespread and collective crime has 
been brought to account has been through targeting the individual members of the 
group through individual prosecutions based on their role within the group. This has 
evolved to a broader scope whereby the group can be viewed as a criminal 
organisation or a criminal corporation. 
Nina Jørgensen, for instance, in her seminal work written in 2000, well 
before the ICJ’s Decision on the Merits in the Bosnian Genocide case, argued that 
the role of the State in international crimes could be analysed in terms of a criminal 
organisation model or alternatively, a corporate crime model.226 According to 
Jørgensen, the criminal organisation model was demonstrated at Nuremberg with the 
inclusion of Articles 9 to 11 in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal.227 
Under these provisions, once an individual member of any group was tried, the 
International Military Tribunal would be able to declare the organisation criminal228 
and where such a declaration was made, the IMT would have the “right to bring 
individuals to trial for membership therein before national, military or occupation 
courts.”229 There was therefore no attribution of responsibility to the group in the 
strict legal sense but a declaration of criminality against the group. Persons were 
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charged under the Indictment as either individuals or as members of a particular 
organisation.230 
Applying this model to the State, she concluded in her evaluation that the 
“declaration of criminality against an organisation such as a State need not expose 
the entire population to the threat of punishment, but enables members of the 
government and significant numbers of key criminals to be tried individually, 
preferably by an international tribunal.”231 Her argument suggests that this model, 
like the criminal organisation model used at Nuremberg, dealt with collective 
responsibility by criminalising a group and sanctioning the membership.232 The role 
of the State thus would be addressed in terms of isolating the government as a 
criminal group and holding that membership to account by trials before appropriate 
tribunals.233 In essence it would still be individual prosecutions, but critically, this 
early model suggested a means, albeit imperfect, through which the collective role of 
the State could be addressed through identification of organisations that had an 
impact on the commission of international crimes. 
According to Jørgensen, the major criticism that was levelled against use of 
these declarations related to accusations of collective criminality.234 This, to her, was 
in part averted by the requirement that membership in the group had to be voluntary 
and also the declaration created a rebuttable presumption of guilt with a reversal of 
the onus of proof,235 thereby suggesting a defence for individuals seeking to distance 
themselves from the criminal acts of the group. 
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Jørgensen’s alternative model, that of the corporate structure, suggested State 
responsibility along the lines of the principles of identification and imputation. She 
argued that under the identification theory, “the basis for liability is that the acts of 
certain natural persons are actually the acts of the corporation.”236 This is because 
these individuals are the very person of the company and thus their guilt is the guilt 
of the company.237 According to her, this theory limits the scope of responsibility to 
those who represent the corporation and thus if this theory were to be transported 
into international law, it would be the equivalent of holding the government 
collectively liable for the international crimes committed in the State.238 Again under 
this model, the question of responsibility would revolve around the prosecution of 
the leadership or government as to who will be individually answerable for 
international crimes committed in its State, notwithstanding the declaration of 
criminality made against it. 
2.5.2 Dual attribution 
Apart from this, Jørgensen found that with maturation of the law relating to 
erga omnes obligations, States will be able to determine the interplay between 
individual prosecutions and State responsibility for international crimes, because as 
prohibitions of international crimes were affirmed in some municipal courts as jus 
cogens norms, municipal courts can prosecute individuals who embody the State 
without immunity being pleaded in bar, because these crimes could never be seen as 
official acts.239 This interplay works both ways. In some instances, the decision to 
prosecute individuals is dependent on a finding of responsibility in the State 
responsibility regime. This is very evident in the prosecution of the crime of 
aggression, except here the prosecution is dependent on an initial finding of State 
responsibility.240 In this regard, some commentators have noted that, with regard to 
the crime of aggression, the course of individual prosecutions can be described as 
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being “parasitic” on a finding of State responsibility.241 She nevertheless identified a 
point of regime interaction that other commentators have discussed further and that 
is attribution of responsibility in different regimes concurrently: thus there is a dual 
attribution. 
Nollkaemper242 has developed this idea of regime interaction through 
concurrent initiation of process substantially. This has been further supported in the 
work of Beatrice Bonafé.243 Nollkaemper initially wrote in 2003 that there was 
already a concurrence between State and individual responsibility as the two regimes 
exist alongside each other and mutually support each other.244 However, he 
acknowledges that State responsibility does not depend on individual responsibility: 
in “factual terms states act through individuals.”245 Consequently, there is dual 
attribution of both State and individual responsibility for a limited number of acts, 
such as genocide, aggression, crimes against humanity or killing of protected persons 
in armed conflict. For example, Germany and Japan were both declared liable in 
international law, notwithstanding that individual prosecutions against the major war 
criminals were taking place,246 and more recently Libya was declared liable 
following the Lockerbie incident, notwithstanding the prosecution of the individuals 
responsible.247 Additionally, the fact that the State acts through individuals is 
reflected in the nature of obligations for third States falling within the scope of 
Article 40 ARSIWA and also in the consequences that flow from the breach of these 
special obligations. Where the acts of an individual who is relatively low level and 
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who has committed a breach of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm, this 
is to be distinguished from acts of high-level individuals or an individual whose 
conduct was systematic. The meeting of the seriousness threshold is important as 
Nollkaemper argues that this will trigger special consequences under Article 41 
ARSIWA, in addition to targeted remedies such as sanctions against a group, 
coercion to restore rights, or imposed arms control.248 While in the former case 
where the acts of an individual acting of his own volition, the latter case may trigger 
aggravated State responsibility.249 There is thus a linkage between the individual and 
the State for either “ordinary” or “enforcement of aggravated “responsibility”.250 
The linkage also exists when addressing simply the implementation of 
international responsibility for States. For instance, some primary norms, eg those 
existing under Article 1 of the Genocide Convention, require that intent of the State 
correspond with that of the individual since it is the only way that genocide could be 
proven. This may not apply to all primary obligations, but will be crucial in cases 
where primary obligations are dependent on questions of intent.251 This also holds 
true for implantation of the principles of attribution. He argued that it was clear that 
where the acts of individuals of high status or rank were attributed to the State, this 
should mean the special consequences under the serious breaches regime should 
follow, but he questioned whether in cases of command responsibility it would be 
equally fair to trigger the same consequences, since the commander in question did 
not commit the crimes but failed to prevent them.252  
Further, there may be cases as mentioned above where the finding in one 
regime is parasitic on the other. An example of this occurs in the prosecution of 
crimes for aggression under the Rome Statute as noted earlier. Under Art 8bis of the 
ICC Statute (inserted pursuant to Resolution RC/Res. 6 of 11 June 2010), the crime 
of aggression is defined as the “planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a 
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person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political, or 
military action of a State, of an act of aggression, which by its character, gravity and 
scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations”. 
According to some writers, “the collective act of aggression by a State is the point of 
reference for the act of the individual perpetrator.”253 The ICC Statute defines this 
act as the “use of armed force by a State against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter 
of the United Nations”. The provision allows for dual attribution in that a criminal 
conviction under this provision before the ICC is parasitic on a finding of State 
responsibility.254 In order for a finding of State responsibility to be made there must 
be an unlawful use of force. While this finding is in turn is dependent on the jus ad 
bellum, there has been some effort to make a non-exhaustive list of acts outlined in 
the ICC Statute.255 The acts that constitute acts of aggression are those detailed 
previously in General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 1974. These are 
invasion, bombardment, blockades, attack on another State’s armed forces, and “the 
sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, 
which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to 
amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.”256 
The “substantial involvement” indicates a lower threshold of involvement on 
part of the State to engage responsibility for the support of armed groups than the 
interpretation of control under Article 8 ARSIWA. According to Ruys, 
In most cases, states involved in the ‘sending of armed groups’ will have 
effective control and the conduct concerned will be attributable to the state 
pursuant to article 8 … [ARSIWA] 2001. However, if a state is only 
‘substantially involved’ this is not likely, yet the state as such will have 
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committed an act of aggression, which breaches the prohibition of the use of 
force…257 
As a matter of concurrent application of processes for attribution then the 
inclusion of the definition of aggression demonstrates regime interaction, but only up 
to a point. The provision is clearly addressed to one class of perpetrator, ie high-level 
individuals who have the authority to direct the military action of the State. 
However, although the acts of armed groups cannot be attributed to a State unless it 
satisfies the thresholds of command under Article 8 ARSIWA, if a State 
substantially becomes involved in the activities of an armed group that commits 
aggressive acts against another State, the involved State has committed an act of 
aggression and responsibility of the State is engaged.258 However, owing to a 
differentiated approach in the ICC Statute, only those in a position of leadership can 
be held responsible, thus it is not possible for lower-order officers to be guilty of 
aggression as an aider or abettor under a proposed Article 25(3)bis.259 
2.5.3 Increased use of joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility to 
charge high-level individuals 
In the preceding section the evolution of dual attribution was discussed. 
Initially, individuals were held to account but over a period of time, a method 
evolved that defined instances whereby a State can be held accountable concurrently 
with a finding of individual responsibility. This evolved further with the settling of 
the provisions on aggression at the ICC whereby a finding of aggression on the part 
of a State supported a later finding of responsibility on the individual.  
These ideas were carried further in the commentary. In a later article, 
Nollkaemper formulated a further fresh proposal to remove the systemic cause of 
criminality. While his 2003 work centred on looking towards the State responsibility 
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regime to remove the causes of egregious violations of peremptory norms,260 he 
suggested in 2010 that the individual responsibility regime was capable of uprooting 
the systemic causes of international crime through application of the doctrines of 
command responsibility and joint criminal enterprise as well as the modes of liability 
such as co-perpetration and indirect perpetration provided for in Article 25(3) of the 
Rome Statute.261 He considered that if the systemic causes of international crimes 
were motivated by leaders, then these causes could be uprooted in part, by 
prosecution of these leaders.262 He considered that if there is a climate tolerating 
abuses, then removal of the military commander who fails to control this will be of 
assistance. So too, he noted that the liberal and expansive interpretation given to JCE 
by international courts and tribunals can connect the individual with the different 
collective entities he associated or participated with in the commission of 
international crimes.263 Moreover, he argued that the doctrine could allow for 
prosecution of the main participants and thus their removal would put an end to the 
systemic criminality.264. 
Bonafé, also writing in 2009, also put forwards a similar argument. 
According to Bonafé, international crimes are committed at the collective level. In 
other words, the individual participates in a collective crime and thus international 
criminal law has relied heavily on modes of responsibility that reflect this collective 
dimension, such as JCE, “command responsibility,” and earlier on the concept of 
criminal organisations.265 She has suggested that the “particular methodology in the 
judicial establishment of individual criminal liability inevitably resembles that used 
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to ascertain aggravated State responsibility,”266 because the same “context of 
collective criminality is at the basis of both kinds of international accountability.”267 
This is true because in most instances there is dual attribution to States and 
individuals for atrocities emanating out of the same events.268 She continues that 
once the assessment of the collective commission of the international crimes is 
carried out, the regimes further require “the application of specific rules on 
attribution to an individual or State.”269 She herself did not discuss what the rules 
should be, but considered that the Tadić Decision by the ICTY proved to be an 
important contact in creating a relationship between State and individual 
responsibility.270 In her closing summaries to her thesis she suggested that 
aggravated state responsibility and individual criminal liability are to be 
seen under a unitary framework. State and individual responsibility for 
international crimes could have been conceived in (almost) perfect isolation 
at a time when international criminal law was applied episodically under 
exceptional circumstances. But the rapid development of international 
criminal law and its increasing focus on mass atrocities and state leaders’ 
liability have significantly brought to the surface the problems associated 
with the overlap between the state and individual responsibility for the same 
crimes…271 
It is this suggestion that State and individual responsibility are part of a 
unitary framework that resonates with this thesis. To put it more dramatically, David 
Luban describes the situation as re-labelling acts of State violence as crimes and in 
this way a curious drama is played out: not “Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark, 
but rather a Prince without Denmark.”272 In other words, the individual bears 
responsibility, but his role in the State system is ignored for the purpose of 
responsibility. For instance, Milošević is responsible for international crimes and yet 
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the State apparatus implicated in the crimes is untouched.273 The isolation of 
international criminal law from State responsibility is artificial because there is a 
clear connection between a State’s responsibility in international law and the State 
leader’s liability. Since both regimes address responsibility for different actors 
arising from the same facts, the manner in which attribution of conduct to States and 
also the assigning of responsibility to individuals is important. The tests of 
attribution should be reviewed, so that the that modes of responsibility that are used 
to address the complicity of State leaders with armed groups for the purposes of 
criminal responsibility can likewise be considered when addressing the issues of 
State responsibility that derive from the same relationship between State leaders and 
members of armed groups who go on to commit international crimes. There is room 
for this progression in the law on State responsibility. Liesbeth Zegveld has 
advanced a further proposal for addressing this through a consideration of 
interactions between the two regimes of responsibility. 
2.5.4 Triple attribution 
Zegveld in her thesis incorporated a discussion of the full range of these 
interactions in her discussion as to the possible ways in which responsibility for the 
commission of international crimes by armed groups could be addressed in 
international law from both the State and individual regimes as a matter of positive 
law.274 Like Nollkaemper and Bonafé, she argued that this could happen 
concurrently. Through asking the question “who is accountable under international 
law for the acts committed by armed opposition groups or for the failure to prevent 
or repress these acts,”275 she suggested that accountability applied at three levels – 
that of the individual, the group and the State. According to Zegveld, 
At the first and lowest level, individuals who actually committed the crime 
can be held accountable. At the second level, superiors are potentially 
accountable on the basis of command responsibility. At the third level, the 
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state itself may be accountable, in that it is responsible for the acts of its 
agents…276 
She has argued that there are customary obligations under Common Article 3 
of the Geneva Conventions277 and under the provisions to Additional Protocol II278 
and because there is strong case law from the jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR 
that shows that individuals have been prosecuted for breaches of these provisions.279 
While Nollkaemper and Bonafé had suggested command responsibility as 
being appropriate to address systemic perpetration of international crimes, she went 
further and identified two strands of command responsibility for group leaders – 
direct responsibility for the international crime in cases where the group leader 
ordered or incited the crime and “command responsibility properly speaking”280 for 
failure to exercise due diligence to prevent or repress unlawful conduct.281  
Beyond this, a State is responsible where there is an adoption of the acts of 
armed groups by the State or where the armed group later becomes the government 
of the day.282 Thus in circumstances where neither of these occur, there will be no 
responsibility. Her focus on the third level of responsibility, ie State responsibility 
for international crimes committed by armed groups, was based on the nexus 
between control over the territory in which the crimes occurred and focussed on the 
duties of prevention.283 She suggested that States could be responsible in their own 
capacity, ie for breach of their duties to take preventative actions on their territory.284  
As with the dual attribution model, there is still a gap in accountability. 
Zegveld has defended this position by stating that “the [S]tate is not an all powerful 
entity, it cannot give an absolute guarantee at the international level that no harmful 
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actions will be committed on its territory.”285 However, the events of the past two 
decades have shown an escalation of commission of armed groups in international 
crimes. In addition, often these groups are being supported by State patrons outside 
their territory of operation. Thus the proposals from Zegveld, although they go a 
long way in addressing the responsibility of different actors, still leave a gap in 
accountability.  
In a recent publication, Cedric Ryangaert reinforces Zegveld’s thesis in his 
conclusions on the question of State responsibility for the conduct of non-State 
actors. According to him, there are a limited number of scenarios that allow for 
attribution of non-State actor conduct to the State under the ARSIWA.286 Where this 
is not possible, the States that had the “capacity to influence the non-State actor” is 
not so much responsible for the acts of the non-State actor, but for its own failure to 
exercise due diligence.287 However, the question that results from this is whether this 
positivist focus in the academic commentaries properly considers the impact that 
some levels of State influence or whether they minimise the impact this influence 
may have had on the members of the armed group being later able to commit 
international crimes. Thus the limits of these proposals in examining the role of 
partisan States in the commission of international crimes by armed groups needs 
further probing. 
2.5.5 Modifying the test of attribution of conduct of individuals to States  
In total, the literature suggests that the way forwards in identifying State 
responsibility for criminal acts of armed groups derives from an interaction between 
the two separate regimes. So far the literature has suggested that interaction to be 
best with concurrent application of legal process or through viewing the activities of 
the State through particular lens, ie as an organisation or corporation, upon which 
acts are imputed on the basis of systemic or structural relationships. 
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However, in his Dissenting Judgment in the Bosnian Genocide case, Vice 
President Al Khasawneh suggested a further means of addressing State responsibility 
for the criminal acts of armed groups. Instead of simply suggesting the possible 
means of locating responsibility for States through a concurrent initiation of process 
between the two regimes, there was the further suggestion to actually vary the test of 
attribution that was defined in Nicaragua.288 His proposed variation derived from the 
fact that there was a common set of objectives between the Serbian State and the 
paramilitary groups they supported. 
This was a distinguishable situation from Nicaragua,289 as based on the 
activities during that conflict, the objectives there plainly was to replace the 
government. He opined that those 
objectives, however, were achievable without the commission of war crimes 
or crimes against humanity. The Contras could indeed have limited 
themselves to military targets in the accomplishment of their objectives. As 
such, in order to attribute crimes against humanity in furtherance of the 
common objective, the Court held that the crimes themselves should be the 
object of control…290 
However, where the activities during the conflict indicated that the criminal 
acts of the group were in fact based on a shared objective in the commission of 
international crimes the situation should be assessed differently. In those 
circumstances he opined to require 
both control over the non-State actors and the specific operations in the 
context of which international crimes were committed is too high a 
threshold…291 
According to him, the “inherent danger in such an approach is that it gives 
States the opportunity to carry out criminal policies through non-State actors or 
surrogates without incurring direct responsibility”.292 Consequently, he advocated 
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the crucial issues raised in the Tadić Appeals Decision, “different types of activities, 
particularly in the ever-evolving nature of armed conflict, may call for subtle 
variations in the rules of attribution.”293 
Since the overall control test may not always be “proximate enough to trigger 
State responsibility,”294 he has proposed a solution in these circumstances by 
enlarging the space for interaction between the two separate regimes of 
responsibility by modification of the tests of attribution. 
2.6 Alternatives to modifying the test of attribution of conduct of 
individuals to States 
There is a separate area in the commentary that has proposed an alternative 
solution to the issues raised in this thesis in relation to States’ involvement with 
armed groups and the current gap in their accountability before positive international 
law.295 In his 2015 publication, Miles Jackson similarly addressed the role States in 
the commission of international crimes.296 In his work he accepted that as a 
“baseline,”297 “it is foundational in international law that state responsibility requires 
the attribution of conduct to the state.”298 Noting that the tests of attribution are 
based on the principles of agency whereby it is the nature of the relationship that had 
to be assessed, so that only where a non-State entity was a de facto organ because the 
tests of complete dependence or strict control was observed could the State be found 
responsible for the acts of these individuals.299 According to him, both of these tests 
denoted the search for a relationship of principle to the agent. 
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In his thesis he noted that the essentially bilateral origins of international law 
considered States as the primary bearer of rights and obligations.300 As a result, there 
was no regulation for the wrongful conduct of non-State actors and consequently this 
meant that States could never be responsible for complicity with such actors under 
international law “because there was no wrong to which a State might be linked by 
the complicity rule”.301 This view is supported on the provisions of Article 16 
ARSIWA which identifies responsibility for aid and assistance in internationally 
wrongful acts, only in State-to-State relationships. 
However he argued that there is has been a development of a lex specialis 
regime of “attribution based on complicity [that] has developed in the Inter-
American Court System,”302 whereby breach of a State’s territorial obligations under 
international law, whereby the State failed in its duty to prevent violations would 
constitute a breach of the State’s positive obligations.303 Under the developing lex 
specialis in that legal system he found that the lex specialis rule was an attempt by 
this court “to supplement in cases of culpable state participation, state responsibility 
for violations of a positive obligation with attribution of the non-State actor’s 
conduct to the state.”304  
Here his critique is that the approach of the Inter-American Court denies the 
coherence of the current framework of attribution that separates primary rules from 
secondary and thus the lex specialis suggests that the secondary rules are “primary 
rule dependent” and this creates confusion in the law.305 Moreover, the lex specialis 
account is simply sweeping complicit conduct into the broader due diligence 
obligations as obtains within the Inter-American System.306 
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He further notes another alternative whereby a further lex specialis has arisen 
in cases related to armed attacks in the context of terrorism and aggression generally. 
According to Jackson, there is in an emerging principle in State practice whereby the 
rules of attribution are defined by complicity as opposed to agency.307 Here he 
argues that, for instance, the comments of George Bush who stated that “by aiding 
and abetting murder, the Taliban is committing murder… and we make no 
distinction between terrorists and those who harbour them,”308 points to a lex 
specialis that these acts are attributable to the State and in these instances can be 
seen to be capable of triggering a right to self-defence under the UN Charter.309 
His argument that in these rare situations, although a “clearly expressed lex 
specialis” can give rise to a varying of the tests of attribution, it is necessary “to 
apply the same rules across different substantive areas of international law,”310 but 
his fear is that “responsibility of this kind does not fit easily with the historical 
structure of international law.”311 In this way, Jackson, like the earlier commentators, 
has detected the lacuna in the law relating to State responsibility for this powerful 
new entity that has emerged on the international scene. This thesis, like his, seeks to 
fill that gap in accountability but through different suggestions as it challenges the 
putative rules of attribution, and this is discussed in the next section. 
2.7 Situation of this thesis within the existing literature 
As this thesis has indicated, States supporting armed groups who commit 
international crimes are not caught under the current under-inclusive tests of 
attribution in the regime of State responsibility. In order to revise this position, an 
enhanced model of attribution could be designed. It can draw on the models used in 
international law, but this can only be done if there is an expansion of the different 
ways in which the separate regimes of responsibility interact with each other. 
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As the literature has highlighted, the interaction between the two regimes is 
based on the development of a body of commentary that has advocated that a 
relationship be created between the two regimes of State and individual 
responsibility. As has been discussed in the preceding sections there have been five 
major categories of interaction identified in the literature so far which provide a 
more harmonised approach towards the question of responsibility by drawing 
together the two fragmented, disparate regimes together. Each of these in some 
measure also addresses the question of State involvement with armed groups in 
international crimes. 
If the five categories were to be viewed along a continuum, at the earliest, 
most rudimentary stage is the proposal that was that found in Jørgensen’s 
commentary312 and in some of Nollkaemper’s early proposals,313 to consider the 
State as an organisation, so that the acts of its membership would be imputed to it on 
the basis of that voluntary association and also because the Heads of State would be 
the embodiment of the organisation. If armed groups’ operations were to be brought 
within these models, then the State would be responsible for their acts through the 
simple act of imputation. The limitations on these models are that they would require 
some clear legislative or treaty enactment to enable the model to work. The model 
was created by the IMT, but it was done in the formative stages of post-Second 
World War reckoning and similar State consensus might now be lacking. 
Furthermore, the nature of the commission of international crimes has since changed 
and international relations as they now stand, may be averse to such harsh and 
blanket imputations of responsibility. 
Moving forwards are the proposals for concurrent initiation of legal process 
or dual attribution in the two separate regimes of individual and State responsibility. 
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Here commentators such as Okowa314 suggest either parasitic processes whereby 
process and sanction under one regime should ground process being initiated in 
another. Alternatively, Nollkaemper315 suggests that sometimes there could be a 
concurrent approach as the determination of issues in one regime is required to 
support a finding being made in the other. Thus if aggression were to be examined, 
for example, a State may not be responsible for participating in an international 
crime committed by an armed group, but it may well be responsible for an act of 
aggression because the test of substantial involvement, as Ruys316 has suggested, is 
far lower to determine if an act of aggression has occurred. This way high-level 
individuals may be found personally responsible and thus this may be related to their 
interaction with the armed group as that finding is derived from the finding in the 
State responsibility regime. This way, although high-level individuals may be found 
responsible, it is an individually focussed approach that does not address questions 
of responsibility in the context of State responsibility. This is because the declaration 
of an act of aggression simply grounds the conviction of an individual and there are 
no sanctions that can be attached to the State as a result such as cessation, reparation, 
orders for surrender of fugitives or the like. The parasitic finding of responsibility 
reinforces the individual criminal regime, it does not strictu sensu address State 
responsibility for supporting armed groups when those groups commit international 
crimes. 
Moving along the continuum, the proposals from Nollakamper317 and 
Bonafé318 suggest that enhanced use of the modes of responsibility such as joint 
enterprise or command responsibility would expand the range of prosecutions of 
high-level actors who are complicit to varying degrees in the actions of the physical 
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perpetrators. This would have a knock-on effect by removing high-level controlling 
figures from the State machinery and destabilising its capacity for continued crimes. 
Again, there is a limitation on this as if the systemic element is deeply engrained and 
there is infrastructure in the State to continue to support armed groups, then the 
removal of an individual is not final as individuals can be replaced, no matter how 
instructive they are in the policy of the crimes. 
Moving even further ahead, is the use of triple methods of attribution. 
Independent of each other, individuals or States can be considered responsible in 
each regime and thus the systems work in tandem. Proposals such as those put 
forwards by Zegveld319 are that individuals, groups and States can each be 
considered responsible based on their breach of positive obligations under 
international law. However even here there are limitations. While individuals can be 
prosecuted either on the basis of their own acts of for their complicity as 
commanders in failing to prevent the commission of crimes, States can only have the 
acts of individuals attributed to them in limited circumstances. Finally, the last point 
on the continuum is the broad proposal put forwards by dissenting Judge, Vice 
President Al Khasawneh in the Bosnian Genocide case.320 While the proposals so far 
suggest coordination of the two regimes, Judge Al Khasawneh proposes that the 
interaction be a point of fusion. The test of attribution of conduct of individuals can 
be modified by drawing on the concepts and principles from the individual criminal 
regime. Since both regimes are premised on the same shared facts and the crimes 
result from the same system, there is a common ground that can support this 
proposed interaction by cross-fertilisation of tests. 
It is at this point along the continuum that this thesis is situated. The tests of 
attribution should be reviewed, so that the approaches considered in assigning 
criminal responsibility under the modes of responsibility that are used to address 
State leaders’ participation with armed groups for the purposes of criminal 
responsibility can likewise be considered when addressing the issues of State 
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responsibility that derive from the same relationship between State leaders and 
members of armed groups. There has been no rigorous examination as to what this 
modified test of attribution should factor in, what elements it should incorporate or 
what doctrines it could draw on and whether there is a common rationale between 
the two regimes of responsibility to support this proposal or whether further cross-
fertilisation from the human rights regime could also assist. 
The thesis aims to start the conversation about this change. This is something 
further commentators could continue to examine and critique so that proposed 
meaningful suggestions from those new debates could pass to the lex lata.  
The subsequent chapters systematically develop this model for enhanced 
accountability and thus move the continuum further along in the quest to address the 
pivotal role of States in systems where armed groups integrate with them and then 





Chapter Three: Attribution of Conduct of Non-State Armed 
Groups to States under the Current Regime of 
State Responsibility  
3.1 The key role of attribution in the State responsibility regime 
and the early debate on attribution  
In developing this model of enhanced accountability through modifications to 
the positive tests for attribution, the first port of call is to examine the fundamental 
role of attribution and discuss the early debates as to its inclusion in the overall 
framework of international responsibility. It is no exaggeration to say that the system 
of State responsibility turns on the tests for attribution. It is the fulcrum of the 
process through which a State will be held responsible for violations of international 
law. Since the State is an abstraction, it can only be found responsible for violations 
of international law to the extent that acts of individuals can be attributed to it. A 
critical aspect in the development of the law in relation to attribution was the 
recognition of different categories of individuals whose acts could properly be 
classed as acts of State. The development of the law is indicative that the 
prescription of the legal test for attribution has been part of an evolutionary process, 
in which the rationale and objectives have adapted to the ever-changing politico-
legal context, so that as inter-State relationships have evolved and responded to new 
dynamics, so have the tests of attribution. The proposals put forwards for variation 
are thus set against this continuum of development, whereby the modifications are 
placed against the current face of armed conflict and the roles States may play in 
them.  
3.1.1 The early debates on attribution 
According to early natural law scholars, a State was a complete entity made 
up by the collection of persons who associated within it.321 According to Hobbes, a 
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State was a “multitude of men, united as one person by a common power.”322 This 
common power was initially the sovereign. However, over a period of time the 
political structures began to shift and sovereign States started to proliferate.323 Thus, 
the way in which a sovereign or later the sovereign State was considered responsible 
to other States for the conduct of individuals within the State became a relevant field 
for scholarly discourse in the development of ideas that helped shape the law of 
international responsibility. 
Belli and Gentili, both writing in the late sixteenth century, proposed 
circumstances whereby acts of citizens would be imputed to the sovereign.324 So, for 
instance, Belli found that a sovereign was responsible to other States for losses 
inflicted by his own soldiers and Gentili suggested that a sovereign was responsible 
for injuries to the envoy of another State, so that the envoy’s sending State also 
retained a right to take countermeasures against the host State.325 Discussion of 
circumstances as to which acts of citizens could be imputed to their sovereign 
continued through the works of Zouche,326 Pufendorf327 and, later Wolff.328 
Wolff considered the circumstances in which the conduct of a private 
individual could be imputed to the State. According to him, if an individual injures 
the citizen of another State of his own volition, then the situation would be 
distinguishable from a situation where he causes injury on the instruction of the 
                                                 
 
322
 JCA Gaskin (ed), Thomas Hobbes: The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic Part I Human 
Nature and Part II De Corpore Politico (Oxford University Press 1999) 107. 
323
 J Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2nd
 
edn, Oxford University Press 2006) 
6. 
324
 See Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (n 98) 3-4, citing P Belli De Re Militari et 
Bello Tractactus (1563) Pt X, Ch. II (transl Nutting 1936) 296-8; A Gentili, De Legationbus (1594) 
Bk II, Ch. VI (transl Laing 1924) 72, 76; A Gentili De Jure Belli (1612) BK III, Chs. XXIII-XXIV 
(transl Rolfe 1933) 421-9. 
325
 Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (n 98) 5. 
326
 R Zouche, Juris et judicii fecialis (1650) Pt I, ss V, X (27, 53) Pt II s V (106-11) (transl JL Brierly, 
Carnegie Institution of Washington, DC 1911) 106-111, cited in Crawford, State Responsibility: The 
General Part (n 98) 11-12.  
327
 S Pufendorf, Elementorum Jurisprudentiae Universalis, Bk II Axiom I s 9 (215-216) (transl WA 
Oldfather, Clarendon Press 1938) 103-104, cited in Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part 
(n 98) 14-15. 
328
 C Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum (1764) Ch III, 140ff (transl JH Drake, 





sovereign or in circumstances where the sovereign later approves the deed.329 In the 
latter case, Wolff found that the injury is not only to the injured citizen, but also to 
the State to which he belongs.330 Vattel developed these ideas further by including 
wide duties to make reparation in these circumstances.331 So that in addition to being 
held responsible, States would also be under a duty to punish the offender or 
relinquish him.332  
Moving forwards into the twentieth century, Anzilotti further contributed to 
this corpus of work by stipulating that imputation is a process of law within itself 
and, as such, carries its own rules that are distinguishable from the cause of the 
injury to the State.333 Crawford noted that Anzilotti’s work introduced State 
responsibility as a distinct topic and though his treatment was generalised, other 
writers such as Clyde Eagleton and Edwin Borchard did further work on 
systematizing it.334  
Borchard, writing in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, 
focussed his work on a consideration of the injuries suffered by foreign nationals as a 
result of the conflict.335 Commenting on the substantial body of nineteenth-century 
case law coming out of the Mixed Claims Commissions and in particular the 
Alabama336 Arbitration Decision, he observed that up to that point the law was such 
that governments were responsible for injuries suffered by aliens, because they failed 
to protect the foreign persons on their territory.337 He noted that the Mixed Claims 
Commission found that this protection could extend to foreign nationals against 
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wrongful acts committed by individuals belonging to mobs338 and insurgents.339 
Thus the Commission suggested that even where individual conduct could not be 
attributed to the State, because it was a private act, the State would still be 
responsible because it failed in its obligation to protect the foreign nationals. 
Interestingly, at this point the language of the commentators changed from one of 
“imputation” of conduct to the State to that of “attribution”.  
These ideas were also considered by the sub-committee created to report on 
State responsibility at the 1924 meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations.340 
According to the sub-committee, since the State is an abstract entity, it must provide 
itself with organs to exercise its powers.341 Thus, while the illegal acts of officials 
were clearly attributable to the State, the same did not hold true for the acts of 
private individuals.342 This was distinguishable from the concept of State 
responsibility discussed by Borchard.343 While Borchard concentrated on the primary 
obligations of States to keep foreign nationals safe, the sub-committee raised a 
different idea that international responsibility is the responsibility of States for the 
acts of their organs.344 There was thus a distinction between international 
responsibility based on the attribution of conduct of State organs and international 
responsibility arising from failure by the State to protect aliens from injury caused by 
mobs or insurgents. 
Later, Eagleton, in the first discrete treatise on State responsibility, discussed 
this further and dedicated separate chapters to four classes of persons whose illegal 
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conduct could be attributed to the State, namely agents of the State,345 individuals,346 
mobs or insurgents347 and a further group he described as “responsible persons”.348  
In all four classes, Eagleton identified the establishment of the “criterion of 
control” as the key basis for finding a State responsible for the acts of individuals. 
According to him, one of the foundation stones of the international system was that, 
where a State has control within its territorial limits, it was to be assumed to protect 
the alien from injury committed by its nationals.349 This then translated into duties to 
prevent injuries to the alien by providing domestic laws in line with international 
obligations that ensured the protection of the alien and his property.350 This in turn 
was measured by a standard of due diligence, the observance of which was assessed 
on a practical basis.351 Failure to exercise this created obligations upon the State to 
provide redress, so that the injured alien was entitled to reparation for injuries 
suffered.352 
However, with agents the same rights for reparation arose, but only if the 
injury was caused by a person who was regarded as an organ of the State. According 
to Eagleton, “[s]ince the state is an abstract entity, it must in order to find expression, 
provide itself with organs wherewith to exercise its powers.”353 Eagleton noted that, 
when a State provides an individual with the authority to act on its behalf, the acts of 
that individual become the acts of the State itself, which is then responsible for the 
act of any of these agents.354 Eagleton concentrated on de jure organs; in addition, he 
was clear that attribution of illegal conduct could only occur where there was control 
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over the agent, either through authorisation of the act or through negligence in the 
supervision of him.355 Thus, for instance, he classed soldiers who were acting outside 
their instructions as being personally responsible and not incurring the responsibility 
of the State.356 Beyond this with other groups such as mobs or insurrectionists and 
“responsible persons,” ie colonies under the British rule, “the slide rule upon which 
responsibility must always be calculated is the rule of due diligence.”357 
Taken as a whole, the period from Belli to Eagleton introduced a duty on 
States to protect aliens and their property on their territory and as well the separate 
process for attributing breach of those obligations to States, in circumstances where 
breach of these obligations was the result of actions from individuals that were 
recognised as organs of the State or where there was a failure to supervise such 
individuals. These ideas further evolved with the codification of the law that 
culminated, in 2001, with the adoption ARSIWA, and their associated 
Commentaries.358 
3.2 Attribution in the work of the ILC 
The work by the ILC on what was to become the ARSIWA was part of its 
mandate of “encouraging the progressive development of international law and its 
codification.”359 The Articles benefitted from two phases of reading, the first from 
1969 to 1996 and second from 1996 to 2001 before their final implementation. The 
Articles benefitted from the input of four different Rapporteurs who worked on 
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them: Roberto Ago (1963–1979), Willem Riphagen (1979–1986), Gaetano Arangio-
Ruiz (1987–1996) and James Crawford (1997–2001).360 
Concerted work on defining the rules regarding attribution was carried out 
during Roberto Ago’s tenure as Special Rapporteur, particularly as regards the 
treatment of entities which are not organs of the State. While the thrust of emerging 
law on attribution had previously focussed on attribution of conduct of State organs 
only, Ago’s draft presented eleven provisions relating to the circumstances in which 
conduct of individuals, not immediately classed as organs of the State, could 
nevertheless be attributed to the State.361 In the Report of the ILC to the General 
Assembly, it was observed that it was a fundamental rule that acts of individuals or 
collective entities which have the status of organs under the internal law of the State 
are acts of the State and are therefore attributable to it for the purpose of establishing 
its international responsibility.362 This rule was codified in Draft Article 5. In this 
regard, the ILC noted that this rule was not absolute and it should not be considered 
that all acts of de jure organs were automatically attributable to the State.363 In its 
Commentary to Draft Article 5, the ILC further commented that there were cases 
which indicated that, since organs are individuals, in each case it would be necessary 
to understand whether the individual acted as an organ or as a private individual.364 
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Likewise, the ILC noted that “certain acts of individuals who do not have the 
status of organs of the State may likewise be attributed to the State in international 
law and thus become a source of responsibility to be borne by that State.”365 This 
was the case with regard to the actions of individuals or entities which exercised 
elements of governmental authority, even though they were not de jure organs of the 
State.366 The rationale for this was that these entities perform specific services for the 
community and thereby exercise functions which constitute elements of government 
authority.367  
The ILC also discussed another possible basis of attribution, which had not 
been considered meaningfully up to that point. Draft Article 8 discussed 
responsibility of the State based on attribution of responsibility for persons acting on 
its behalf.368 The provision in question covered individuals who were not formally 
organs under the internal law of the State, but nonetheless acted on behalf of the 
State in particular circumstances. This was a limited area. The ILC considered that 
an example of this would be in the context of an armed conflict, where private 
citizens take up arms to defend themselves or assumed administrative roles because 
the de jure organs of the State are no longer able to act.369 It further contemplated 
that this attribution could also occur in cases where States supplement their action by 
utilising private persons who act as “auxiliaries” while remaining outside the 
structure of the State.370 
In these circumstances, the ILC found that it was necessary to look for a “real 
link” between the person performing the act and the State machinery rather than a 
“lack of formal legal nexus between them.”371 The ILC found that there were two 
situations where this had occurred in State practice: where auxiliaries were deployed 
in armies or the police or where persons were employed to carry out particular 
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missions in foreign territory.372 However, the scope of responsibility was limited 
only to circumstances where proof was established that the private individuals were 
actually appointed and “performed a given task at the instigation of those organs.”373  
Further, Draft Article 11 provided that in some instances a State could be 
responsible depending on the level of participation or complicity of its organs in the 
acts or omissions committed by the private entities by failing to protect against the 
acts these individuals committed.374 The ILC included within the ambit of this 
Article situations where the State may incur responsibility for the acts of armed 
bands or groups.375 According to the Commentary to Draft Article 11, they are de 
facto State organs where an armed band maintains links with the government of the 
country where they are based and the government is known to 
encourage and even promote the organisation of such groups, to provide 
them with financial assistance, training and weapons, to co-ordinate their 
activities with those of its own forces to the point that they are acting in 
concert with and at the instigation of the State and perform missions 
authorised by or even entrusted to them by that State.376 
It is important to note that the Commentary to the Article noted that these are 
by no means clear situations.377 
Under Crawford, consideration of the circumstances for attribution was 
further developed and the relevant Articles finalised. However, some of the 
proposals put forwards by Ago were not included in the final set. In the adopted set 
of Articles there are eight provisions which address the circumstances in which 
conduct may be attributed to the State, some of which are most directly relevant to 
the question of State responsibility for support of armed groups. 
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Article 4 codifies the basic principle that the conduct of “any State organ 
shall be considered an act of that State under international law”.378 It specifies that an 
organ is any person or entity that has that status under internal law whether the organ 
exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it 
holds in the organisation of the State and whatever its character as an organ of the 
central government or of a territorial unit of the State.379 The Commentary to the 
Article indicates that this is the first principle of attribution for the purposes of State 
responsibility and that the term “State organ” covers all the individual or collective 
entities which make up the organisation of the State and act on its behalf.380 The 
definition of organ further includes organs of “any territorial government entity as 
within the State on the same basis as the central governmental organs of that 
State.”381 This particularly addressed the situation of federal States which had no 
separate legal personality of its own. This was distinguishable from situations where 
constituent units could enter into treaty relations independently.382  
In its 2007 Decision in the Bosnian Genocide case, the ICJ described Article 
4 as reflecting existing customary rules.383 The ICJ has interpreted the phrase “State 
organs” in the Decision in the Bosnian Genocide case along the same lines as the 
previous Decision in the Nicaragua case, that acts of persons or entities may be 
attributed to the State for the purposes of international responsibility, “provided that 
in fact the persons, groups or entities act in ‘complete dependence’ on the State.”384 
The ICJ noted that this was the case where the persons or entities do not have status 
as organs under the internal law of the State.385 In these circumstances, these persons 
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or entities can be “equated with state organs.”386 They are, in other words, de facto 
State organs.387  
Further, Article 5 ARSIWA provides that where persons or entities exercise 
elements of governmental authority, their acts are similarly attributable to the 
State.388 In this way a State cannot avoid responsibility by privatising or delegating 
particular acts.389 The acts of these person or entities will continue to engage the 
responsibility of the State, even in circumstances where their acts were committed 
ultra vires.390 Further, where individuals form part of an organ that was placed at the 
disposal of one State by another, then the responsibility of the former State would be 
engaged under Article 6.391 The Articles also provided that State responsibility will 
be engaged in circumstances where persons or groups of persons exercise elements 
of governmental authority in the absence or default of the regular governmental 
authorities.392  
Separately, Article 10 also provided for circumstances whereby acts were 
committed by private individuals such as insurgents could be attributable to the 
State.393 These acts do not engage State responsibility unless the insurgent later 
becomes the government of the State or succeeds in establishing a new State.394 If 
the insurgents are unsuccessful then their acts cannot be attributed to the State.395 
Apart from these provisions, Article 11 provides that where conduct which is not 
attributable to the State, it can nevertheless be considered an act of that State if the 
State acknowledges the acts and adopts it as their own.396 A good example of this 
occurred in the Diplomatic and Consular Staff case cited in the Commentary to the 
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Article.397 Here militants seized the United States embassy in Iran and held the 
personnel hostage. The Ayatollah later announced that he authorised a policy that 
would maintain the occupation and detention of the hostages.398 This was sufficient 
for the ICJ to attribute the conduct of those individuals to the State. 
Of these Articles, 4, 10 and 11 thus identify three clear categories where 
conduct of armed groups can potentially be attributed to the State. Under Article 4, 
according to the interpretation of State organs by the ICJ as including persons, 
groups or entities act in “complete dependence” on the State,399 if these armed 
groups as the later section will discuss, are completely dependent the State will be 
responsible in international law. Additionally, where insurgents are successful in 
their conquest and establish a new State or replace the regime they were in 
opposition to, then the actions of the insurgent group can be attributed to the new 
State. Alternatively, under Article 11, if the State adopts or acknowledges the acts of 
the armed group then State responsibility is patently made out. While the latter two 
examples are fairly straightforward matters, the former is not as determining 
“complete dependence” is a question of fact and the concept is subject to 
interpretation by the ICJ.  
Beyond this there is another category under which the acts of armed groups 
can be attributed to States identified in the ARSIWA. Under Article 8, the conduct of 
a person or group shall be considered an act of State under international law, if the 
person or group of persons are in fact acting under the instructions of, or under the 
direction or control of that State in carrying out the conduct.400 In its 2007 Decision 
in the Bosnian Genocide case, the ICJ noted that Article 8 reflects existing 
customary rules.401 This interpretation was based on an acceptance of the approach 
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used by the ICJ in the earlier Nicaragua case.402 There the ICJ opined that for the 
United States to be found responsible for violations of international law403 
committed by the Contra rebels which the USA were funding and assisting, it would 
have to be proven that the USA had “effective control over the military operations in 
the course of which the violations were committed.”404 
The principles of attribution under Articles 4 and 8 are crucial as they 
directly address the assessment of the level of State support that will be necessary to 
establish State responsibility. The ICJ were very focussed on the Nicaragua 
standards of control and dependence. These adopted Articles furthermore have also 
been interpreted and applied in a very strict and somewhat literal manner. This is 
notwithstanding that the earlier Ago drafts commented that the situations of 
attribution where armed bands maintain links with the State are by no means clear.405 
The issue then is whether the ICJ is placing an overly strict and literal interpretation 
of Articles 4 and 8 that is masking the real link between the supporting State and the 
armed group. This is explored in the next section.  
3.3 The ICJ’s approach to attribution to a State of the conduct of 
non-State armed groups  
The ICJ has discussed the questions of attribution of conduct under Articles 4 
and 8 in three seminal Decisions – the Nicaragua Decision406, the Armed Activities 
Congo Decision407 and the Bosnian Genocide Decision.408 In all, conduct was 
attributed on an assessment of whether the individuals committing serious breaches 
of peremptory norms were either de jure or de facto State organs. These cases 
function as studies which underscore the systemic weaknesses of the rules of 
attribution. They are discussed in the next sections. 
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3.3.1 The Nicaragua Decision 
The current tests applied by the ICJ for attribution of conduct to States for 
support of non-State armed groups derive from the ICJ’s judgment in the Nicaragua 
case which was later confirmed in the Armed Activities Congo case of 2005409 and 
the 2007 Decision in the Bosnian Genocide case.410 This test attributes conduct to 
States on a narrow basis, requiring proof that at the time the internationally wrongful 
acts occurred, these groups were operating as either de jure or de facto organs of the 
Respondent State. For this to happen, it would have to be proven that at the time the 
internationally wrongful act occurred, the group was acting as an organ of the State 
or was completely dependent on it.411 Alternatively, it would have to be shown that 
at the time the internationally wrongful act occurred, the operations conducted by the 
group were under the direction and control of the State, or as the Court described it 
“effectively controlled by” the State.412 
On the facts in Nicaragua, Nicaragua alleged that the United States were 
supporting military and paramilitary actions of rebel guerrilla fighters, loosely 
described as the Contras who were opposing the government of the day.413 As found 
by the Court, there was clear support of the groups by the United States. It further 
held that it was a “fully established fact” that the United States financially supported 
them, a fact to which the USA “openly admitted the nature, volume and frequency of 
this support.”414 Although there was no evidence that the United States “created” the 
Contras, there was evidence that they “largely financed, trained, equipped, armed 
and organised” them.415  
One of the key pieces of evidence that was considered in relation to the 
question of the degree of control exercised over the group was a publication that 
disclosed no author or publisher but was referred to as a manual titled Psychological 
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Operations in Guerrilla Warfare (“the Manual”).416 The Manual was severely 
criticised and rejected in a report from the US Intelligence Committee and this 
rejection was further reiterated by the President of the United States in late 1981, and 
the Contras advised to ignore it.417  
The ICJ found that 
[w]hen considering whether the publication of such a manual, encouraging 
the commission of acts contrary to general principles of humanitarian law, 
is unlawful, it is material to consider whether that encouragement was 
offered to persons in circumstances where the commission of such acts was 
likely or foreseeable. The Court has however found …[t]he publication and 
dissemination of a manual in fact containing the advice quoted above must 
therefore be regarded as an encouragement, which was likely to be 
effective, to commit acts contrary to general principles of international 
humanitarian law reflected in treaties.418 
In this regard then the ICJ found that, although the dissemination of the 
Manual could be regarded as “encouragement, which “was likely to be effective,”419 
they stopped short of attributing the conduct of the Contras to the United States on 
the basis of that foreseeability.420  
The Court held, however, that the United States participation “in the 
financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping of the Contras, the selection 
of its military or paramilitary targets, and the planning of the whole of its 
operation,”421 even if “preponderant or decisive”422 
[was] still insufficient in itself, on the basis of the evidence in the 
possession of the Court, for the purpose of attributing to the United States 
the acts committed by the contras in the course of their military or 
paramilitary operations in Nicaragua…423 
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According to the Court, such a finding would require proof that the United 
States “directed or enforced” the perpetration of the unlawful acts which were in 
violation of existing human rights and humanitarian law.424 Any evidence falling 
short of this could leave the possibility open that the Contra rebels had carried out 
these acts without United States control.425 In principle, for the acts of the Contras to 
be attributed to the United States, the Applicant State would have to provide 
evidence that the State had “effective control of the military and paramilitary 
operations in the course of which the violations were committed.”426  
According to the principles established in Nicaragua, the conduct of the 
Contra rebels could only be attributed to the State in circumstances where 
the relationship of the contras was so much one of dependence on the one 
side and control on the other that it would be right to equate the contras, for 
legal purposes, with an organ of the United States Government, or as acting 
on behalf of that Government…. the United States having actually exercised 
such a degree of control in all fields as to justify treating the contras as 
acting on its behalf.427 
According to the Court, it will only be right to do so, “to the extent to which 
the United States made use of the potential for control inherent in that 
dependence…”428 This translated into the establishment of a very rigid test for 
control whereby no matter how “preponderant or decisive” the financing and training 
offered by the State was over the groups involved in the conflict,429 it would not be 
enough to attribute the acts of the group to that State. For the Court to attribute 
unlawful acts of the Contras, there must be proof that the State “effectively 
controlled” the operations during which the unlawful acts occurred or prove that they 
were in a relationship of complete dependence.430  
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The principle of effectiveness in international law has always played an 
important role,431 but unfortunately has no precise definition, and its proof very 
much turns on how the word is interpreted and this in turn impacts on how evidence 
is appreciated in the case. The ICJ in Nicaragua was clear as to what evidence it 
would reject as falling short of meeting this threshold of “effectiveness,” but 
nowhere did it define what “effectiveness” meant. 
In requiring proof of “effective control” over the operations during which the 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law occurred, the ICJ gave States the 
leeway to support the non-State entity and covertly engineer, or at the very least 
suggest, the form of tactical operations on the field, while at the same time escaping 
responsibility for criminal acts carried out by the group. Although the fact of 
providing support might breach other obligations incumbent upon the State, for 
instance, the prohibition of intervention under the UN Charter, the threshold of 
control as established in Nicaragua is unsuitable to address the practicalities of 
modern-day conflict. This is because the threshold suggested in Nicaragua is very 
high. Moreover, the test as defined did not factor in considerations of knowledge or 
foreseeability of the crimes by the Contras in its assessment of control. An act can be 
effective because it has accomplished a desired result and thus an interpretation of 
effective at these exacting standards is under-inclusive and fails to capture the range 
of military tactics that can be employed to effectively control an operation. These 
principles were later applied in the Armed Activities Congo Decision. 
3.3.2 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo Decision 
In this case, there were complex factual events that revolved around the 
overthrowing of President Mobutu by Laurent Kabila in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (“DRC”). In order to facilitate this overthrow, the DRC utilised Rwandan 
and Ugandan military support to sustain the coup. These States, according to the 
DRC, were rewarded with substantial economic and military rewards. Eventually, 
once installed, Kabila sought to reduce these ties. This led to an invasion and a series 
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of battles ensued until there was a summit convened among key African nations to 
end hostilities. This culminated in the signing of the Lusaka Peace Accords, which 
agreed to the cessation of hostilities and disarmament of these groups. These accords 
also allowed for the deployment of the United Nations Organization Stabilization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo into the DRC and Organisation of 
African Unity verifiers. This accord was supplemented by the later Kampala and 
Harare accords, which further supported the disengagement process. The DRC 
intimated that following this agreement, Uganda still engaged in hostile conduct and 
continued to arm rebel groups, in particular the Congo Liberation Movement 
(“MLC”).  
Pursuant to this, the DRC filed an application in 1999 against Uganda at the 
ICJ alleging that acts of armed aggression were perpetrated by Uganda on its 
territory.432 The DRC claimed that Uganda both created and controlled the MLC led 
by Jean Bemba.433 Uganda asserted that they gave “just enough” support to Bemba 
and the MLC to drive out Sudanese and Chadian troops from the MLC as this 
facilitated protection of the Ugandan border.434 Bemba, however, as the Court noted, 
both in his book and verbal accounts, claimed that although he received support from 
Uganda, he created and controlled the MLC.435  
In assessing whether the acts of the MLC could be attributed to Uganda, the 
ICJ applied the Nicaragua436 test in determining the claim brought by the DRC as to 
whether Uganda controlled the MLC. Here, the Court held that there was no 
probative evidence that the MLC was an organ of Uganda under Article the 
ARSIWA, or that the MLC was an entity exercising elements of governmental 
control under Article 5.  
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The ICJ further found under Article 8, that although Uganda provided 
assistance to the MLC, “there is no credible evidence to suggest that Uganda created 
the MLC… [nor] controlled or could control the manner in which Mr. Bemba could 
put such assistance to use.”437 This level of control fell short of the degree described 
in the Nicaragua Decision. As Uganda said, they gave “just enough” support to 
protect their borders.  
Although the ICJ found that there were violations of obligations under 
international law,438 and that Uganda was an occupying power in the Ituri district 
and thus responsible for failing to be vigilant to prevent violations by the MLC 
rebel groups in the area,439 on the separate issues of attribution, there could be no 
finding of State responsibility. The discussion on the questions of attribution was 
limited, and it was only in the later Bosnian Genocide Decision440 that a more 
substantial inquiry into the question of attribution of the acts of individuals to 
States. 
3.3.3 The Bosnian Genocide Decision 
This case concerned the Application by Bosnia–Herzegovina against Serbia–
Montenegro before the ICJ alleging, among other things, that Serbia–Montenegro, 
the continuator State of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (“FRY”) committed acts 
of genocide on its territory in July 1995. The acts in question occurred in the 
Srebrenica enclave in the north-eastern province of Bosnia–Herzegovina. Here, acts 
of genocide were alleged to have been committed by members of different 
paramilitary formations that received substantial State support in many fields – arms, 
financing, logistics and administration. However, the acts of these armed groups 
were not attributable to Serbia–Montenegro (“Serbia”), ie the Respondent State and 
thus Serbia was not responsible for the genocide that occurred in Srebrenica. 
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The ICJ similarly applied the tests for attribution outlined in Nicaragua441 but 
provided a more detailed explanation of its rationale.442 The Separate Dissenting 
Opinions of Judges Al Khasawneh and Mahiou differed critically from the finding of 
the Court on the stipulation of the legal test for attribution.443 This in turn impacted 
on their respective assessments as to the level of direction and control that was 
required to justify attribution of genocidal conduct of armed groups to the 
Respondent State.444 The Majority and these Separate Dissents also differed on the 
level of proof required to show that armed groups were in complete dependence of 
the Respondent State to the point that they could be considered de facto organs of 
that State.445 
In arriving at its conclusion that acts of genocide were committed in 
Srebrenica446 by different paramilitary entities, namely the Vojska Republike Srpske 
(“VRS”), the Red Berets and the Scorpions,447 the Court concluded that those acts 
could not be attributed to the Respondent State. The Applicant argued that the VRS 
and the Scorpions could be considered de jure organs of the Respondent State on the 
basis that the VRS officers, including General Mladić, had their salaries, promotions 
and affairs administered by Belgrade.448 The Court, although it accepted that there 
was “no doubt” that the Serbia had provided “substantial support,” inter alia 
financial support, to the Republika Srspka, it “still felt that there was insufficient 
proof that the VRS was an organ of the Respondent State.449 So, too, the Court 
attributed no weight to two intercepted documents that referred to the Scorpions as 
“MUP of Serbia”450 (“MUP”: Ministry of Internal Affairs) and as a “unit of the 
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Ministry of the Interiors of Serbia”.451 These documents confirmed that the senders 
were officials of the Republika Srspka, but since there was no clear address to 
Belgrade, they were not able to view the document as evidence that the Republika 
Srpska and VRS were incorporated into the forces of the Respondent.452 
The Court further held that these groups could not be considered de facto 
State organs because they were not completely dependent on the State such that it 
could be stated that they were merely its instrument.453 In arriving at its conclusion, 
the Court found that the Respondent State had powerful political, military and 
logistical relations but they were insufficient because the groups maintained a 
qualified “but real” margin of independence, notwithstanding that there was 
evidence the VRS would have been unable to carry out its most crucial and 
significant military and paramilitary activities,454 but for the support of the 
Respondent State. 
This high threshold of control was also reflected in the evaluation of the level 
of control required to prove direction and control under customary law as reflected in 
Article 8 ARSIWA. The Court rejected the test of “overall control” that was put 
forwards by the ICTY in Tadić in favour of its own settled jurisprudence, and 
instead, applied the test for attribution on the basis of direction and control outlined 
in Nicaragua.455  
In the Tadić456 case before the ICTY, the Appeals Chamber was required to 
consider whether the conflict in Serbia was international in character since the status 
of the conflict directly impacted on the issue of whether the charges of grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions would be sustainable against Tadić.457 In 
rendering judgment on the issue, the Appeals Chamber found that 
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international rules do not always require the same degree of control over 
armed groups or private individuals for the purpose of determining whether 
an individual not having the status of a State official under internal 
legislation can be regarded as a de facto organ of the State…458 
As such, it found that Serbia exercised “overall control” over these 
paramilitary groups and that this was sufficient to recognise them as de facto organs 
of Serbia.459 The Appeals Chamber further opined that 
control by a State over subordinate armed forces or militias or paramilitary 
units may be of an overall character (and must comprise more than the mere 
provision of financial assistance or military equipment or training).460 
They further noted that under international law, it was not necessary for each 
operation to be planned by the controlling authority so that they “choose their 
targets, or give specific instructions concerning the conduct of military operations 
and any alleged violations of international humanitarian law.”461 Instead the control 
can be established where the controlling authority simply “has a role in organising, 
coordinating or planning the military actions of the military group, in addition to 
financing, training and equipping or providing operational support to that 
group…”.462 
This test was rejected by the ICJ in the Bosnian Genocide case, where it 
found that the ICTY had not been called upon to make such pronouncements on the 
law of State responsibility. The ICJ reaffirmed the tests outlined in Nicaragua, 
requiring proof that the Respondent State had effective control over the operation 
during which the unlawful acts occurred.463  
What remained after that was an assessment of whether the evidence brought 
against the Respondent State could meet that threshold. The Court held the evidence 
was not sufficient to establish direction and control and rejected the evidence 
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adduced by the Applicant that aimed to demonstrate the VRS and its paramilitary’s 
dependence on the Respondent State and also the evidence used to support the 
latter’s control over them. Thus, all of the evidence that was adduced was considered 
too remote as it stretched too far the connection that was required to have existed. 
The interpretation of the word “effective” was very literal and so the 
threshold for proving it was very high. To elaborate, the Court was referred to a 
meeting that took place among three men: the European Union Negotiator, Carl 
Bildt, Milošević and General Mladić,464 and, more controversially to two reports, 
one prepared by the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation in 2002, entitled 
Srebrenica – a ‘safe’ area,465 and the other, entitled Balkan Battlegrounds, published 
by the United States Central Intelligence Agency.466  
Bildt gave evidence of the level of connection between General Mladić and 
Milošević. Milošević was seen to have maintained a strong position of control over 
Mladić after the massacre, so much so, the brokering and honouring of post-
massacre agreements maintained a strong level of control from Belgrade, despite 
Belgrade’s protests to the contrary. Moreover, by 19 July 1995, when the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General arrived to finalise the negotiations, it was on 
the basis that both Mladić and Milošević would be able to show flexibility and 
finalise the military details for humanitarian aid and access into the enclaves, return 
of ammunition to Dutchbat (the Dutch Battalion Protection Force) and for transfer of 
Dutchbat out of that enclave.467 Critically, the Court noted that while the United 
Nations Protection Force commander met with Mladić, Bildt held parallel 
negotiations with Milošević. They also noted that throughout the meeting both 
groups were in communication with each other.468 Even at the end of negotiations 
the UN Special Representative had to communicate with Milošević in order for the 
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negotiations to be honoured.469 While this showed influence, it could not prove 
effective control by Serbia. 
Additionally, one of the reports, Srebrenica – a ‘safe’ area, did not find any 
“hard evidence” to suggest that the Yugoslav Army provided assistance to the VRS 
or that there was any liaison between the Yugoslav Army and Belgrade.470 It did 
however observe that Dutch and Western intelligence concluded that the “July 1995 
operations were co-ordinated with Belgrade.”471 In the separate Balkan 
Battlegrounds report, it was found that the Yugoslav Army and Serbian Security 
may have contributed to the massacre at Srebrenica.472 
None of the evidence could meet the threshold of effective control because 
although they showed determinative and compelling levels of influence, it could not 
cross the threshold of control. The bar set in Nicaragua was so high that anything 
falling short of direct “hard evidence” or express directives of control by the 
Respondent State would fall short. As the evidence came forwards, the Majority 
found that the Respondent maintained a strong influence over the Bosnian-Serb rebel 
groups rather than control.473 The question that neither Nicaragua nor the Bosnian 
Genocide case explored was what was the distinction between strong levels of 
influence and “effective control” or whether there may be circumstances when the 
former is proof of the latter.  
While the facts in Nicaragua demonstrated strong financial and tactical 
support and training, the United States was not operating at a parallel level of 
influence in the decision-making of the Contras. The level of coordination and 
organisation between the supporting State and the entity was different in the Bosnian 
Genocide case. This was especially so in light of the history of the disintegration of 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“SFRY”) and the role the FRY took in 
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overseeing and promulgating its vision for protection of the Serbian peoples within 
the newly created ex-SFRY States. Moreover, since the 1930s there had been strong 
ethnic tensions between the different ethnic groups in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 
that were only contained from the mid-1940s by the Tito regime. In addition to the 
social chaos during the disintegration, there was also a history to that level of 
hostility. The adherence to the Nicaragua principle thus did not allow for a critical 
look at the conflict or provide for an assessment that grasped the reality of the 
“relationship between the person taking action and the State to which he is so closely 
attached.”474  
The ICTY in the Tadić case had taken these matters into account. This “grasp 
of reality” was accomplished with the standard used in Tadić, which was later 
advocated in the two Dissenting Separate Opinions as discussed below, because it 
allowed for such critical levels of influence to be viewed in the context of their effect 
in the course of conflict.  
3.3.4 The Dissenting Views in the Bosnian Genocide Decision 
There were Dissenting Views to their Decision. This questioning of the 
nature of the relationship between the Respondent State and the paramilitary groups 
operating in Bosnia–Herzegovina was evident in the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Al 
Khasawneh. He took exception to several aspects of the Court’s Judgment, one of 
which was the stipulation for the legal tests for control. According to Judge Al 
Khasawneh, 
the Court’s rejection of the standard in the Tadić´ case fail[ed] to address 
the crucial issue raised therein — namely that different types of activities, 
particularly in the ever-evolving nature of armed conflict, may call for 
subtle variations in the rules of attribution.475 
He continued to highlight the distinction by noting that while the USA and 
the Contra rebels had a shared objective that was limited to the overthrow of the 
government, those objectives could very easily have been achieved without the 
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commission of international crimes. This is why the Court held that to hold the USA 
responsible would require” that the crimes themselves should be the object of 
control”.476 
He distinguished this position from cases where the shared objective is the 
commission of international crimes. According to him, 
[w]hen, however, the shared objective is the commission of international 
crimes, to require both control over the non-State actors and the specific 
operations in the context of which international crimes were committed is 
too high a threshold. The inherent danger in such an approach is that it gives 
States the opportunity to carry out criminal policies through non-State 
actors or surrogates without incurring direct responsibility therefore. The 
statement in paragraph 406 of the Judgment to the effect that the “‘overall 
control’ test is unsuitable, for it stretches too far, almost to breaking point, 
the connection which must exist between the conduct of a State’s organs 
and its international responsibility” is, with respect, singularly unconvincing 
…477 
From this dictum, there is a questioning of whether the requirement for 
separate proof of control over the specific operations in which the crime occurred as 
opposed to the history of support and control over all the operations in the conflict, 
creates an artificial disconnection. His Dissenting Opinion identifies that ultimately 
this blanket application of the Nicaragua test allows the more subtle and insidious 
roles of States in these internecine conflicts to fall outside the net of responsibility. 
With a variation of the attribution of conduct test, the threshold of proof required to 
create that critical nexus of control could be reconsidered so that these critical items 
of evidence that show strong and determinative influence will be cogent proof of not 
mere influence, but control sufficient to ground international responsibility for these 
heinous crimes. As a consequence, different areas of evidence reconsidered in light 
of this test would yield different conclusions.  
The acts of the VRS in Srebrenica would become attributable to Serbia 
because there was sufficient evidence to prove that Serbia–Montenegro had a role in 









organising, coordinating or planning the military actions of the groups in addition to 
financing, training, or equipping and providing operational support to that group and 
that is all that is required under the Tadić standard. According to Al Khasawneh, it 
was self-evident that the overall control test as identified in Tadić could be sufficient 
to trigger responsibility.478 
So, for example, his consideration of Bildt’s evidence indicated that Bildt 
met twice with both Mladić and Milošević in the “midst of the takeover of 
Srebrenica and the subsequent massacre.”479 In his evidence, President Karadžić 
revealed that knew nothing of the meetings with Bildt, Mladić and Milošević, which 
occurred at the time when the Court agreed that the decision to eliminate the adult 
male population in Srebrenica was made,480 thereby putting forwards the integration 
of Belgrade into the decision-making processes regarding Srebrenica. He further 
noted that even after the fall of Srebrenica that the negotiations continued between 
Bildt and these two men at all times. The inference that arises based on these facts 
was that, notwithstanding Milošević’s statements that distanced him from the 
massacre, Serbia at all times was present when the plan to carry out the massacre 
was made, even when the president of the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska was 
absent.481  
This, coupled with evidence that promotions, salaries and other 
administrative roles for the VRS were completed by Belgrade through the 30th 
Personnel Division, would have been sufficient evidence under the overall control 
test to have triggered State responsibility because the lower threshold has allowed for 
a different evaluation of the evidence. Judge Al Khasawneh described this as being a 
more context-specific approach that prevents partisan States from veiling 
international responsibility by diffusing chains of command and both operational and 













tactical missions at strategically opportune times to carry out terrible breaches of 
obligations without incurring responsibility for them.482  
His suggestions for a reconsideration of the tests for control was further 
reinforced by Judge Mahiou in his Separate Dissenting Opinion.483 Central to this 
Dissent was a firm conviction that the facts surrounding the judgment in the 
Nicaragua case were distinguishable from those in the Bosnian Genocide case and 
that this merited reconsideration of the tests for attribution of conduct of individuals 
to States.484 Whereas there were common views between Serbia–Montenegro and the 
Republika Srpska on the initiative for “Greater Serbia” in that there was the goal of 
uniting all “Serbian Peoples” under the two entities,485 this similarity of views did 
not arise on the facts in Nicaragua. To the contrary, the United States was not 
seeking to enlarge its territory or to exert any control over the Central American 
area. It collaborated with the Contra rebels with the aim of “destabilizing and 
overthrowing the government in place in Nicaragua”.486 According to Judge Mahiou, 
“it was difficult to demonstrate the involvement of the United States by way of some 
vague and uncertain general control, and very precise evidence therefore needed to 
be found to show that the United States exerted effective control over the activities 
of the Contras.”487 
The relationship between Serbia–Montenegro and the Republika Srpska was 
distinguishable. It was an enduring relationship which, for Judge Mahiou, required a 
different assessment of control as suggested in the jurisprudence of the ICTY. For 
instance, many officers were seconded from the Yugoslav’s People’s Army (“JNA”) 
into the VRS. Additionally, Mladić was appointed commander of the Second District 
of the JNA by Belgrade after the recognition of Bosnia–Herzegovina by the 
international community. Moreover, even after the JNA withdrew its troops, he 
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remained on that territory without being recalled by Belgrade and continued to serve 
under the JNA, which was renamed the VRS.488 This, for Judge Mahiou, together 
with strong administrative links required a reconsideration of the tests applied in 
Nicaragua. Noting that the control exerted by the Serbia seemed pervasive, Judge 
Mahiou accepted the reasoning of the ICTY that such control existed 
notwithstanding any “autonomous choices of means and tactics although 
participating in a common strategy along with the ‘controlling State’”.489 
Like Judge Al Khasawneh, Judge Mahiou’s opinions on a reconsideration of 
the tests for attribution of conduct are worthy of fresh consideration. This is 
especially so when the Dissent is compared to the jurisprudence of ECtHR in cases 
that similarly addressed questions of attribution of conduct of individuals to States 
for the purposes of assessing State responsibility, as the next chapter discusses.  
3.4 The limitations of the current ICJ approach  
The current interpretation of the tests of attribution by the ICJ as defined in 
the lex lata is limited and this has in turn limited the scope of international law to 
address State support for non-State armed groups engaging in international crimes. 
To address the role of States in this regard, there must be a considered look at 
whether there should be change of the underlying policy towards interpretation of the 
test of attribution that pays credence to modern-day realities of conflict support and 
partisanship and also to the nature of the law on attribution itself. Modification of the 
current tests of attribution would go a long way in identifying the responsibility of 
the State, and while adjudication before the ICJ is not a panacea for all the problems 
associated with the rise of paramilitary roles in current conflict, an enhanced model 
of attribution will serve as a deterrent to future commission. 
There is a need to review. So far the law on attribution has been slow to 
develop moving from a continuum of development from the sixteenth century to the 
present day. Even now, the law on attribution has been described by some as being 
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not fully developed,490 thereby suggesting that the law is still moving along that 
development continuum as it slowly evolves and responds to the socio-political 
context in which it operates.  
As this chapter has discussed, there is some discord in the manner in which 
the Nicaragua principles were applied in the Bosnian Genocide case, in view of the 
difference in relationship between the State and the non-State armed groups. Most 
critical is that the application and indeed the interpretation of the Nicaragua 
principle has placed a limitation on international law in terms of how it addresses 
State support of these non-State armed groups for commission of international 
crimes, particularly in terms of the potential for control that is inherent in 
relationships founded on support by the State over the non-State group. This 
limitation is in part founded by a commitment to a particular ratio that sees the test of 
attribution as being unwavering. This is problematic. This was evident on the ILC 
Commentaries to Article 8 where it has been noted that 
it is clear that a state may either by specific directions or by exercising 
control over a group, in effect assume responsibility for their conduct. Each 
case will depend on its own facts, in particular those concerning the 
relationship between the instructions given or the direction or control 
exercised and the specific conduct complained of…491 
On this basis it is useful to examine how other courts have approached the 
question of attribution of acts of individuals from non-State armed groups in 
particular circumstances and analyse the rationale behind their approaches. 
Cassese argued that “it is a matter for appreciation in each case whether 
particular conduct was or was not carried out under the control of a State, to such an 
extent that the conduct controlled should be attributed to it.”492 According to 
Cassese, it was legally correct because the ILC in its Commentaries urged that each 
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case be approached on a case-by-case basis,493 and the Court was also bound to 
consider all rules belonging to other bodies of law with the purpose of construing a 
part of a corpus of rules it must consider.494 In light of the context in which the 
course of the conflict operated, this may have been the only way to perceive the true 
effects of the support rendered and help assess if that support was of such influence 
to be considered as control over the armed opposition group. In the words of the 
Judge Cassese, in an Independent Commentary he prepared after the Decision, he 
noted that 
extensive support that states provide to military or paramilitary groups or 
armed bands fighting abroad against other states or at home against 
rebellious or secessionist groups… is a frequent and dangerous occurrence 
in the world community. It may lead to full-blown international armed 
conflicts or at any rate to serious threats to peace and security if 
international law does not have the means available for making the 
supporting state answerable for violations of international law by the armed 
groups – at least where the support goes so far as to involve coordinating or 
helping in the general planning of the military activities of those groups. I 
submit that the 'overall control' test is a valid legal standard for making 
those states accountable…495 
This proposed broader test of attribution was rejected by the ICJ in the 
Bosnian Genocide case, in which the Court noted that the ICTY had not been called 
upon to make such pronouncements and that 
logic does not require the same test to be adopted in resolving the two 
issues, which are very different in nature: the degree and nature of a State’s 
involvement in an armed conflict on another State’s territory which is 
required for the conflict to be characterized as international, can very well, 
and without logical inconsistency, differ from the degree and nature of 
involvement required to give rise to that State’s responsibility for a specific 
act committed in the course of the conflict”496  
The Court instead reaffirmed the tests outlined in Nicaragua, requiring proof 
that the Respondent State had effective control over the operation during which the 
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unlawful acts occurred.497 However, as Cassese noted, should there be more 
willingness by the ICJ to probe and consider other proposals?498 
According to Judge Cassese, the intrinsic value of this case is that it could 
prove “helpful in legally appraising new trends in the use by States and International 
Organisations of armed military units”.499 His argument in this regard was three-fold. 
Firstly, State support of armed groups is now a “frequent and dangerous occurrence 
in the world community.”500 He further argued that international law does not have 
the means available to make States answerable for general planning and coordination 
or support of armed groups.501 The “overall control” test as he defined it, would go a 
long way to stymieing the tide of impunity. Secondly, the test can also be used to 
assess whether States who are aiding and abetting terrorism can be caught under the 
rules of attribution as the test as suggested would not require proof of control over 
each and every terrorist attack.502 Thirdly, it will be of use when considering cases 
where international organisations use large national contingents.503 Thus from a 
policy perspective it was seen by him to be a necessary widening of the rule. 
There have not been many supporters for this approach launched by Judge 
Cassese. Marko Milanović, for instance, advocated a pure positivist approach 
towards the assessment of control.504 According to him, the rules of State 
responsibility should not be conflated with the rules concerning, the rules concerning 
characterisation of conflict and humanitarian and human rights law.505 State 
responsibility has a distinct purpose as “it arose from the muddied waters of 
diplomatic protection and treatment of aliens and should now try to resist being 
dragged back into the methodological mud made up of different substantive primary 
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rules.”506 According to him, a State can be responsible for acts of individuals to the 
extent that they are properly characterised as de facto organs because they are 
completely dependent on it, and, apart from that, only if effective control is proven 
because that is how State practice has defined it thus far.  
However, in a modified manner Judge Al Khasawneh, suggested that there 
may be circumstances which call for subtle variations to the current tests of 
attribution, and that the ICJ was remiss to so easily dismiss the suggestions put 
forwards by Judge Cassese in the Tadić Appeals.507 However, if Al Khasawneh’s 
proposal is investigated deeply, it is evident that, he has in fact suggested a modified 
approach towards the assessment or the setting of the tests for control where the “the 
shared objective” identified in the relationship between the State and the armed 
group “is the commission of international crimes.”508 According to him, “to require 
both control over the non-State actors and the specific operations in the context of 
which international crimes were committed is too high a threshold”.509 
He did not amplify further in this regard, but both his Dissent and the 
Decision of Judge Cassese have influenced the unique proposal suggested in this 
thesis to accept the suggestion that the tests of attribution should be subtly varied and 
to suggest the variation.  
The next chapter explores whether there can be a variation to the current tests 
for attribution of conduct of individuals who are members of non-State armed groups 
to the State or States which provide support to them, by approaching the 
interpretation of “direction,” “control” and “complete dependence” in a similar 
manner to international human rights courts. 
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Chapter Four: The Tests of Attribution of Conduct of 
Individuals Applied in International Human 
Rights Courts 
4.1 The circumstances in which other international courts and 
tribunals have attributed the conduct of individuals affiliated 
to non-State armed groups to States  
This chapter questions the extent to which the application of approaches from 
the international human rights law regime can be used in a similar manner when 
considering the critical concepts of control within the regime of State responsibility, 
and in particular how they can be used to the vary the current tests of attribution of 
conduct applied by the ICJ.  
There are circumstances in which other international courts and tribunals 
have attributed the conduct of individuals belonging to armed groups to States. 
Broadly, these circumstances are where there has been a provision of funding, 
logistic support, administration or provision of weapons and other equipment.510 In 
some instances, international courts have also attributed the conduct of individuals 
belonging to armed groups to States where it has been shown that the State was the 
parent entity that sponsored or created the group in question.511  
Within the field of international human rights protection, a State incurs 
responsibility for failure to protect individuals from arbitrary actions by the State on 
its territory or with regard to individuals who are otherwise found to be under the 
State’s “jurisdiction”.512 Although the questions of attribution of conduct of 
individuals to States are done in the context of determining whether alleged 
violations of human rights have occurred, under the jurisdiction of the State party to 
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a human rights treaty, the approaches used by the ECtHR for example has adopted a 
lower test of “overall” control similar to that used in the Tadić Appeal. This chapter 
focuses on the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the IACtHR because both Courts 
have adopted particular methodologies towards the question of attribution of conduct 
of armed groups and created non-State entities to States.  
4.2 The approach of the European Court of Human Rights to 
questions of “jurisdiction” for the purpose of application of 
ECHR obligations 
The concept of territory under Article 1 the European Convention on Human 
Rights (“ECHR”) is expansive.513 The ECtHR has moved away from the more 
formalistic notions of jurisdiction that are primarily territorial and which can only be 
applied extra-territorially in limited circumstances, ie where there is some form of 
connection to the State either through passive or active personality, the universality 
principle or the protective principle.514 According to Sarah Miller, the ECHR has an 
expanded notion of jurisdiction that is now more “functional than formal:”515 
functional, in that it addresses a range of circumstances in which jurisdiction of the 
State is established. Thus under this instrument, jurisdiction can be established both 
territorially and extraterritorially. According to Sarah Miller, 
At present, the European Court has identified four primary bases for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction: cases where a signatory state exercises 
‘effective overall control’ over another territory; cases where either state 
authorities act abroad or their actions produce extraterritorial effects; 
extradition or expulsion cases involving the risk that an individual’s rights 
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will be violated once he leaves the territory of the signatory state; and 
diplomatic, consular, and flag jurisdiction cases…516 
These human rights protections thus operate within a wide jurisdictional 
space.517 While the processes of determining attribution are distinct, the approaches 
by the ECtHR with regard to the determination of whether a State is exercising 
jurisdiction over particular individuals and/or portions of territory outside its borders 
can be used to clarify the scope of principles on attribution of acts of non-State 
actors to the State.  
This is examined through some selected case studies, Ilaşcu v Moldova518 
and the cases brought against Turkey, Loizidou v Turkey519 and Cyprus v Turkey.520 
These cases have been selected to illustrate the approach used by the ECtHR to 
determine “effective overall control” over another territory, through consideration of 
whether particular conduct qualified as “control”. 
4.2.1 Ilaşcu v Moldova 
The case of Ilaşcu v Moldova521 originated from an application before the 
ECtHR concerning acts committed by authorities of the Moldovan Republic of 
Transdniestria” (the “MRT”), “a region of Moldova which proclaimed its 
independence in 1991 but is not yet recognised by the international community”.522 
On 18 December 1991, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine signed the Minsk 
Protocol formally creating the Commonwealth of Independent States (“CIS”) of 
which the Republic of Moldova subsequently became a member.523 In the months 
that followed there were clashes between Moldovan police and Transdniestria 
separatists until eventually fully armed Transdniestrian paramilitary units were 
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formed and maintained engagements. The Russian Federation armed and supported 
these groups, justifying their position by alleging that the area was “Russian 
Territory,”524 and made available to the Transdniestria separatists munitions and 
stores from the 14th Army (ie the Russian army) that was still on the territory despite 
an earlier agreement for withdrawal.525 Moreover, even after the CIS agreement, the 
Russian Federation continued to support and maintain relations with the MRT.526 
The Applicants complained of a variety of violations, including contending 
that their right to a fair trial had been violated by convictions against them rendered 
by a Transdniestrian Court which they argued was not competent for the purposes of 
Article 6 of the ECHR527 and that the conditions of their detention separately 
violated Articles 3, 5 and 8 of the ECHR.528 With regard to Ilaşcu, he further argued 
that the death sentence passed against him by the Transdniestrian courts further 
violated Article 2 of the ECHR.529  
The Applicants argued that responsibility of Moldova was engaged for their 
illegal arrest, detention and sentencing by the MRT authorities, because the relevant 
acts had occurred on Moldovan territory (albeit territory occupied by the separatist 
MRT), and that the Moldovan authorities had not taken any appropriate steps to put 
an end to any of the violations resulting from these acts.530  
They further asserted that the responsibility of the Russian Federation was 
also engaged since the “territory of Transdniestria was… under de facto Russian 
control on account of the Russian troops and military equipment stationed there and 
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the support allegedly given to the separatist regime by the Russian Federation.”531 
The Applicants noted that the Moldovan authorities had appealed to the international 
community, including the UN Security Council, to sanction the Russian Federation, 
whose support of the MRT separatists, they argued, amounted to an act of aggression 
within the meaning of the UN Charter.532 This was denied by the Russian Federation, 
which countered that its role in the territory was more of a peacekeeping nature 
geared towards ensuring peace and stability in the region.533The Applicants further 
argued that Russia had assisted in the arrest and transfer of the Applicants to 
premises of the 14th Army and the Tiraspol police headquarters which was possibly 
also the premises of the MRT Ministry of Security.534 
This level of control and influence was not taken lightly by the ECtHR, 
which summarised the situation noting that the MRT had been 
set up in 1991-92 with the support of the Russian Federation, vested with 
organs of power and its own administration, remains under the effective 
authority, or at the very least under the decisive influence, of the Russian 
Federation, and in any event that it survives by virtue of the military, 
economic, financial and political support given to it by the Russian 
Federation.535 
As a result, the ECtHR held that, due to the support provided to the MRT by 
the Russian Federation, and the collaboration, there was a “continuous and 
uninterrupted link of responsibility on the part of the Russian Federation for the 
Applicant’s fate”536 and therefore the Applicants were within Russia’s jurisdiction 
within the meaning of Article 1 ECHR.537 It then went on to find that, as the Russian 
Federation had done nothing to prevent the violations carried out by the 
Transdnestrian authorities, it was responsible for the violations they had suffered. 
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While that finding was clear insofar as members of the 14th Army had 
transferred the Applicants to the authorities in Tiraspol, insofar as the Court also 
found that Russia was responsible for acts carried out by officials of the MRT, 
including actual ill treatment of the Applicants, one could argue that the violations of 
the ECHR were in effect attributed to the Russian Federation on the basis that it had 
the ability to prevent or stop the violations by the entity it supported, because it had 
the power to control the decisions and affairs of that entity.  
The implication here is that due to the level of support rendered to the MRT 
by the Russian Federation, the acts of the MRT could be attributed to it. In arriving 
at its conclusion that the Russian Federation was responsible for the violations found 
in respect of Ilaşcu and the other Applicants on the basis that the Russian Federation 
had maintained jurisdiction over the MRT, it is arguable that, implicitly, the Court 
must necessarily also have found that the level of control over the territory and 
authorities of the MRT meant that the MRT was functioning as a de facto authority 
of the Russian Federation.  
This reasoning was not new to the ECtHR. In a series of cases concerning 
alleged violations of the ECHR in Northern Cyprus, in arriving at the conclusion that 
the acts at issue, while having taken place outside Turkish territory, fell under 
jurisdiction of Turkey within the meaning of Article 1, and therefore engaged its 
responsibility under responsibility under the ECHR the Court had utilised a similar 
rationale in arriving at its conclusions.  
4.2.2 The cases brought against Turkey 
The two key cases in this regard are Loizidou v Turkey538 and the inter-State 
case of Cyprus v Turkey.539 
The facts of Loizidou were that the Applicant was the owner of several plots 
of land in Kyrenia, located in the northern part of Cyprus.540 Kyrenia, and indeed the 
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whole of Northern Cyprus, was under the administration of a so-called separate 
constitutional entity, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (“TRNC”), as well as 
hosting the headquarters of the Turkish Army in the area.541 The Applicant alleged 
she had been prevented from enjoying her property in Kyrenia.542 In addition, she 
complained of a breach of her right to liberty, as on 19 March 1998, she, together 
with a group of women, participated in a march to “assert the right” of Greek Cypriot 
refugees to return to their homes, and had been detained by Turkish soldiers and 
released only ten hours later.543 
Loizidou argued that her detention should be attributed to Turkey because the 
TRNC was an entity that Turkey sponsored.544 The ECtHR held that Turkey was 
potentially responsible under the Convention for the violations alleged on the basis 
that 
the relevant principles of international law governing State responsibility, 
that the responsibility of a Contracting Party could also arise when as a 
consequence of military action - whether lawful or unlawful - it exercises 
effective control of an area outside its national territory. The obligation to 
secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention, 
derives from the fact of such control whether it be exercised directly, 
through its armed forces, or through a subordinate local administration…545 
According to the ECtHR, it was patently clear on the facts that such control 
existed. In its findings it noted that in this case this was “obvious from the large 
number of troops engaged in active duties in Northern Cyprus. Such control, 
according to the relevant test and in the circumstances of the case, entails her 
responsibility for the policies and actions of the TRNC.”546 
A similar finding of control was also made in the subsequent Decision in 
Cyprus v Turkey.547 Notwithstanding the proclamation of the TRNC in November 
                                                 
 
541
 Ibid para 16. 
542
 Ibid para 12. 
543
 Ibid paras 13-14. 
544




 Ibid para 56. 
547




1983 and the subsequent enactment of the TRNC Constitution in May 1985,548 
Cyprus maintained that the TRNC was an illegal entity from the standpoint of 
international law and pointed to the international community’s condemnation of the 
establishment of the TRNC. Turkey, on the other hand, maintained that the TRNC 
was a democratic and constitutional State, which was politically independent of all 
other sovereign States, including Turkey. On that basis, Turkey stressed that the 
allegations made by Cyprus were attributable exclusively to the TRNC and that 
Turkey could not be held responsible under the Convention for them.549  
In its Decision, in finding that Turkey was responsible for the actions of the 
authorities of the TRNC, the ECtHR considered that this was consistent with its 
earlier statements in Loizidou v Turkey (Merits Judgment).550 In Loizidou, the Court 
had noted that Turkey exercised “effective control” over Northern Cyprus through its 
military presence there, with the result that its responsibility under the Convention 
was engaged for the policies and actions of the TRNC authorities.551 In Loizidiou, 
the Court stressed that Turkey’s responsibility under the Convention could not be 
confined to the acts of its own soldiers and officials operating in Northern Cyprus, 
but “was also engaged by virtue of the acts of the local administration … which 
survived by virtue of military and other support”.552  
These cases indicate that the ECtHR is willing to probe behind the façade of 
appearances and consider the question of control as one of fact, at least for the 
purpose of determining whether a State exercises Article 1 jurisdiction over a 
situation potentially raising issues under the Convention.  
4.2.3 Suggestions from these case studies 
In these case studies, the Ilaşcu v Moldova case and the cases brought against 
Turkey, the use of this test of control allowed the ECtHR to engage the responsibility 
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of the Respondent States by establishing that the Respondent States had jurisdiction 
over the individuals due to the level of support rendered to the relevant entity. The 
ECtHR interpreted control as a factual assessment of degree of support provided by 
the Respondent States. Where that degree of support or State connivance is 
substantial, the entity ceases to be a non-State entity but instead is operating as a de 
facto State organ. The approach was thus distinguishable from that articulated by the 
ICJ in the Bosnian Genocide case. It is not so much that the entity would not survive 
without the assistance given but that the entity cannot function without State 
assistance. The test as articulated in the ECtHR is far more purposive as it considers 
the question of survival of the entity, by virtue of State assistance in a more 
pragmatic way. This approach can be further looked at by examining the 
jurisprudence of the IACtHR. 
4.3 The approach of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
to questions of “jurisdiction” for the purpose of application of 
ACHR obligations 
The American Convention on Human Rights (“ACHR”)553 also takes account 
of the impact of State support provided to non-State actors who later go on to 
commit widespread violations of human rights. Similar to the ECHR, State 
responsibility for support of armed groups is addressed by the question of whether 
acts committed by them fall under the “jurisdiction” of State Parties to the ACHR. 
The ACHR establishes jurisdiction differently to the ECHR. The ACHR 
mandates State Parties to respect the rights and freedoms outlined in its text.554 In 
this regard, the Inter-American System “follows the basic structure of negative and 
positive obligations common to international human rights law.”555 Jurisdiction is 
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applied through these obligations as State Parties are charged with the duty to both 
respect the rights outlined in the American Convention and ensure that all persons 
can have a full and free exercise of those rights.556 This was detailed by the Court in 
its Decision in the Velasquez Rodriguez case557 in which it stated that the first 
obligation on States under Article 1(1) is to respect the rights and freedoms outlined 
in the Convention. According to the Court, there are 
individual domains that are beyond the reach of the State or to which the 
State has but limited access. Thus, the protection of human rights must 
necessarily comprise the concept of the restriction of the exercise of state 
power…558 
The Court further noted that the second obligation under Article 1(1) is to 
enjoy the full and free exercise of rights under the Convention. In this regard they 
noted that 
the free and full exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention to 
every person subject to its jurisdiction. This obligation implies the duty of 
the States Parties to organize the governmental apparatus and, in general, all 
the structures through which public power is exercised, so that they are 
capable of juridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights. 
As a consequence of this obligation, the States must prevent, investigate and 
punish any violation of the rights recognized by the Convention and, 
moreover, if possible attempt to restore the right violated and provide 
compensation as warranted for damages resulting from the violation…559 
Thus, where there have been violations within the territory due to the conduct 
of non-State actors, this could “constitute a breach of the State’s positive obligations 
to take measures to prevent violations committed by non-State actors, an obligation 
[that is] conditioned by a due diligence standard.”560 Thus jurisdiction in these 
circumstances results from the fact that in circumstances where the State either 
created or supported the armed groups, they are considered to have failed to act 
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diligently to prevent the non-State actors from committing the violations,561 by 
“supporting or tolerating the infringement of the rights recognized in the 
Convention.”562 There is no dearth of precedent in the Inter-American Court system 
that addresses the responsibility of States for violations of human rights in 
connection with mass atrocities committed by members of paramilitary groups, ie 
armed groups.563 Several Latin American States utilised paramilitary operations to 
achieve political agendas and thus forced disappearances and massacres were not 
unusual during periods in which there were volatile struggles for power.564 With a 
view to highlighting the discussion of the approaches used by the IACtHR towards 
determining the attribution of conduct of individuals, three cases are now discussed.  
They have been selected as they represent the typical factual matrix through 
which mass atrocities were committed by armed groups whose existence depended 
on the support they received from States and who in some instances worked in 
conjunction with the regular State forces, thereby blurring the lines of command 
during particular operations. The cases selected are the Paniagua Morales case,565 
the Pueblo Massacre case566 and the Mapirpan Massacre case.567 
The Paniagua Morales case was selected because it established an operative 
principle in the jurisprudence of the IACtHR, whereby support or tolerance of armed 
groups would be sufficient to engage the responsibility of the State as the acts of 
those individuals can be attributed to the State on the basis of this tolerance or 
support.568 The case concerned State agents as opposed to armed groups. Miles 
Jackson notes that the assessment of the law in this case was wider than it should 
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have been,569 but this broad assessment is why it was selected as it identified for the 
first time in the IACtHR jurisprudence, the effect of toleration or support on 
questions of attribution of conduct. 
The Pueblo Massacre case was selected because it details the tests for 
attribution of conduct of individuals under the ACHR and sets out a clear rationale as 
to its approaches in the determination of these tests concerning the effect of 
toleration or support of armed groups on questions of attribution of conduct as well.  
The Mapiripan Massacre case further details these approaches but presents a 
particularly complex model that applied the findings of the Bogota Constitutional 
Court on the criminality of Colombian army officials in its consideration of the issue 
as to whether State agents actually collaborated as opposed to merely tolerating the 
mass atrocities in Mapiripan,570 and the impact that such collaboration had on the 
identifying a link with members of the armed groups on the basis of control and to 
some extent dependence. What is crucial is not why the relationship was being 
examined, but how it was examined and whether that approach can be useful in 
considering the tests for attribution of conduct in the future jurisprudence of the ICJ.  
In all three cases the approaches used were instrumental in identifying the 
link between the State and the members of the armed groups and this is useful to 
determine the extent to which the test of attribution of conduct as applied by the ICJ 
can reflect these nuanced considerations. 
4.3.1 The Paniagua Morales case 
The Commission of the IACtHR outlined the facts of this case. The 
Commission found that State agents had abducted, tortured and murdered several 
persons between 1987 and 1988.571 The Court opined that in the circumstances of 
this case where it was plain that these atrocities were being committed by State 
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agents attributing, or as the Court termed it “imputing,” the acts of the State agents 
was not difficult. 
However, in arriving at this Decision the Court found that 
[u]nlike domestic criminal law, it is not necessary to determine the 
perpetrators’ culpability or intentionality in order to establish that the rights 
enshrined in the Convention have been violated, nor is it essential to 
identify individually the agents to whom the acts of violation are attributed. 
The sole requirement is to demonstrate that the State authorities supported 
or tolerated infringement of the rights recognized in the Convention. 
Moreover, the State’s international responsibility is also at issue when it 
does not take the necessary steps under its domestic law to identify and, 
where appropriate, punish the authors of such violations…572 
This approach towards determining the level of support needed to render 
conduct of members of armed groups set the precedent for other cases to follow and 
develop and the next two cases are examples of that. 
4.3.2 The Pueblo Massacre case 
The facts of this case concerned the extrajudicial killings of six peasants and 
the forced disappearance of thirty-seven more from the village of Pueblo Bello in 
Colombia sometime in January 1990.573 This instilled a level of fear in the local 
community and this in turn strengthened the position of the paramilitary group in the 
area.574 During the period of January 1988 and 1990, there were more than two 
hundred deaths related to paramilitary action.575 Further evidence reported a history 
of intense collaboration between State agents and these groups for the purposes of 
provision of arms and intelligence.576 The issue was whether the violations that 
resulted from these massacres and other acts could be attributed to Colombia. 
The Commission found that the State played a large role in the creation of 
these groups in the 1970s and 1980s. However, in 1989, the previous protection from 
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the Supreme Court of Justice was removed and the State started to term these groups 
“criminal”.577 Aside from this, the Commission found that they did nothing further to 
dismantle these armed groups and to the contrary, promoted them and even 
requested them to commit crimes on the assurance that they would not be prosecuted 
subsequently.578 On this basis, the Commission found that owing to the tolerance and 
support given to these groups, the acts of the military agents were attributable to the 
State.579 
The State responded that the “objective international responsibility of the 
State cannot exist merely due to the fact that an illegal armed group flagrantly 
violated human rights.”580 According to the State, 
in order to attribute responsibility to the State for the facts committed, it is 
necessary to take into account the structures for attributing the fact to the 
State, which arise from the obligations embodied in the Convention. Only 
when it can be proved that the conduct of the illegal members of the armed 
group, is attributable by act or omission of the Colombian armed forces… 
may international responsibility be attributed to the State…581 
They further argued that it would be unfair otherwise as 
[t]he structures for attributing responsibility to the State constitute numerus 
clausus, because they consist of a rigorous description of the events in 
which the violation of the treaty-based obligation is attributable to the State 
in question. This premise constitutes a guarantee of the principle of legal 
certainty. 
On that basis the State attempted to deflect responsibility by arguing that the 
Colombian forces did not participate in these attacks and furthermore, the State 
(bearing in mind the financial constraints it was operating under) did all that was 
possible on the facts to avoid these violations by taking the necessary precautions.582 
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The Court did not agree with the State’s arguments. It opined that the 
existence of a rigorous structure for attribution was impossible and that attribution of 
conduct depended on the facts and circumstances of each case. According to the 
Court, 
the many different forms and characteristics that the facts may assume in 
situations that violate human rights makes it almost illusory to expect 
international law to define specifically – or rigorously or numerus clausus – 
all the hypotheses or situations – or structures – for attributing to the State 
each of the possible and eventual acts or omissions of State agents or 
individuals… 
According to the Court, the international responsibility of a State arises when 
there is a violation of the erga omnes obligations to guarantee and render effective 
the protective norms under the Convention.583 Consequently, the conduct of 
individuals can be attributed to the State where the State fails to uphold the erga 
omnes obligations that are reflected in the Convention, since the State is the 
guarantor.584 That failure could sometimes result from particular relationships the 
State engages in with, for instance, collaboration with armed groups in a situation 
where these groups are clearly criminal in their objectives. Thus a stable “structure 
for attribution” is untenable and the better view would be to assess the nature of the 
collaboration and the effect that had on questions of State control over the groups 
committing mass atrocities. This focus on the effects of collaboration was also 
central to the Court in the Mapiripan Massacre case. 
4.3.3 The Mapiripan Massacre case 
The facts of this case, similar to the Pueblo Massacre, involved the massacre 
and torture of at least forty-nine civilians in the municipality of Mapiripan.585 These 
atrocities were committed by members of the United Self-Defense Forces of 
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Colombia (“USDFC”) with the “collaboration and acquiescence of agents of the 
State.”586 
The State argued that the acts derived from “irregular actions of its agents 
and not from a policy of the State or its institutions.”587 While they accepted 
responsibility for this, they refused to accept responsibility on the basis that the acts 
of the armed group, the USDFC could not be attributed to them “as if they were 
agents.” It argued that since the ACHR did not create a lex specialis towards the 
determination of the tests of attribution of conduct, the tests of attribution had to be 
drawn from general international law.588 In this regard they argued that this conduct 
is not attributable to the State unless it falls under the principles reflected in Article 
8, that the acts were done under the effective control of the State, or Article 9, that 
the acts were done in the absences of public authorities or Article 11, that the acts 
were adopted by the State.589 
The State argued with respect to responsibility in the rules reflected under 
Article 8, that “there were no instructions or effective control by the State.”590 The 
State then went on to say that the acts were done by these armed groups which they 
referred to as criminal and some of the agents of the State, even if by omission.591 
They argued that those agents were punished harshly and thus in total, the acts of the 
individuals who participated in that massacre could not be attributed to the State.592 
The Commission in response to this found that applying the Paniagua 
Morales principle earlier discussed, ie that acts of individuals who committed 
serious violations of human rights are to be attributed to the State in instances where 
the State tolerated or condoned these acts.593 On this basis owing to the “degrees of 
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participation and collaboration” between the armed group in question, responsibility 
was engaged under the Convention.594 
The Court in determining a finding on the merits of the arguments found that 
the ACHR created a lex specialis in view of its special nature as a human rights 
treaty.595 It opined that 
[t]he effect of these obligations of the State goes beyond the relationship 
between its agents and the persons under its jurisdiction, as it is also 
reflected in the positive obligation of the State to take such steps as may be 
necessary to ensure effective protection of human rights in relations 
amongst individuals. The State may be found responsible for acts by private 
individuals in cases in which, through actions or omissions by its agents 
when they are in the in the position of guarantors[ and], the State does not 
fulfill these erga omnes obligations embodied in Articles 1(1) and 2 of the 
Convention…596 
On that basis the Court found the acts of the USDFC attributable to the State.597 Part 
of the ratio for this finding was that the Court found that the failure to perform the 
erga omnes obligations under the Convention arose out of the relationship between 
the State and the USDFC. The link between them resulted from 
a set of actions and omissions by State agents and private citizens, 
conducted in a coordinated, parallel or linked manner, with the aim of 
carrying out the massacre….598 
In this regard, it might be useful to examine how the Court approached the 
issue of determining conduct that was coordinated, parallel or linked. This was 
accomplished by what they referred to as a rational appraisal “that did not close its 
eyes to the evidence.”599 Items that were considered relevant were the fact that the 
State allowed these groups landing rights without airport controls, logistical 
assistance to the scene of the massacre, movement through the training areas of the 
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Army Mobile Brigade, lack of cooperation with authorities who tried to reach the 
scene and concealing evidence of the facts.600 On this basis the Court found that 
there was true collaboration between the State and the armed group that went beyond 
mere omission.601  
4.3.4 Suggestions from these case studies 
In sum, therefore, these three case studies suggest that responsibility for the 
violations under the ACHR are not as a result of acts of non-State actors being 
attributed to the State, but because the responsibility for any violations under the 
ACHR was engaged on the basis that there was a failure to guard against them.602 
However, this does not mean that it has no value to offer in suggesting better 
ways in which the question of attribution can be examined in cases coming before 
the ICJ. Some, as discussed in Chapter Two, have gone so far as to argue that State 
responsibility in these circumstances is not engaged on the basis of agency at all, but 
instead on complicity,603 thereby treating the question of responsibility for State 
support of armed groups under the ACHR as a lex specialis regime of attribution,604 
through which States can be seen to be responsible for support of the armed groups. 
That, as discussed before,605 is one way of addressing the lacunae in the positive law 
towards addressing State support of armed groups and the Court in Mapiripan have 
supported this.606 
However, the issue that remains is whether the approaches used by the 
IACtHR to determine the attribution of conduct of individuals, can be of any 
assistance in suggesting improvements to the tests of attribution of conduct applied 
by the ICJ when they are both premised upon distinctive rationales and have 
different objectives. At first sight, the answer would be no. However, an examination 
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of the circumstances in which “support or tolerance”607 of the armed group amount 
to direction or control by the State is important as the question of participation with 
the armed group in circumstances where there are obvious risks that mass atrocities 
can occur or have already occurred, and whether that level of collaboration with the 
group was sufficient to create a relationship that was one of dependence on the one 
side and control on the other.608 In Mapiripan609, the level of collaboration was 
sufficient to indicate a link. Thus in terms of incorporating approaches from other 
regimes in a parallel manner, this suggestion of approaching the link between States 
and armed groups on the basis of collaboration is significant.  
4.4 Discussion  
The suggestion that alternative standards for the tests of attribution for the 
purpose of State responsibility could be derived from the jurisprudence of human 
rights courts does not situate well with many commentators. Milanović, as discussed 
in Chapter Three, found that the rules of State responsibility should not be conflated 
with the rules concerning, determination of jurisdiction for the purpose of 
applicability of international human rights obligations.610 As noted in that chapter, he 
found that State responsibility has a distinct purpose as “it arose from the muddied 
waters of diplomatic protection and treatment of aliens and should now try to resist 
being dragged back into the methodological mud made up of different substantive 
primary rules.”611 Implicit in his argument is the fear that that if a comparative 
approach were to be used, it would be dangerous as the Human Rights Courts 
approach the question of attribution in relation to existing primary obligations that 
exist either on an erga omnes or erga omnes partes basis. The ICJ has distinguished 
the questions of primary obligations from its secondary rules of which attribution is 
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one. However, though the fear is understandable considering other approaches 
towards an assessment of facts in understanding links and the underlying nature or 
contexts of State relationships with armed groups is not dragging the questions of 
attribution back into a methodological mud. 
The law is a tool for assessing and remedying the wrongs whether those 
wrongs are delictual, criminal or as with international law, neither of these. Method 
should support the fact finding process, so the consideration of different methods or 
approaches is not seeking to conflate primary with secondary rules. Instead it is 
seeking to determine whether the process of fact finding under the secondary rules 
can consider degrees of State assistance more inclusively and in so doing address the 
apparent disconnection between the State and the non-State armed group, in order to 
reveal that the influence being exercised over the group was controlling; and thus 
that it should be brought into the open, analysed and, indeed, judged. 
The Decisions discussed in this chapter, both from the IACtHR and the 
ECtHR, operate on a more progressive basis in terms of how they are approaching 
the questions of attribution. Granted they are considering the questions of attribution 
in relation to determining jurisdiction, but this does not preclude the adoption of 
their more searching methods towards consideration of questions of relationships of 
control or dependence between the State and the armed group through which they 
assess the pragmatic results of State support and direction in all fields. The trend in 
the IACtHR towards addressing the relationship in nuanced way, distinguishing 
tolerance from collaboration or support, shows a more hands-on approach to the 
evidence. The trend in the ECtHR to evaluate in detail the questions surrounding 
dependence by analysing in painstaking detail the effect of funds transfer, debt 
forgiveness and provision of arms and equipment is not an approach to be ridiculed. 




of stating and restating the law, but also to develop it to meet the requirements of a 
dynamic international society.612 
This is being done by other international courts. For instance, while the 
ECtHR in the cases analysed above was looking at questions concerning the 
existence of “jurisdiction” within the meaning of Article 1 ECHR, the finding that 
such jurisdiction existed in those cases was only possible due the European Court 
giving full effect to the reality of the relationship between the TRNC and Turkey (in 
Loizidou) and between the MRT and Russia (in Ilaşcu v Moldova) in its assessment 
of the nexus between the Respondent State and the self-proclaimed government it 
supported. In a similar way, the ICJ should also factor in a full understanding of the 
nature and effect of the relationship between the State and the group, thus allowing a 
broader understanding of the role the State played in the operations of the groups it 
sponsored.  
Despite contrary arguments, the test for attribution of conduct of indviduals 
to States is not settled. In his 2014 publication on State responsibility, Crawford did 
provide an unqualified statement that the test was settled. He noted that the 
Dissenting Opinion by Judge Al Khasawneh613 objected to the test prescribed by the 
Majority.614 
Thus notwithstanding arguments to the contrary at both the judicial and 
academic levels, there is a need to continue to critique and reconsider the test for 
attribution of conduct for individuals as this test is the fulcrum for addressing the 
current questions of responsibility for State support of armed groups and perhaps 
consideration and inclusion of approaches from other international courts and 
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tribunals in the assessment of “control” will go a long way in addressing the current 
lacuna in law towards addressing State responsibility for support of armed groups 
who commit international crimes or later go on to commit international crime. 
In the next chapter, this issue of interpretation of “control” is investigated by 
examining the tests from the international criminal law regime with a view to 
determining the extent to which these approaches towards the determination of 
control or dependence can be used to modify the ICJ approach towards attribution on 





Chapter Five: The Tests for Assigning Criminal 
Responsibility in the International Criminal 
Courts and Tribunals 
5.1 Individual responsibility for participation in crimes of a 
collective nature  
This chapter examines the different ways in which individuals are assigned 
responsibility in the international criminal law regime for participating collectively 
in international crimes. This is done with a view to assessing whether there are 
useful approaches from the international criminal courts towards suggesting 
appropriate modifications of the tests of attribution of conduct to States. The aim of 
this enquiry is to determine the extent to which implementation of similar 
approaches in dealing with individuals can be applied mutatis mutandis to States so 
as to more fully reflect the role of the State in the commission of international crimes 
perpetrated by non-State armed groups. 
The international criminal law regime has, from its very inception, 
considered questions of allocation of criminal responsibility for participation in 
crimes of a “collective” nature in a sustained and detailed manner. Although this 
thesis accepts that the regime of State responsibility and the individual regime of 
responsibility are predicated on different rules and tests, there is a common link 
between them because they are both involved in the assigning of responsibility based 
on individual conduct. This chapter suggests that the approach of the international 
criminal courts towards the assigning of responsibility to individuals for 
participation in a common criminal plan could be applied to considerations of 
determination of State control over the acts of individuals in circumstances where 
these individuals commit international crimes. The regime of individual 
responsibility has considered these questions of individual participation not only in 
the context of collectively perpetrated crimes where the “collective” involves 
relationships between different branches of the State, but also relationships between 
State agents and members of paramilitary groups or other private entities and thus 




assigning individual responsibility in these circumstances can usefully inform 
suggested modification of the tests of attribution of conduct of individuals to States. 
As discussed in the next sections, the question of how to apportion 
responsibility for international crimes involving multiple participants has engaged 
the attention of the international criminal tribunals since the creation of the IMT, 
International Military Tribunal of the Far East (“IMTFE”) and the Tribunals 
established under Control Council Law No. 10 at Nuremberg, persistently up to the 
creation of the modern tribunals and courts such as the ICTY, ICTR, different hybrid 
or “internationalised” tribunals and the ICC because of particular problematic 
aspects associated with the diversity and the scale of participation. As such, 
particular modes of participation through which responsibility could be assigned 
(“modes of responsibility”) have been developed to address these problematic 
aspects. This chapter thus discusses the modes of responsibility that have been 
applied in the international criminal courts and tribunals to overcome these 
problematic aspects. 
5.2 The challenges posed by the prosecution of international 
crimes 
A first problematic aspect of the prosecution of international crimes derives 
from the fact that the crimes in question see the participation, at various levels and in 
different capacities, of multiple individuals. This requires international criminal 
tribunals to identify principles of attribution which can, as far as possible, distinguish 
“adequately between the various participants in mass atrocity and label their 
responsibility accurately.”615  
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The second problematic aspect concerns the “systemic nature” of 
international crimes, which are inherently different from their domestic counterparts. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, while domestic crimes carry with them societal 
reprehension of the anti-social individual, who is to be penalised for the harm he has 
inflicted on society,616 those individuals who participate in international crimes are 
not seen as being “social deviants”. Their commission of crimes is integrated into the 
fabric of society whereby these actions are instigated, motivated and condoned by 
the State.617 As Neha Jain puts it, there is a “communal engagement with 
violence,”618 or, as Vetlesen argues, an “internalisation of ideology,”619 so that 
ultimately there is a system of criminality.620 Thus international crimes, unlike their 
domestic counterparts, do not represent the actions of criminal individuals acting in 
isolation, but instead represent criminal individual actions that are contextualised 
within the wider system of State-condoned criminality. Therefore it was always 
necessary that devising appropriate approaches towards the determination of 
responsibility addressed individual responsibility in the context of collective 
criminality without veering into collective guilt.  
There is a further, third problematic aspect which relates to this systemic 
dimension, which is that the scale of participation in international crimes is vast, thus 
linking the Accused to other participants is difficult. This is because the individual 
who completed the actus reus of the offence is often remotely connected to other 
participants, particularly high-level individuals who participated in the crime by 
either formulating the criminal policy, providing arms and equipment or simply 
being an impetus to the commission of international crimes even though they were 
outside of defined chains of command.  
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The challenge thus facing prosecutors is the determination of appropriate 
modes, theories or approaches towards assigning responsibility on an individual 
basis where international crimes are collectively perpetrated with a tremendous 
number of participants who are often remotely connected to each other. 
Consequently, this challenge was overcome by different courts and tribunals 
by identifying modes of responsibility that could, as far as possible, fairly label the 
responsibility of these individuals appropriately and consequently ensure that the 
punishment inflicted on them matched the severity or seriousness of the role they 
played in the wider system of criminality.  
International criminal law, since its inception, has been influenced by 
domestic criminal law doctrines. While there is an increasing move towards a more 
comparative approach and the use and adaptation of domestic doctrines, as the 
introduction of German doctrines into the jurisprudence of the ICC shows, the IMT, 
IMTFE and the post-Second World War Tribunals set up under Control Council Law 
No. 10 relied heavily on Anglo-American criminal doctrines for assigning criminal 
responsibility based on complicity or accessory liability. Through accessory liability, 
individuals are labelled as perpetrators or accomplices/accessories to the crime 
(generally referred to as an “accomplice”). In addition to this, the law on complicity 
liability suggests that an accomplice can participate in an offence under one of two 
particular models of participation – either unitary or differentiated.621  
Under the unitary approach, all those who contribute to the commission of a 
crime are treated equally for the purposes of criminal responsibility; in other words, 
under this approach, “[t]here are no accomplices; all are principals”.622 Under this 
model, there is no differentiation for the purposes of attribution among the 
participants to the collectively perpetrated crime as they are all treated as 
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confederates to the same criminal purpose on the basis that “there is little difference 
between the responsibility of the principal and accessory for the outcome”.623  
Criminal law, as some writers have posited, is premised on the notion that a 
crime is a moral wrong for which an individual is personally responsible for the fault 
or culpa he bears in causing harm to the public.624 The unitary model of participation 
sees personal fault for infliction of harm as being spread through the cooperation of 
the participants, so that culpability could stretch to participants without whose skills, 
dynamism or influence the criminal activity could not have occurred, thereby 
meriting the unity of attribution.625 The only scope for differential treatment among 
participants is in their punishment. According to David Ormerod and Karl Laird, 
“[t]he courts have generally seen their task as one of fitting the penalty to the 
particular degree of iniquity… of the offender.”626 Thus, differentiation among 
participants is left for the sentencing stage where the sentences upon the different 
participants are calibrated by application of judicial discretion.627  
Under the differentiated approach, by contrast, there is a distinction both at 
the stage of attribution of responsibility, as well as in the punishment that is meted 
out to the different participants at the sentencing stage. This is accomplished by 
classifying individual roles for collectively participating in the commission of a 
crime into two broad categories: on the one hand, the principal (or principals) to the 
crime, and, on the other, accessories to the crime or accomplices.628 The fault 
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element under this model, unlike the unitary model is not distributed between the 
two categories of individuals: the principal is seen to bear the greater share because 
the accessory or accomplice is seen as merely having provided assistance to the 
crime instead of participating in it. 
This model of participation is problematic when it comes to international 
crimes. Due to the unique nature of these crimes, it would not be fair that the person 
who would normally be considered to be the principal, ie the person closest to the 
physical commission (actus reus) of the offence,629 should be so labelled and 
consequently punished more harshly when they are not the true engineers of, or 
motivators behind, the crime. Moreover, a differentiated approach of the type just 
described would not pay sufficient recognition to the systemic dimension to these 
crimes because it underplays the role of some participants, insofar as it relegates 
their position as mere accomplices when the commission of international crimes was 
driven by a cooperation of all participants. This is because it was only with this scale 
of cooperation that these international crimes could have had a concomitant effect on 
the scale of victims. 
For these reasons, the drafters of the instruments establishing the various 
international criminal tribunals have generally looked towards adopting modes of 
responsibility that reflect a unitary approach. In this regard, there are five main 
modes of responsibility under a unitary model of participation that have been applied 
by international courts and tribunals, namely the IMT, IMTFE, tribunals set up under 
Control Council Law No. 10, the ICTY, ICTR and ICC and hybrid tribunals such as 
the SCSL who have patterned their Statutes after that of the ICTY. These modes are 
conspiracy, joint criminal enterprise, co-perpetration, indirect co-perpetration and 
superior responsibility. These Courts and Tribunals have in addition simultaneously 
applied “aiding and abetting,” planning, instigation and ordering as differentiated 
models of participation.  
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Since this thesis seeks to suggest modifications to the test of attribution of 
conduct to States by suggesting some of the approaches towards the assigning of 
responsibility from international criminal law, it concentrates on modes of 
responsibility that fall under unitary models of participation as these unitary models 
factor in the effect of participation on the assigning of criminal responsibility to the 
participants. Where a State agent planned, instigated or ordered international crimes 
to be committed by armed groups, proof of direction and control over the individuals 
who committed those crimes is readily established. Thus these tests are not 
particularly helpful in identifying viable suggestions for a variation in the test of 
attribution of responsibility to States which reflects more nuanced forms of 
involvement. Additionally, since the mode of superior responsibility630 addresses the 
assigning of responsibility, it (as the name suggests) is reliant on proof of a superior- 
subordinate relationship in order to trigger its application.631 It is also of limited 
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assistance in suggesting approaches towards questions of direction and control 
because they are also directly proven under this mode of responsibility and for the 
same reasons as planning, instigation or ordering, offers little assistance. 
Additionally, since this thesis, as earlier discussed, is focussed on variations 
of the test of attribution outlined under Articles 4 and 8 ARSIWA, it does not seek to 
discuss the responsibility of States under Article 16 ARSIWA for the purposes of 
complicity as those tests consider complicity in the context of relationships between 
States only and this thesis is focussed on identifying State responsibility for support 
of a non-State actor – armed groups. Thus the discussion on aiding and abetting as a 
mode of responsibility is limited as those modes of responsibility will not be put 
forwards for the suggested variations to the tests of attribution. The modes of 
responsibility which look towards direct responsibility under a unitary model of 
participation, namely conspiracy, joint criminal enterprise, co-perpetration and 
indirect perpetration is more useful as it can relate to the objectives of this thesis to 
address State responsibility outside of the law on complicity. The tests used to 
determine liability under these selected modes of responsibility are now examined. 
5.3 Conspiracy  
The modes of liability that were pursued at the IMT, IMTFE and the 
tribunals established under Control Council Law No. 10 provided a foundation upon 
which the later international courts and tribunals elaborated upon to work out 
appropriate tests to identify and determine individual guilt in the context of 
collective criminality.632 In the main, these early instruments and jurisprudence 
established that, notwithstanding the scale of participation and the apparent 
disconnect between the policy makers and high-level individuals who devised and 
supported these crimes and the lower-level individuals that committed the physical 
aspects of the crimes, they would all would be accountable on the basis of a shared 
plan. The introduction of this mode underscored an approach towards the assigning 
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of criminal responsibility that obtains currency today. This mode introduced the 
notion that international crimes are collectively perpetrated and thus the 
collaboration among the different participants to effect a common plan is central to 
any question of determination of individual responsibility.  
Under the Charter of the International Military Tribunal633 there were no 
discrete modes of commission or participation identified. It loosely articulated 
“conspiracy or common plan” into the last sentence of Article 6 IMT Charter. The 
provision in question, which established three crimes under the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal, namely crimes against the peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity 
in Article 6(a), (b) and (c), respectively,634 also provided that the IMT maintained 
jurisdiction to try persons as “individuals or as members of organisations”.635 
Furthermore, according to the last sentence in the same place,  
[l]eaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the 
formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of 
the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons 
in execution of such plan… 
However, despite the fact that the last sentence of Article 6 stipulated that the 
leaders, instigators and accomplices were responsible for conspiracy to “commit any 
of the foregoing crimes” listed in the provision, the Tribunal found that conspiracy or 
common plan only applied to crimes against the peace,636 thereby disregarding the 
attempt by the Prosecution in its initial Indictment to link the conspiracy to commit a 
crime against the peace to the commission of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, because the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity were 
“embraced or contemplated” in the “course of the common plan or conspiracy.”637  
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This conservative approach towards application of the conspiracy or common 
plan as a mode of responsibility was largely imitated by the IMTFE. The IMTFE 
also found that although the doctrine could only address crimes against the peace and 
saw no connection between crimes against the peace and the other two crimes under 
the Statute. It did, however, go further than the IMT because the Majority Judgment 
did not consider the time or decision of the action to invade territory relevant.638 At 
the heart of these early attempts to deal with responsibility on the basis of common 
plan or conspiracy there was a judicial fear that, without an appropriate definition of 
scope of the plan, it would result in loose imputations of guilt. While vigorously 
defending conspiracy before the IMT, even Jackson later took issue with it in later 
US prosecutions that similarly utilised it as a mode of liability akin to accomplice 
liability,639 referring to it as a sprawling and elastic doctrine.640 Today, its reach is 
critiqued as it is seen as veering into guilt by association.641 Due to this, its 
applications were, and still are limited to specific types of cases, such as racketeering 
and corruption where specific legislation allows its application.642  
Similar issues were also raised in connection with the inclusion of the 
provision on liability based on “membership in criminal organisations”. According 
to Bernays, who conceived of the mode, the conviction of an individual only 
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achieved its true moral significance, if the true nature of the instigation of the crime 
was addressed.643 According to him, individuals functioned within a group and thus 
were motivated by the criminal intentions of the group.644 The guilt of the individual 
thus had to be contextualised within the group, so that once an individual member of 
any group was tried, the IMT would be able to declare the organisation criminal645 
and where such a declaration was made, the IMT would have the “right to bring 
individuals to trial” as members.646 There was therefore no attribution of 
responsibility to the group in the strict legal sense but a declaration of criminality 
against the group and attribution of individual responsibility as members of the 
criminal group.647 
There was thus an incorporation of this concept into Articles 9,648 10649 and 
11650 of the IMT Charter and subsequent to this there was an incorporation of laws 
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convicted) that the group or organization of which the individual was a member was a criminal 
organization. Article 9(2) London Agreement: After the receipt of the Indictment the Tribunal shall 
give such notice as it thinks fit that the prosecution intends to ask the Tribunal to make such 
declaration and any member of the organization will be entitled to apply to the Tribunal for leave to 
be heard by the Tribunal upon the question of the criminal character of the organization. The Tribunal 
shall have power to allow or reject the application. If the application is allowed, the Tribunal may 
direct in what manner the applicants shall be represented and heard. 
646
 Article 10 (n 76): “In cases where a group or organization is declared criminal by the Tribunal, the 
competent national authority of any Signatory shall have the right to bring an individual to trial for 
membership therein before national, military or occupation courts. In any such case the criminal 
nature of the group or organization is considered proved and shall not be questioned.”  
647
 In the presentation of the case for the prosecution, Justice Jackson mentioned laws from several 
countries in which he posited there were pre-existing laws for collective criminality of groups. He 
cited examples such as the British India Act and US laws from the 1940s, which penalised 
membership in gangs. He also referred to French, Soviet and German Penal Codes which similarly 
addressed responsibility for membership in groups organised to perform banditry or crimes against 
the public peace.  
648
 Article 9(1) London Agreement (n 76). 
649
 Article 10 London Agreement (n 76). 
650
 Article 11 London Agreement (n 76): Any person convicted by the Tribunal may be charged 
before a national, military or occupation court, referred to in Article 10 of this Charter, with a crime 
other than of membership in a criminal group or organization and such court may, after convicting 
him, impose upon him punishment independent of and additional to the punishment imposed by the 




criminalising membership in organisations declared criminal in the Allied Nations 
and also in the occupied zones of Germany.651 Under Control Council Law No. 10, 
a criminal organisation is analogous to a criminal conspiracy, in that the 
essence of both is cooperation for criminal purposes [however] that 
definition should exclude persons who had no knowledge of the criminal 
purposes or acts of the organisations and those who were drafted by the 
state for membership, unless they were personally implicated in the 
commission of acts declared criminal by Article 6. … Membership alone is 
not enough.652 
Therefore an officer who took part in atrocities would thus only be 
responsible on the basis of individual participation. The declaration of criminality 
was not thus an attribution of responsibility to the group. Instead, there was a 
declaration of criminality and the attribution of responsibility to an individual would 
only occur if it was proven that he knew of the criminality of the organisation and 
was voluntarily participating in it. Furthermore, use of this method of declaration of 
criminality extended to administrative and judicial departments. For instance, in 
Josef Alstötter et al (the “Justice” case) the judicial system was described as being 
“perverted into a mechanism of the dictatorship” of the Third Reich.653 In this case 
the judiciary was declared criminal and all of its membership held criminally 
responsible for crimes under the IMT Charter. The defendants were all judges and 
prosecutors as well as ministerial officers. The organisation was seen as a conspiracy 
and thus participation through membership rendered the members culpable. 
However, though the mode was applied in the context of State organs, the 
same rationale was not applied in connection with non-State actors. Thus in the IG 
Farben case, the twenty-two defendants were all directors of a major German 
chemical company, who were charged with aggression, crimes against humanity and 
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war crimes due to the fact of having provided funding to the Nazi Party, and 
providing bomb-making materials.654 The US military court found that the 
defendants were not as they “[w]ere neither high public officials in the civil 
government nor high military Officers. Their participation was that of followers not 
leaders. If we lower the standard of participation to include them, it is difficult to 
find a logical place to draw the line between the guilty and the innocent among the 
great mass of German people. It is of course unthinkable that the majority of 
Germans should be condemned as guilty of committing crimes against peace. This 
would amount to a determination of collective guilt…”655 
As a functional tool for identifying individual responsibility in the context of 
collective criminality, therefore, the mode of conspiracy allowed the imputation of 
guilt based on voluntary and continued association with a criminal group. However, 
the IMT did not go so far as to allow this form of participation to implicate civilians 
in crimes against the peace.  
Moreover, although principles of Nuremberg were endorsed by the UN 
General Assembly in 1950,656 there was no inclusion of that early idea of 
organisations’ responsibility. In the later trials that commenced in the 1990s before 
the specially created the ICTY and the ICTR (“ad hoc” tribunals) and the hybrid 
tribunals, such as the SCSL, or the ECC, there is no reliance on conspiracy or 
organisational responsibility in the instruments. However, the concepts seem to have 
filtered into the understanding of common purpose liability particularly in the 
creation of the three categories of JCE, which have been developed to reflect 
different nuances in the variety of ways individuals participated in wide reaching 
common criminal ventures. Despite the limitations of conspiracy as a mode of 
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responsibility, it informed the approach towards individual assignment of 
responsibility by focussing on an individual’s involvement in a common plan. 
5.4 Joint Criminal Enterprise 
Joint Criminal Enterprise (“JCE”) is a mode of responsibility which 
addresses individual responsibility in the context of collective participation in 
circumstances where crimes are pursued at the collective level.”657 JCE was seen to 
be capable to match “the complex relationships and deliberative structures”658 
involved in “[t]he use of the paramilitary group[s] by the higher-level group of 
political and military leaders.”659 In these circumstances the high-level remote 
military or political leader is directly responsible for the criminal acts of armed 
groups on the basis that he was involved in a common plan or purpose with them. 
JCE was a graft of Anglo-based domestic principles of common purpose liability660 
into international criminal law.661 In its domestic form the mode evolved to deal with 
cases where it was unclear who was the aider or perpetrator.662 The term “joint 
enterprise” was therefore used to describe these situations of collectively perpetrated 
crimes.663 According to Smith, where there is a common purpose among participants, 
each Party is responsible for the acts of others carried out in pursuance of this 
agreement.664 The doctrine however has many variations and, again according to 
Smith, if an individual goes outside the remit of the agreement, his co-adventurers 
are not responsible for his acts,665 but the co-adventurers are responsible if that 
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unplanned act, though unintended, was nevertheless reasonably foreseeable to the 
other co-adventurers.666  
This mode of responsibility was articulated in the jurisprudence of the ICTY. 
Some commentators have identified the introduction of the doctrine of JCE as 
occurring with the Decision of the ICTY Trial Chamber against Anton Furundzija in 
1998,667 because it was the first conviction against an accused person made on the 
basis that he “participated in the purpose behind the offence.”668 Other commentators 
have cited the 1998 ICTY’s Trial Chamber’s Decision in the Delalic case669 as an 
introduction of this mode instead, due to the fact that the conviction of the 
individuals of the Čelebići camp were on the basis that there was a shared common 
plan among them.670 However, JCE formally entered into international criminal law 
jurisprudence in the 1999 Decision against Dusko Tadić by the Appeals Chamber of 
the ICTY, as this was the first Decision to identify and discuss JCE as a mode of 
responsibility in a rigorous manner. It was discussed in the determination of a cross-
Appeal filed by the Prosecution following an initial acquittal.671 On Appeal, Tadić 
was convicted for the killing of five men from Jaskici although he did not carry out 
the actus reus of the offence.672 This case is discussed in further detail as the case 
introduced different categories of JCE and these are analysed later in the chapter. 
The attribution of responsibility to him was based on the application of the common 
purpose or joint criminal enterprise doctrine which was read implicitly into the 
provisions of Article 7 of the ICTY Statute.673 This implicit reading was justified by 
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the Tribunal, on the basis that there was a foundation for the application of JCE on a 
customary basis.674  
Due to the fact that this mode of responsibility responds to situations where 
there are multiple offenders, there are multiple legal tests for assigning 
responsibility. This can be seen to create a level of uncertainty to the law as there is 
no one legal test for assigning responsibility where a common criminal enterprise 
existed. Consequently, its grafting onto customary international law did not have a 
smooth path675 and there was a need to delimit the parameters of its application very 
carefully. The end result is that JCE, as applied in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
courts, separated or categorised different factual scenarios in which the mode might 
be relevant and prescribed unique tests for each of these scenarios. Particularly, in 
the ad hoc jurisprudence there was consideration of the reach of the mode and some 
effort was made to establish limits and safeguards against imputation of guilt by 
association. In this way, it elaborated on the common law doctrine, but created more 
definition so as to label the responsibility of multiple participants in an international 
crime as fairly and clearly as possible. 
This was accomplished by the creation of three separate categories of JCE as 
modes of responsibility. The Appeals Chamber defined both physical and mental 
elements for the proof of JCE.676 There are three physical elements: plurality of 
persons, the existence of a common plan or purpose, and the participation of the 
Accused in the common plan or purpose.  
To elaborate on the physical elements, it would have to be established that 
there was a plurality of persons and this plurality did not necessarily have to be 
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organised into any specific political or administrative structure.677 Secondly, there 
would have to be in existence a common plan that did not have to be previously 
arranged or formulated, but which could have materialised extemporaneously.678 
This test was based on the very inclusive interpretation of “common plan” in the 
Tadić Appeals Decision that allowed for the consideration of all plans, including 
those formed in a spontaneous manner.679 The third element, as outlined by the 
Appeals Chamber was that there must have been participation in the common design 
involving the perpetration of one of the crimes provided for in the Statute. 
This participation need not involve the commission of a specific crime 
under one of those provisions… but may take the form of assistance in or 
contribution to the execution of the common plan or purpose.680 
These apply to all three forms of JCE. The mental elements, however, are 
different under the separate categories of JCE.681  
According to the ICTY Appeals Chamber, the first category JCE or “JCE 
1,”682 applied to “cases of co-perpetration, where all individuals voluntarily 
participated in the common design and shared the same criminal intent to commit a 
crime and one or more of them actually perpetrated the crime with intent.”683 The 
second category or “JCE 2” applied to cases where “the offences charged were 
alleged to have been committed by members of military or administrative units, such 
as those running concentration camps.”684 This was referred to in later cases as the 
“concentration camp cases JCE” or “systemic JCE.”685 This applied to cases where 
officials of concentration camps had personal knowledge of international crimes 
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being committed in the camp and were found to have had an ntent to further the 
criminal purpse by sharing in the common intention to commit these crimes.686 The 
third category JCE or “JCE 3” applied to cases involving “a common design to 
pursue one course of conduct where one of the perpetrators commits an act, which 
while outside the common design, was nevertheless a natural and foreseeable 
consequence of effecting that common purpose.”687 These are discussed in more 
detail in the following sub-sections. 
5.4.1 JCE 1 – The “shared intention” 
Individuals would be responsible under the JCE 1 if they “voluntarily 
participated in one aspect of the common design, even if they did not personally 
effect the physical act.”688 The key element was the sharing of an intention of the 
criminal result. Two cases are discussed in the following sub-sections to illustrate the 
approach used by the Appeals Chamber in assigning responsibility under this mode. 
5.4.1.1 The Tadić Appeal 
This sharing of intention was evidenced in Tadić689, and in some other cases 
involving small-scale criminal enterprises by a division of roles or some other 
significant act of causation.690 This provided a moral justification to treat the 
Accused as direct co-perpetrators with parity of culpability, since to hold only one 
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person liable as perpetrator would disregard the role of all the others who had “in 
some way made it possible for the perpetrator to carry out the physical act.”691  
This emphasis on a significant act of causation to evidence a shared intention 
in a common criminal purpose is not new. It seemed to have had some early 
precedent at the Nuremberg trials and this was relied on as evidence of the 
customary root of this doctrine by the Appeals Chamber.692 Five cases that were tried 
under Control Council Law No. 10 were examined in the Tadić Appeals Chamber 
Decision – the George Otto Sandrock case (the “Almelo Trial”),693 Hoelzer et al,694 
Jespen and others,695 Schonfeld696 and the Ponzano case.697 All five cases dealt with 
such significant acts that were either a direct role in a common criminal plan to kill 
prisoners of war or an indirect form of assistance that helped bring about the offence. 
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For instance, in the Almelo case,698 one man fired the fatal bullet at the Dutch 
prisoner of war while another stood as look out; or in Ponzano699 orders were given 
for execution without clear proof that the execution was the Decision of a lawfully 
constituted Court. 
In all the judgments there was a reference to liability that could perhaps be 
best summed up in the dictum given by the Judge Advocate in the Ponzano case, 
which concerned the killing of three British officers in the vicinity of Ponzano di 
Miagra. Here, the Judge Advocate found that an Accused did not have to inflict the 
fatal injury. It was sufficient that he was merely a “cog in the wheel of events 
leading up to the result.”700 
The mode of responsibility could thus be proven where there was evidence of 
division of roles to the common plan. Further, each of the roles should have 
demonstrated a link in the chain of causation leading up to the offence. These roles 
should also have been with the knowledge that the criminal plan was being effected, 
so that while the participation did not have to be the sine qua non, it should 
nevertheless form a link in the chain of causation.701  
This analysis of knowledge of the common plan with a heavy focus on the 
distribution of roles was evident in the later jurisprudence coming out of the ICTY 
and also in the ICTR. However, later cases suggested the inclusion of further tests so 
as to limit a “generally expansive” use of this category,702 with some inquiry being 
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made as to whether JCE with its focus on the division of roles in a common plan 
could be pleaded in relation to large-scale plans, that encompassed relationships 
between leaders and various paramilitary groups and regular forces, or whether that 
could be criticised as an overreaching of this mode of responsibility.703 To this end, 
there was further enquiry as to the scope of assignment of individual responsibility 
for criminal participation under this category of JCE in the Trial Chamber’s Decision 
in the Brdjanin case.704  
5.4.1.2 The Brdjanin Decisions 
In this case, the Prosecution had pleaded on the Indictment that Brjdjanin, 
together with other high-level individuals from the Serbian Democratic Party and the 
leadership of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia–Herzegovina, together with the army 
of the Republika Srspska and Bosnian-Serb paramilitaries, participated in a joint 
enterprise for genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches to the Geneva 
Conventions and Violations to the Laws and customs of war. The common plan 
under consideration was the “Strategic Plan” among the Bosnian-Serb leadership and 
the Bosnian-Serb representatives of the armed forces to link areas that were mainly 
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populated by persons of Serb descent and to eventually gain control of these areas 
and forcibly and permanently remove all persons of non-Serb descent.705 This plan 
could only have been implemented through instilling fear and by force against non-
Serbs.706 
The Trial Chamber, here, in discussing the tests used to determine proof of 
mens rea under JCE 1, suggested that there must be proof that there “was a common 
plan between the member of the JCE physically committing the material crime 
charged and the person held responsible under the JCE for that crime.”707 As a result, 
the count failed in relation to the JCE, because, according to the Trial Chamber, 
[t]he Accused can only be held criminally responsible under the mode of 
liability of JCE if the Prosecution establishes beyond reasonable doubt that 
he had an understanding or entered into an agreement with the Relevant 
Physical Perpetrators to commit the particular crime eventually perpetrated 
or if the crime perpetrated by the Relevant Physical Perpetrators is a natural 
and foreseeable consequence of the crime agreed upon by the Accused and 
the Relevant Physical Perpetrators…708 
It further found that there was no agreement among the physical perpetrators 
and the Accused and indeed, any of the high-level authors who formulated this 
Strategic Plan. These high-level authors remained “structurally remote” from the 
physical perpetrators.709 They postulated that although there was a common plan, ie 
the Strategic plan, all participants driven by the same motive to implement the plan 
could have done so without agreement with each other. Alternatively the relevant 
physical perpetrators could have committed those crimes as a result of orders from 
their paramilitary superiors. That meant the individuals committing the crimes were 
never involved in the common plan between their paramilitary superiors and the 
Accused.710 Thus, in the absence of an agreement between the relevant physical 
perpetrators and the high-level Accused, in these large-scale crimes, there is room to 
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reasonably infer that the relevant physical perpetrators were committing international 
crimes independently of the Accused.711 This finding was also based on the Trial 
Chamber’s drawing of a distinction between an “espousal” of a plan as opposed to an 
actual agreement among participants.712 The Trial Chamber suggested that where 
there is a vast scale of participation, JCE 1 may not be appropriate as a mode of 
responsibility, as the Tadić Appeals Chamber Decision focussed on a far smaller 
scale of enterprise.713 This reasoning was rejected on Appeal.714  
The Brdjanin Appeal addressed a core set of cases from the ad hoc 
jurisprudence to determine whether proof of participation in a common plan required 
proof of agreement among all participants. 
As that as the cases tried after the Second World War focussed on a loose 
notion of being “concerned,” they could not neatly fit into the categories of JCE 
discussed by the ICTY.715 Acknowledging this, the Brdjanin Appeals Chamber 
Decision nevertheless found that there were two significant cases that addressed 
large-scale enterprises in which the accused persons were remotely connected to the 
physical perpetrators. The cases in question were United States v Greifelt and others 
(the so-called RuSha case)716 and the Justice case,717 both tried under Control 
Council Law No. 10. 
The Appeals Chamber noted that in the Justice case, both the physical 
perpetrator and a person connected with plans or enterprises involving the 
commission of a crime were considered to have “committed” the crime.718 There was 
a perversion of the German Justice system whereby petty infractions of the law 
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resulted in serious charges being levied against Jews so that the Justice system 
resulted in the torture and ill treatment of thousands during detention and after 
sentence.719 This was sufficient to inculpate the Chief Justice, Chief Prosecutor and 
other officials from the Justice system who conformed to the criminal policies of the 
Nazi State.720  
The same reasoning was also applied in United States v Greifelt and others. 
Here the Military Tribunal opined that while an Accused may not have physically 
carried out an evacuation of populations, if there are orders signed by him, he can be 
inculpated and in fact “his participation by instigating the action is more pronounced 
than that of those who actually performed the deed…”721 
In both cases, the question of participation in a common criminal plan did not 
require proof of agreement between the physical perpetrators and the high-level 
Accused who were responsible for ideologically driven policy. The Appeals 
Chamber also looked at more contemporary authorities and noted that two key cases 
from the ICTY also addressed this question of whether agreement among 
participants was required as proof of intention to participate in a common plan and 
the applicability of JCE in large-scale criminal enterprises: Krstić722 and Stakić.723 
In Krstić, the Trials Chamber did not require the physical perpetrators to have 
been members of the JCE.724 Krstić was a general of the Drina Corps in the 
Republika Srpska army. Krstić and the political and military leadership of the VRS 
formulated a plan to permanently remove the Bosnian Muslims from Srebenica and 
take over the enclave.725 According to the Trials Chamber, where the crimes that 
were committed 
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fell within the object of the joint criminal enterprise, the prosecution must 
establish that the accused shared with the person who personally perpetrated 
the crime the state of mind required for that crime…726 
Here, the Trial Chamber focussed on the sharing of the common intention 
and did not evidence that from proof of agreement between the different participants. 
According to the Trials Chamber, Krstić’s intention was clearly proven in this 
category of JCE on the basis of his “extensive participation” in the criminal 
enterprise.727 The Trial Chamber found that the humanitarian crisis that prevailed 
during the forced evacuation was evident and that it was so instrumental to the 
forced evacuation that “it cannot but have also fallen within the object of the 
criminal enterprise.”728 Thus regardless of proof of an agreement between the 
Accused and the relevant physical perpetrators, the Trial Chamber found that there 
was an intention to share in a common criminal enterprise. This finding was not 
overturned on Appeal.729  
Similarly in Stakić, the common enterprise was among high-level political 
leaders, the police and military, but the physical crimes were committed by other 
individuals including members from paramilitary groups.730 There was no separate 
requirement that there be an agreement between those committing the actus reus of 
the crimes and those who designed it. What was imperative was that there be some 
sharing of the intent for the common plan and that the use of the mode of 
responsibility, in some way reflected “the responsibility of those who made it 
possible for the perpetrators to carry out the criminal acts.”731 As to the issue of 
whether this mode of responsibility can be used to address large-scale commission of 
crimes or systemic crimes in that it involves a substantial degree of State machinery, 
the Appeals Chamber found the mode to be applicable.  
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The Brdjanin Appeals Chamber fortified itself on this position by applying 
the Rwamakuba Decision before the ICTR.732 In the Rwamakuba case, the Defence 
also argued that JCE was inappropriate to address responsibility for genocide 
because there was no customary rule to suggest that the mode could be extended to 
genocide.733 They also argued that the mode was “confined to crimes with greater 
specificity in relation to the identity and relationship as between the co-perpetrators 
and victims to the extent they dealt with specific incidents and situations.”734 The 
Appeals Chamber rejected this again relying on the Justice case.735 The Appeals 
Chamber opined that the Justice case “shows that liability for participation in a 
criminal plan is as wide as the plan itself, even if the plan amounts to a “nation-wide 
government-organized system of cruelty and injustice.”736 Accordingly, in 
Rwamakuba, the liability for the genocide could be similarly based as detailed in the 
travaux préparatoires to the Genocide Convention whereby the overall objective of 
the Convention was to suppress and punish this crime at all stages, including all the 
successive stages to the perpetration including incitement, preparation and 
attempt.737 
The outcome of the Brdjanin Appeal was that he was convicted on the basis 
of JCE 1 because he participated in a common plan with the relevant physical 
perpetrators. There was no need to prove that he entered into a specific agreement 
with each armed group or military formation, what was sufficient was that each of 
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them were participating in some aspect of the common plan with a view to effect a 
forced evacuation at all costs. 
That being so, there was strong precedent to apply the JCE in circumstances 
whereby there is no agreement among the physical perpetrators such as 
paramilitaries or lower-level soldiers and the high-level planners, once it was clear 
the physical perpetrators committed the crimes in response to the plans for the 
crimes that were made by high-level planners whose objectives these physical 
perpetrators executed. 
5.4.1.3 Discussion 
The cases discussed above were crucial in introducing an analysis of the 
effect of participation in the assigning of responsibility to an Accused. The mode 
dissolved the distinction between the perpetrator and the so-called accessory and 
instead introduced a mode of responsibility that held the individual far removed from 
the physical perpetration of the act equally responsible as the physical perpetrator 
because he shared the same intention as that individual. The cases showed that this 
sharing of an intention focussed on a common plan that could either have been 
express or implied. In each instance, it was not necessary that the accused person be 
shown to have had express agreement with the physical perpetrator but that this 
agreement with the physical perpetrator could be inferred. The cases showed the 
ratio of the Tribunal in arriving at these conclusions. Both cases have been of general 
application in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal. The cases are significant because 
they show that the accused persons were responsible because the shared intention 
was sufficient to create a link between the participants, each of whom had different 
roles. The issue here is whether this approach towards assessment of the link 
between the high-level State agent and an apparently random armed group member 
can usefully applied to the tests of attribution of conduct to individuals in the State 
responsibility regime.  
Katrina Gustafson, in defence of JCE 1, critiqued the attempt to limit the 
ambit of the operation of the doctrine by reference to an agreement between physical 




requirement goes against the very rationale underpinning this mode of responsibility 
which is that 
in a context of system criminality, the leaders of criminal activity are often 
removed from the physical commission of crimes, while at the same time 
are thought to bear at least the same, if not greater, responsibility for these 
crimes as compared to the principal perpetrators…738 
Thus, an attempt to impose this almost artificial limitation was based on a 
flawed understanding of the rationale and requirements of this mode of 
responsibility. Thus quite distinct from the crime is the consideration of the impact 
of the initial plan on others who for one reason or the other shared in that intention 
and a consideration of how that plan was effected. It perhaps would not be best to 
see some as “members” or “non-members” of the plan but instead to see the different 
participants as operating in one overall enterprise through different concurrent acts 
created by a diversity of roles, or as the Italian doctrine posits, there is a concurrence 
of interdependent causes, “causa causae est causa causati”.739  
The overall enterprise could be broken up into workable components through 
which plans, as a matter of practicality, can be effected. This is referred to by Elies 
van Sliedregt as the concept of delinking.740 What van Sliedregt sees is that instead 
of using the prosecution strategy to charge one large-scale joint enterprise, liability 
could instead be engaged for those who participate in separate but linked JCEs, 
which run in tandem with each other.741 According to her, 
[w]hile the Appeals Chamber accepts that JCE liability may attach to those 
participating in large scale criminal enterprises, the ‘interlinked JCE’ seems 
to be the preferred theory in cases such as Brdjanin, with policy makers on 
one hand and executors or foot soldiers on the other hand.742 
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Thus, if knowledge can be imputed to at least one member in each enterprise, 
then there is a link in the overall chain of causation. So emerging from this are 
separate JCEs in which there are different members. The non-members of one are 
linked to the other through a common denominator, which is the overall policy 
approach by the State that supports the commission of the crimes.  
If this idea of separate but linked JCEs is taken to its logical conclusion, it is 
a viable tool to address system-wide criminal enterprises which incorporate a variety 
of actors and thus usefully suggest an approach through which the conduct of all 
individuals engaging in the crime could be seen as being attributable to the State 
because the paramilitary groups are in reality acting on behalf of the State by giving 
effect to its policies or plans. This creates control over the operations in which the 
crimes occur because the crimes of apparently disconnected groups in apparently 
separate JCEs are really all committed in obedience to the State, as they effect the 
underlying criminal policy or plan. The jurisprudence of the ICC has not utilised this 
mode of responsibility and instead have applied the doctrine of co-perpetration. The 
use of co-perpetration was discussed by Judge Schomburg in Stakić743 and 
Gacumbitsi.744 It never took root in the ad hoc jurisprudence but has been identified 
as a mode of liability in several indictments from the ICC. These two Decisions and 
their relevance to these stated conclusions are discussed in section 5.5. 
5.4.2 JCE 2 – Inference of intention from knowledge of the common plan 
The second category of JCE (JCE 2) builds on the elements of JCE 1, so that 
in addition to requiring proof of a shared intent for the crime, there must be further 
evidence that the Accused had personal knowledge of the “system of ill treatment”745 
as well as an intention to further a criminal purpose.746 In the next sections the 
approach used by the Appeals Chamber in assigning responsibility under this mode 
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is discussed by revisiting the Tadić Appeal Decision and two further cases that 
applied the mode. 
5.4.2.1 The Tadić Appeal 
According to the Tadić Appeals Chamber, in order to prove the subjective 
elements of this mode, firstly, the Accused must have personal knowledge of the 
nature of the system and secondly, the Accused must be shown to intend to further 
the common concerted design for ill treatment.747 Both requirements could be 
inferred automatically based on the rank or official position of the Accused and this 
would show the “common design and the intent to participate therein.”748 The 
identification of these principles were based on two selected cases decided by the 
Nuremberg Tribunals established under Control Council Law No. 10.749 The 
reference to the term ‘system’ by the ICTY750 was not in relation to large-scale 
systems of actors, but more to the fact that there was a defined system for the 
perpetration of crimes. The Tribunal referred to the Dachau Concentration Camp 
case751 and Belsen,752 both of which dealt with trials of German authorities for 
offences committed in concentration camps. In both these cases, the accused men 
were found guilty for specific instances of ill treatment of the detainees as well as 
killing in the concentration camps. Under this head, participation and intent to 
participate in the criminal acts were automatically inferred based on the rank and 
position of the accused men within the camps. The Appeals Tribunal did not expand 
further as to the application of this approach. There are limited examples of the 
application of JCE 2, but two of these are discussed below.  
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5.4.2.2 The Kvočka Appeal 
The Kvočka753 and Kronjelac754 Appeal Chambers’ Decisions provide further 
interpretation of how these two elements are to be interpreted and applied.755 
Kvočka was charged together with several other guards from the Omarska 
camp. These camps were established after the Serbian takeover of Prijedor in 1992 to 
detain individuals in opposition to the takeover.756 He was described by the Appeal 
Chamber as the functional equivalent of the Deputy Commander and had some 
degree of authority over the guards at the Omarska camp.757 He made limited 
attempts to prevent crime or alleviate suffering of the detainees at the hands of 
service guards at the camp.758 Furthermore, he played a crucial role in “maintaining 
the functioning of the camp” despite his obvious awareness that the camp was a 
“criminal endeavour.”759  
Despite Kvočka’s claims that he was not aware of the criminal activities at 
the camp, the Appeals Chamber found differently. To the Chamber, the conditions at 
the camp, including the widespread ill treatment and harsh detention conditions, 
would have been obvious to anyone working at the camp, even for a few hours.760 
This was even more so in the case of Kvočka who was in a position of authority at 
the camp.761 The Appeals Chamber found that the requirement that the accused 
person be aware of the criminal objectives of the system was met.762  
In discussing the ratio for finding Kvočka responsible at the Omarska camp, 
the Trial Chamber found that Kvočka opted to work at the camps and was in a 
position of authority over other guards committing acts of abuse against the 
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detainees763 and would regularly have received information regarding this abuse.764 
Moreover, he had the power to prevent the crimes and did so only on a few 
occasions, and to the contrary maintained functioning of the system.765 Thus not only 
was there knowledge of the criminal system but an active participation in fulfilling 
it.766 The Appeals Chamber upheld these finding and endorsed proof of these two 
factors that were relied on by the Trials Chamber in determining this mode of 
responsibility.767 There was further elaboration of these tests in the later Kronjelac 
Appeals Chamber Decision. 
5.4.2.3 Kronjelac Appeal 
Kronjelac was a commander at the KP Dom concentration camp. He was 
alleged to have participated in a common criminal purpose for the persecution and ill 
treatment of Muslim and non-Serb detainees at the camp.768 This case further 
discussed the extent to which an accused person under this mode can be held 
responsible on the basis of inference of a shared intent with members of the system, 
where those other members went on to commit crimes of specific intent.  
According to the Trial Chamber, Kronjelac could not be found liable under 
this mode because there was no evidence that he entered into an agreement with 
other members of the camp769to abuse the detainees and thus lacked the intent to 
commit the particular crime charged.770 Further, since it could not be proven that he 
shared an intention with these other employees to further the criminal purpose 
because he did not enter into an agreement with them,771 he could not be found 
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responsible under JCE 2 and instead was convicted under the lower mode of aiding 
and abetting.772 
The Appeals Chamber overturned this and reinstated convictions for JCE,773 
finding that his knowledge of the system in place was sufficient to infer his intention 
to participate in the crimes committed as part of that system.774 On the question of 
whether the second element was proved, the Appeals Chamber found that there was 
no express requirement to prove that Kronjelac had entered into any agreement with 
his subordinates. According to the Appeals Chamber, 
the intent of the participants other than the principal offenders presupposes 
personal knowledge of the system of ill-treatment (whether proven by 
express testimony or a matter of reasonable inference from the accused’s 
position of authority) and the intent to further the concerted system of ill-
treatment. Using these criteria, it is less important to prove that there was a 
more or less formal agreement between all the participants than to prove 
their involvement in the system…775 
According to the Appeals Chamber, what was important was that the Accused 
simply intended to further this system of ill treatment and this could be established 
by the inference of intent from the facts, namely “Kronjelac’s duties, his knowledge 
of the system in place, the crimes committed as part of that system and their 
discriminatory nature…”776 
Unlike JCE 1 with a requirement to prove a shared intention, in this system- 
or group-based category where there was an organised structure within the group, all 
that was relevant was that within that group the Accused demonstrated the will to 
further the common approach towards ill treatment.  
Similar to Kvočka therefore, the assigning of criminal responsibility was 
upheld simply on the basis of an inference of intention to participate in the crimes of 
other camp employees, simply by virtue of a high position in a defined system that 
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was routinely effecting international crimes. This shared intention however was not 
based on an act of control by the State agent in the system but his acquiescence. 
5.4.2.4 Discussion  
Of all the categories of JCE applied by the ad hoc tribunals, JCE 2 has been 
applied most limitedly. As a mode of responsibility it draws most heavily on the 
Nuremberg ideas of imputations of intent resulting from association in an 
organisation. While the mode did not resort to the assigning of responsibility on the 
basis of responsibility as member, the manner in which the tests for intention have 
been applied, by referring heavily on presumptions of knowledge and consequent 
inferences of intent, make the mode less suited for the proposed modifications to 
tests of attribution of conduct by the ICJ. 
While it may be possible to assign responsibility in this automatic manner in 
a confined system as a concentration camp, it will be overreaching to suggest its 
usefulness to large-scale enterprises. The mode has been applied only with reference 
to these concentration camp type situations. 
Of the three strains, the way in which JCE 2 inferred intention, on the basis 
of acquiescence or failure to prevent crimes of subordinates, is not immediately 
useful, in suggesting a parallel approach towards the determination of direction or 
control. This is because the State responsibility regime views duties to prevent or 
punish under primary obligations. Thus to suggest an approach that merges the two 
might conflate the distinction between primary and secondary rules. Where it can 
have potential to suggest meaningful approaches is to the extent that one State agent 
was aware of the system of criminality that was either ongoing in another State 
which he was supporting or in armed groups under his patronage or that of the State 
he was supporting.  
According to the test clarified in Kvočka, personal knowledge of the system 




activities within the system are not proven, once there is an awareness later on that is 
sufficient to consider intention.777 For reasons discussed above, this approach might 
not be immediately useful as with this mode there were defined power structures and 
lines of command thereby assisting with questions of complicity through omission. 
With the questions of direction and control in the context of the regime of State 
responsibility under consideration in this thesis, there are not these defined lines of 
command so the inference of knowledge in a structured systemic environment might 
be an overreaching of the suggestions for subtle variations to the current tests of 
attribution. 
An interesting possible application of JCE 2 outside of the concentration 
camp situation was in one of the Decisions, Prosecutor v Jose Cardoso Ferreira,778 
coming out of East Timor’s Special Panels for Serious Crimes.779 Section 14.3(a) of 
this instrument mirrors Article 25 of the Rome Statute. The Panel applied JCE under 
this mode of liability, reading it as the “mode of participation envisaged in section 
14(a).”780 The Accused was a member of the Kaer Mutin Meran Putih militia and, 
though not a commander, he participated in several acts of ill treatment on the basis 
of political affiliations and consequently, was charged with several counts of crimes 
against humanity.781 The case thus suggests that the concept also works within non-
State structures. 
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Admittedly, Boas has noted that nowhere in the Decision is distinction 
among the different forms of participation made. Nevertheless, in its findings, the 
Panel treated the Kaer Mutin Meran Putih as a discrete organisation in which the 
Accused was a member and one of the bases of the conviction was that the Accused 
shared in the common intention to arrest and detain victims.782 Although the arrests 
and detentions were random and not (as with the ICTY cases) in a concentration 
camp, there was still an organised approach towards them. The detainees were either 
taken to Koramil,783the sub-district territorial defence command, kept in their own 
homes784 or taken to fields or forests785 and detained and ill treated there. This may 
have influenced the Court’s broad reasoning. This suggests that JCE 2 could be 
applicable in these circumstances as well since a paramilitary operation, could be 
likened to a systemic operation. 
However, even here there is a formal line of command in place through 
which the inferences can be made and the crimes may occur in obedience to the 
organisation as opposed to the wider State policies and thus it may be that a 
modification in the approach towards how control can be assessed will need to look 
beyond this category. 
5.4.3 JCE 3 – Inference of intention where crimes are foreseeable 
Under JCE 3 an Accused is responsible on the basis that he participated in a 
common design to pursue one course of conduct where one of the perpetrators 
commits an act, which while outside the common design, was nevertheless a natural 
and foreseeable consequence of effecting that common purpose.”786 This has been 
seen as an extended form of JCE that considers an individual equally responsible for 
crimes considered in excess of collateral to the initially planned.787 Once again the 
category was identified in the Tadić Appeal Decision and thereafter consistently 
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applied in the jurisprudence of both ad hoc tribunals. Tadić is once more revisited 
along with two selected cases that address how the test of reasonable foreseeability 
can be applied. In this regard, although there is a considerable number of cases that 
have applied this mode across the two ad hoc and internationalised tribunals, there 
are few Decisions that have considered the question of how reasonable foreseeability 
is to be assessed and thus those Decisions have been selected for particular 
examination in the next sections.  
5.4.3.1 The Tadić Appeal 
The Appeals Chamber in Tadić found that criminal responsibility “may be 
imputed to all participants within the common enterprise where the [crime] was both 
a predictable consequence of the execution of the common design and the Accused 
was either reckless or indifferent to that risk.”788 In justifying the customary nature 
of this mode, the Tadić Appeals Chamber relied on the Essen Lynching case789 that 
was heard in a British military court and the Kurt Goebell (Borkum Island) case790 
which was heard before a US military court. Both cases involved the killing of 
prisoners under military guard by mobs as they were marched in the street. In finding 
that the escorts and the charged civilians were criminally responsible for the deaths, 
the Court in both of those instances found these men guilty of murder because they 
“were all concerned with the killing”.791 Marching prisoners of war through the 
streets and not intervening to prevent attacks connected these guards to the crime as 
they became concerned in the killing. Moreover, marching them in the streets was an 
unlawful act, from which this consequence of the mob attacks was obvious.  
In considering the applicability of these early cases, the Tadić Appeals 
Chamber found of the Accused that “not all of them intended to kill but all intended 
to participate in the unlawful ill treatment of the prisoners of war.”792 Thus on that 
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basis it was reasonable hold them “morally and criminally responsible for the 
deaths,”793 although they did not complete the actus reus of the offence. 
The Tribunal further applied an objective assessment of the tests of 
foreseeability. In examining early jurisprudence coming out of Nuremberg, the 
Chamber noted that in D’Ottavio et al794 the Court of Cassation held that on similar 
facts relating to death resulting from the action of a group member not specifically 
contemplated between the members, that they were all responsible. The Appeals 
Chamber in Tadić building on this, opined that 
for there to be a relationship of material causality between the crime, willed 
by one of the participants and the different crimes committed by another, it 
is necessary that the latter crime should constitute the logical and 
predictable development of the former.795 
In other words, it was virtually certain to have occurred based on the whole 
of the evidence against the Accused as objectively assessed.796 To elaborate, in 
assessing the extent to which this extended version of JCE can be applied, it must be 
virtually certain that the criminal outcome was predictable.797  
However, the test also incorporated a subjective element. Inherent in the 
participation in an act that will logically and predictably terminate in another crime 
is risk taking. The concurrent application of both objective and subjective standards 
when approaching the issue of risk sharing became an issue in the later 
jurisprudence. Tadić and the later cases suggest that the foreseeability requirement 
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should be interpreted simultaneously, both objectively and subjectively. According 
to Boas, Tadić suggested both types of foreseeability.798 He noted that 
[t]aking paragraphs 220 and 228 together, Tadić would appear to put 
forward three additional elements that must be established in order to 
attribute third category JCE liability on the accused (1) it was foreseeable 
that a crime other than the one agreed on in the common plan (the deviatory 
crime) might be perpetrated by one or more of the JCE participants; (2) the 
accused and everyone else in the group must have been able to predict the 
deviatory crime would ‘most likely’ be perpetrated by one or more of the 
JCE participants; and (3) the accused nevertheless willingly took the risk 
and participated in the JCE…799 
Boas further found that the first and second element maintained both the 
objective and subjective foreseeability tests.800 The Accused and the rest of his group 
must have been able to predict the crime and the crime should also have been 
something a reasonable person in the position of the Accused could have foreseen as 
well.801 This apparent requirement that the deviated or collateral crime must have 
been both objectively and subjectively foreseeable was also applied in Brdjanin Trial 
Judgment802, the Vasiljević Appeals Judgment803 and the Krstić Trial Judgment.804 
Boas notes that the formulation including both objective and subjective assessments 
of the foreseeability of the crime was confirmed in Vasiljević805 and thereafter that 
the Vasiljević formulation repeated into several cases across both ad hoc tribunals806 
and the hybrid or internationalised tribunals, such as the ECC and SCSL.807 The 
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formulation was that the crime was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the 
execution of that enterprise and that the Accused was aware of that consequence but 
nevertheless participated in the enterprise.808 In the later Krstić Decision there was 
an even further consideration of the degree of risk that was considered to be 
sufficient to inculpate accused persons. 
5.4.3.2 The Krstić Appeal Decision  
Krstić was the Chief of Staff and later the Commander of the Bosnian-Serb 
Army.809 He was Commander during the Srebrenica massacre and was alleged to 
have committed genocide, crimes against humanity and violations to the 
humanitarian law.810 Although JCE was not specifically pleaded on the Indictment, 
the Trial Chamber found that there was sufficient notice of it as the Prosecution had 
alleged he acted in concert with others.811 He was found responsible on the basis that 
those acts were foreseeable from his involvement in the plans to separate enclaves in 
Srebrenica,812 despite his defence that as a career officer he was duly cautious and 
ensured observance that the Geneva Conventions humanitarian protections were in 
place.813 He was nevertheless found to have been responsible on the basis of JCE 3 
because the crimes with which he was charged were a natural and foreseeable 
consequence. This conviction was upheld on Appeal. The Appeals Chamber found 
that in cases where it must be determined whether an Accused is to be responsible 
for acts that are a natural and foreseeable consequence, there is no need to show that 
he “was aware that those other acts would have occurred.”814 All that was necessary 
was that it be shown that when the Accused participated in the enterprise, it was 
probable that the collateral crimes would result.815 This formulation that relied on 
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probability of occurrence was also applied in the Vasiljević Trial Chamber 
Decision816 and has been consistently applied in the range of jurisprudence applied at 
the ad hoc tribunals and the internationalised tribunals who have charged on the 
basis of this extended version of JCE 3.817 
On this basis therefore, if there was an agreed forcible transfer as, for 
instance, in Krstić, and this resulted in murders, beatings and abuses at the detention 
area, these were “the foreseeable consequences of the ethnic cleansing campaign.”818 
Additionally, if there was a plan for forcible transfers and this later resulted in acts of 
genocide being committed, then that would as well mean that the accused person 
would be criminally responsible for the acts of genocide as well under this mode of 
responsibility. 
This has been questioned in the later cases with some finding that reliance on 
this mode led to a “dilution of the genocidal intent in the ad hoc Tribunals’ 
jurisprudence.”819 In the Stakić Trial Chamber Decision,820 this was further 
discussed. 
5.4.3.3 The Stakić Trial Chamber  
The case concerned charges of crimes ranging from genocide to 
extermination and to destruction of places of worship against Dr. Molimir Stakić.821 
Stakić had been elected to the Prijedor Municipal Assembly and eventually 
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nominated as the Vice President of the Serbian Democratic Party (“SDS”).822 In that 
capacity, it was alleged that he had planned, together with Karadžić and other 
members of the Bosnian-Serb leadership, for the forcible removal of non-Serbian 
individuals from certain defined areas. The relevant acts in question had been 
materially committed by members of various Bosnian-Serb paramilitary groups.  
Stakić was acquitted of genocide.823 The Stakić Tribunal Chamber opined 
that “according to the applicable law for genocide, the concept of genocide as a 
natural and foreseeable consequence, does not suffice.”824 
In its Decision at the Trial, the Chamber could not reconcile the dolus 
specialis required to prove genocide with this mode of liability. It was not convinced 
that it could convict an Accused for a crime requiring this special intent, on the basis 
that the Accused could foresee or logically predict as a consequence to the plan for 
creating a unified Serbian State through destruction of particular groups.825 
Moreover, it found that the intention to displace a group is not the same as the 
intention to destroy it.826 Thus, according to the Trial Chamber, while the killing that 
resulted from the broader framework of activities from the SDS and the Autonomous 
Region of Krajina concerning the separation of States, there was insufficient 
evidence of his personal intention to destroy the Muslim group.827 
The Stakić Appeals Chamber applied the earlier precedent and confirmed that 
in the Brjdanin Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, the Appeals Chamber confirmed 
that once an Accused entered into a joint criminal enterprise with an awareness that 
additional crimes would occur, that was sufficient.828 Additionally, bearing in mind 
that the mode of responsibility is to be proven separately to the offence, the 
consideration of intent while considering the mode is unnecessary.  
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The issue that arises then is to what extent this category of JCE can usefully 
provide suggested proposals that can be applied to modifications to the current tests 
of attribution of conduct of individuals to States and overall what suggestions arise 
from this mode of responsibility in its entirety? 
5.4.3.3 Discussion 
There are three main concerns that are relevant in answering this question of 
applications from JCE to the tests of attribution: firstly, the extent to which 
application of both objective and subjective tests and their relationship to the 
assigning of responsibility on assessments of risk create uncertainty in the law, 
secondly whether it is indefensible to suggest borrowing approaches towards 
assigning of responsibility from a mode of responsibility that imputes criminal 
intention to all accused persons even where they have been charged with crimes of 
special intent and lastly, whether this category is too unwieldy to offer any 
meaningful suggestions to an already settled test in international law, which for all 
its limitations is stable in law. 
Firstly, in this mode intention was not predicated on pre-meditation but was 
based on recklessness; either the Accused foresaw the risk and continued with his 
action or he was indifferent to it. In both cases the assigning of responsibility under 
this category was based on an appreciation of risk.829The formulation of this 
category and this “risk” assessment dimension was not new, but had some precedent 
in international criminal law from the early jurisprudence coming out of the 
Nuremberg Tribunals, where the early Decisions set out a pair of requirements. They 
were “a criminal intention to participate in a common design and the foreseeability 
that criminal acts other than those envisaged in the common criminal design are 
likely to be committed by other participants in the common design.”830 
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There is the fear that deciding cases on the basis of risk assessment is 
dangerous because it has the potential to introduce confusion into legal approaches. 
This is so particularly when assessments start to evaluate esoteric points such as 
probabilities and possibilities as these cases have done. However, despite the 
reasonableness of these fears, there are safeguards that prevent perverse 
interpretations. These have been usefully identified by the different Chambers in the 
cases selected for discussion and have been implemented across the corpus of cases 
that have applied this category. One safeguard is that there is a double barrelled 
approach towards assessment of whether participation in the plan would logically 
and predictably terminate in further crimes being committed. In devising both 
objective and subjective assessments of the question of foreseeability, the risk is 
evaluated within clear guidelines that consider both the information that was 
available to the Accused at the time he decided to participate in the initial plan and 
also the information that would have put a reasonable and objective individual on 
notice that a collateral crime could occur. There is an even further safeguard as the 
question of logical foreseeability has to be virtually certain and there must be no 
competing inferences.831 This being so the question of foreseeability was not one of 
chance but of a considered assessment of the situation. 
If this assessment is applied in the situations where State agents embark on 
relationships with armed groups and supply their needs from the point of view of 
military, administrative and weapons supply, the question to be asked on a case-by-
case basis is whether on that initial agreement it was foreseeable that the armed 
groups operating in the social or military context as they were would go further to 
commit international crimes. The further issue from this is whether the provision of 
aid in particular circumstances where there is every likelihood that an armed group 
will commit offences is sufficient to imply that there was a relationship of control 
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between the armed group and the State because the State was the entity controlling 
the armed group’s ability to complete the crime. 
Inherent in the notion of control is the concept of direction and there are 
circumstances where provision of support in different fields suggests that the armed 
group is being directed in terms of implicit directions being offered to them to 
complete their conquest. In cases where the State maintained relationships with 
groups in volatile situations, it can be evidenced that the State is in control as in 
continuing to support that group, it exercised effective control over any operation in 
which international crimes occurred because the international crimes were logically 
predictable. The State through its agents controlled the execution of the crimes by 
the members of the armed groups by giving them the means and the impetus to 
complete the physical aspects of the crime. The decisions of the armed groups were 
steered by the supporting State. It therefore follows that there is effective control in 
these circumstances and it is reasonable to attribute the conduct of individuals to the 
State in these circumstances. 
Secondly, the modes of responsibility are always separately proved from the 
substantive crime. According to van Sliedregt, JCE 3 is a form of derivative liability 
and as such it is “no different to any other form of criminal participation” and thus it 
does not require full proof of the crime.832 According to her, to suggest that charging 
JCE 3 has the effect of watering down the dolus specialis for genocide is 
unmerited.833 Her view is supported in the jurisprudence as in the Brdjanin Appeal 
judgment, Justice Shahabudeen noted that 
[t]he third category of Tadić does not, because it cannot, vary the elements 
of the crime; it is not directed to the elements of the crime; it leaves them 
untouched. The requirement that the accused be shown to have possessed a 
specific intent to commit genocide is an element of that crime. The result is 
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that that specific intent always has to be shown; if it is not shown, the case 
has to be dismissed…834 
Thus there is no reason to dismiss the approaches for determining 
responsibility because of the nature of particular crimes. The assigning of 
responsibility is a distinct process. Since this is so, an examination of the suggested 
improvements to the current tests of control are thus not out of place as the focus is 
on method of assessment.  
Thirdly, this category has been criticised for being unwieldy and over-
expansive,835 but this betrays a level of unwarranted panic. It is important to note that 
the methodology towards the assigning of the responsibility is well structured so that 
it is clear how the connection of the Accused to the crime was made and whether the 
proof of the objective and subjective elements were clear. This would prevent fears 
by some writers that the mode is being manipulated to fit to the facts instead of being 
a “pure product of the law.”836 It has been criticised on the basis that the principle 
has no customary base, that it violates the nullem crimen principles, and most States 
now approach similar issues on the basis of co-perpetration.837 While co-perpetration 
is a valid tool for assessing and assigning responsibility, it does not mean that this 
approach is as flawed as some have made it out to be. At the end of the day what is 
critical is that the mode of responsibility is clearly and logically applied.  
According to Cassese, much of the fear about the doctrine has never 
materialised and in addition, as the doctrine it served a valuable policy purpose.838 
According to him, the concept is crucial in international criminal law, even more 
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than in its domestic ancestors because international crimes are “perpetrated by 
groups of individuals, military details, paramilitary units or government officials 
acting in unison or in pursuance of a policy.”839 If the debates over structural 
remoteness have been conceded and it is accepted that participatory responsibility of 
this nature depends not on the connection to the individual, but to the crime, then 
fears of overreaching are misplaced as a careful approach to working out the means 
by which the Accused was connected to the crime is at the end of the day what is 
important.  
The van Sliedregt model of looking at the different JCEs committed by 
paramilitary groups, and government officials and determining the ways in which 
they interact provides a way forwards.840 This will no doubt be an invaluable tool in 
working out the modalities of commission when examining responsibility for mass 
atrocities. In addition to this are the modes of responsibility based on perpetration, 
which expressly view the participation in a common plan as “functional 
domination.”841 
5.5 Perpetration 
Perpetration as a mode of responsibility entered into international criminal 
jurisprudence with the Decision from the Trial Chamber at the ICTY in the case 
against Molomir Stakić.842 The case to some has been described as being innovative, 
as it marks a turning point in the Trial Chambers’ search to look for new sources of 
law outside those explored by the ICTY.843 Although its application was later 
rejected on Appeal at the ICTY844, this mode of participation has overtaken JCE in 
the jurisprudence of the ICC as the cases that have come out of that Court have relied 
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substantially on this mode of participation to assign criminal responsibility as 
opposed to JCE.845 
Perpetration in the form that it is being applied at the ICC is based on the 
application of German law identified in section 25 of the German Criminal Code, the 
Strafgesetzbuch.846 Article 25 states that 
(1) Any person who commits the offence himself or through another shall 
be liable as a principal. 
(2) If more than one person commit the offence jointly, each shall be liable 
as a principal (joint principals).847 
Article 25 itself is the product of the 1975 reformulation by the Bundesgerichtschof 
of the law that was based on Roxin’s 1965 theory of perpetratorship.848 It identifies 
three forms of perpetration: direct, co-perpetration and indirect perpetration.849 
Article 25(3)(a) ICC Statute has incorporated all of the provisions of Article 25 of 
the Strafgesetzbuch,850 and as Judge Van den Wyngaert noted the jurisprudence of 
the ICC has further introduced a combined version “indirect co-perpetration.” 
Consequently both the jurisprudence coming out of the ICC as well as academic 
commentary describing the methods of assigning criminal responsibility under this 
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mode draws heavily on German case law. Since discussion in the Stakić Trial 
Chamber Decision851 focussed on the “control over the crime” theory that was 
“systematized through the scholarship of Claus Roxin,”852 and since the scholarship 
was instrumental in the formulation of the current German law, Roxin’s imprimatur 
has impacted on the formulation of different legal tests with which to label the 
responsibility for participation in international crimes by those high-level actors that 
have been indicted. Co-perpetration and indirect perpetration are distinct and they 
have been separately applied by the Office of the Prosecution at the ICC in their 
charging appropriate modes of liability on the indictments. However, sometimes 
there has been an undifferentiated treatment between the two strains or categories of 
perpetration in the jurisprudence. Additionally, beyond the ICC, these doctrines have 
also been applied in domestic German law, and as well some authors have noted 
their application in Spain and Latin America where international crimes are being 
prosecuted domestically.853 These applications are discussed in the next sections.  
5.5.1 Co-perpetration 
Co-perpetration has been succinctly defined as “the joint commission of a 
criminal act through a knowing and willing working together of the individual 
participants.”854 According to Jain, it has two requirements. Firstly, there is an 
objective requirement that there must have been the execution of a criminal act 
collectively and secondly, there is the subjective element that there must have been a 
common plan.855 As functional domination, it presupposes the existence of a 
common plan to which all participants agree.856 However, this imports a reckless 
standard to assessing whether the accused person was aware that there was a 
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“substantial likelihood that crimes would result from cooperation” over the common 
acts.857  
The first requirement for the collective execution of the criminal act occurs 
where each perpetrator has a “functional act domination, of each co-perpetrator 
which arises from the principle of division of labour and functional role 
allocation.”858 Secondly, due to this allocation of roles, the criminal act can only be 
achieved if each role is performed, so that within each role while there is a autonomy 
or as the German case law terms it “act-domination,”859 the failure by one co-
perpetrator results in the failure of the entire criminal plan,860 and thus it can be said, 
that the heart of this mode of participation is that each co-perpetrator 
“simultaneously controls the total act.”861 
In this way it bears similarity to JCE 1 which was classed as a form of co-
perpetration and which also was based on an allocation of roles to achieve a desired 
common purpose.862 The formulation of the mode is not without its challenges as 
there have been arguments by German scholars as to whether an individual who 
assists at the preparatory stage is actually a co-perpetrator or, on a differentiated 
theory, should be labelled as something less, ie an accessory.863 There is a division in 
the interpretation. There is authority that suggests that even the smallest contribution 
at the preparation stage is enough to render that contributor a co-perpetrator if it is 
carried out with the appropriate will.864 According to the dictum coming out of those 
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courts, simply convincing one person to stab another, was a sufficient level of 
contribution to render the whole group as co-perpetrators.865  
Against this, there are also some views whereby, preparatory acts such as a 
gang leader who suggests a crime but leaves the modalities of commission up to the 
autonomous choices of the rest of the gang, it may not be enough, but that is 
question that is decided on assessment of the facts.866 Michael Bohlander considers 
that in examining these questions, the challenging issues are resolved on a case-by-
case basis on careful examination of the facts.867 According to him, even though a 
consideration of the will of the Accused is a subjective matter, it can be objectively 
assessed by inferring criminal intention from the whole of the facts under analysis.868 
In this way, the question of whether a collective of individuals are co-perpetrators 
and thus equally liable on the basis of division of roles is a question of fact more 
than a question of law, as the critical issue is to consider the full significance of the 
roles in allowing the execution of the final criminal act.  
Proof of the second requirement, ie that there was a common plan is also 
proven by a subjective test. Similar to the common law requirement discussed earlier 
in the context of JCE, here too, in order to prove this mode of responsibility there 
must be a common plan. Drawing on the details from the General Legal Principles of 
International Criminal Law on the Criminal Liability of Leaders of Criminal Groups 
and Network (“MPICC”) report869, Jain noted that although there must be mutual 
consent for the “joint realization of the act,”870 this could be demonstrated at either 
the beginning or at the time of the act. Moreover, there was no requirement that it 
had to be “jointly developed,” or explicit as such consent could be implied.871 So too, 
each of the participants do not need to know each other, it will suffice that they each 
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focussed on their own roles, but are aware that each other participant is similarly 
working towards the realisation of the crime. 
Unlike Anglo-American law, there is no responsibility for crimes that have 
been committed in excess or collaterally to the common plan.872 However, while 
Anglo-American law perceives criminal acts that occurred during the execution of 
another crime as an excess, German law does not. Instead, it finds that 
each perpetrator may be given some leeway to act as the situation demands 
as long as this helps accomplish the common goal. Therefore, deviations 
from the common plan that are within the range of the relevant acts with 
which one must normally reckon do not count as an excess…873 
On that basis therefore, responsibility could be assigned. However, what is 
required is that this deviation was foreseeable as 
[a] deviation from the original plan during the joint executing action can 
also be introduced into the agreement by a mutual understanding, which 
again negates excess.874 
Seeing as mutual understanding can be inferred and also does not have to be 
jointly developed, the scope of this mode of participation is particularly suited to 
situations in which there is collaboration, either express or implied between State 
agents and paramilitaries or armed groups. Although it is directed at collective 
criminality as JCE is, the methodology here imputes dominion over the act or control 
over the act far more easily.  
5.5.1.1 The Stakić Trial Decision  
The jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, starting with the Decision of the 
ICTY Trial Chamber in the Stakić case, is illustrative of the way in which the 
doctrine of co-perpetration developed and has been applied.  
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In determining whether Stakić was guilty of the crimes charged, the Trial 
Chamber departed from ICTY precedent and applied co-perpetration as a mode of 
responsibility.  
In this case, Stakić was alleged to have taken a critical role in the takeover of 
power in the Prijedor area.875 The crimes with which he was charged occurred in this 
political context.876 His role in the crimes charged came to prominence shortly after 
the proclamation of the Autonomous Region of Krajina in response to the declaration 
of independence of Bosnia–Herzegovina.877 He was installed in a key position in the 
municipality as president of the Crisis Staff that was established straight after the 
proclamation.878 His role as a co-perpetrator started to emerge after this assumption 
of power as he started to liaise with other State agents on particular plans to remove 
non-Serbs from the area between Semberija and Krajina, as the goal was to create 
access corridors for Serbs.879 This was to be accomplished according to the Strategic 
Plan in which Radovan Karadžić outlined six strategic goals. The Prosecution’s 
military expert Ewan Brown concluded that this could be seen as the “political 
direction given by the Bosnian Serb leadership regarding the creation of the Bosnian 
State.”880 At the heart of these goals was the “separation from the other two national 
communities – separation of states.”881 
Stakić was key in disseminating propaganda via the media and proved to be 
instrumental in effecting separatist sentiments.882 There were later attacks on several 
areas in this Prijedor region883, establishment of detention centres884, in which there 
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were killings885, interrogations886, acts of sexual abuse in the camps,887 destruction of 
cultural, residential and commercial properties888 and forcible transfers of non-Serb 
individuals out of the area.889 These acts were committed by the Serbian authorities 
in conjunction with paramilitary groups.890 According to the Trial Chamber, “[t]here 
is ample additional evidence to suggest that the Serb authorities organised and were 
responsible for escorting convoys out of Serb-controlled territory.”891 
As a high-ranking official of the SDS and as president of the Crisis Staff, 
Stakić was part of the plans for forcible removal of individuals in these targeted 
areas and the escalation of events whereby Serbian agents were disarming 
paramilitaries or working in conjunction with Bosnian-Serb entities could only have 
been done in conjunction with the Bosnian-Serb authorities, thereby evidencing a 
mutual consent. This in turn led to the other consideration, namely where, aside from 
the plan, was there functional control over the act? This could only be determined 
with reference to the plan and the role of the individual in relation to it. 
At Trial, the Prosecution pleaded all three categories of JCE. In regards to the 
third category, the Defence argued that the Prosecution must prove that the Accused 
had a “share in the intent of the crime committed by the extended joint criminal 
enterprise” and where the prosecutions relies on inference to prove mens rea it must 
be the “only inference available on the evidence”.892 This, as was seen in Brdjanin, 
could have led to a fracturing of the evidence as in that case, the Court found that 
there were competing inferences that mitigated against the finding that the crimes 
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committed in excess of the plan.893 However, with co-perpetration these issues 
simply would not have arisen. 
In dealing with these submissions, the Trial Chamber applied the doctrine in 
accordance with Roxin’s894 theory completely, thereby establishing that Stakić by 
virtue of a common plan, ie the formulated Strategic Plan, exercised dominion over 
the criminal acts perpetrated by the different paramilitaries based on a combination 
of factors. 
To the Trial Chamber, the notion of co-perpetration through joint control “is 
closer to what most legal systems understand as committing and avoids the 
misleading impression that a new crime not foreseen in the Statute of this Tribunal 
has been introduced through the backdoor.”895 The Trial Chamber defined co-
perpetration as “an agreement or silent consent to reach a common goal by 
coordinated co-operation and joint control over the criminal conduct.”896 In this way, 
it was not so much that the crimes committed were reasonably foreseeable on the 
implementation of the separatist plans, but additionally that it ascribed responsibility 
to different actors for a shared control they demonstrated over the act. The Trial 
Chamber repeatedly in its judgment referred to this sharing of control over the 
crimes committed, describing the role of the Accused as being “based on [a] mutual 
exchange of information,”897 his “interdependency between the Crisis Staff and the 
army and police”898 and the commission of international crimes being the product of 
“synchronised activities”.899 Moreover, the general lawlessness which also prevailed 
in Prijedor, allowed for implementation of the objectives of the Strategic Plans.900 
Though there was one wide separatist plan, it was fulfilled through the skill and 
dynamism of different groups and sectors operating concurrently with each other, so 
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that they all maintained joint control over the acts committed through the 
dissemination of varied roles. There was, as it were, a joint realisation of criminal 
goals, such goals being the logical consequence of embarking on a policy of forced 
removal and separatism at all costs. 
The idea of co-perpetration itself, as applied by the Trial Chamber, relied on 
the work of German scholar Roxin.901 According to Roxin, there was a shared 
control over the criminal act. The co-perpetrators could only realise the plan if they 
act together.902 Conversely, the failure of one Party to act can frustrate the whole 
joint plan.903 The mens rea of the offence under this doctrine is the awareness of the 
substantial likelihood that punishable conduct would occur as a consequence of 
coordinated cooperation based on the same degree of control over the execution of 
common acts.904 Mohammed Badar, writing on the issue of mens rea here, notes that 
[i]n addition to the mens rea required for the specific crime charged, this 
mode of liability (co-perpetratorship) requires proof of (i) mutual awareness 
of substantial likelihood that crimes would occur; and (ii) the defendant’s 
awareness of the importance of his own role...905 
This was the critical test. According to the Trial Chamber, this was evident to the 
facts of the present case. The Trial Chamber was convinced that 
Dr Stakić knew that his role and authority as the leading politician in 
Prijedor was essential for the accomplishment of the common goal. He was 
aware that he could frustrate the objective of achieving a Serbian 
municipality by using his powers to hold to account those responsible for 
crimes, by protecting or assisting non Serbs or by stepping down from his 
superior position...906 
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The doctrine thus, in focussing on the acts and intention of his role in the 
plan as opposed to other collateral acts and antecedents, allowed for the attribution of 
responsibility without need to show a connection between the Accused and the direct 
perpetrator. It also allowed for the attribution of responsibility where power chains 
and lines of communication were broken, so that evidential requirements would be 
easier to meet. 
Therefore, on this particular point, the Stakić Trial Chamber applied a 
combination of two forms of commission, namely co-perpetration and indirect co-
perpetration (to which the tribunal refers using the German notion of mittelbare 
Täterschaft (“perpetrator behind the direct perpetrator”).907 This approach drew to a 
close several of the doctrinal queries on the reach of the law to embrace participants 
who are far removed from the physical perpetrators. With coordinated cooperation 
the scope for connecting the various groups that perpetrate commission of 
international crimes on a vast scale is enhanced.  
However, as noted earlier, this application was overturned by the Appeals 
Chamber acting ex proprio motu. In rejecting the Trial Chamber’s approach, the 
Chamber opined that the introduction of new modes would cause confusion in the 
jurisprudence.908 
The Appeals Chamber further found that the Trial Chamber erred in 
conducting this analysis and stated that co-perpetratorship as defined and applied by 
the Trial Chamber does not have support in customary international law or in the 
“settled jurisprudence of the Tribunal.”909  
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This exclusion did not obstruct the application of this mode in later cases at 
the ICC, where it seems to be preferred over JCE. 
5.5.1.2 The Lubanga Trial Chamber Decision  
The jurisprudence of the ICC so far has interpreted Article 25 as including 
the two categories of perpetration – co-perpetration and indirect perpetration and 
there has been a suggestion for a combined approach by Judge Van den Wyngaert 
“indirect co-perpetration.”910 This implicit reading of these modes of liability into 
Article 25 has met with some criticism. At the forefront of these criticisms are no 
less than two current Judges, Judge Adrian Fulford and Judge Christine van den 
Wyngaert, whose Dissents are later examined in this section. Co-perpetration and 
indirect perpetration have been applied in separate cases, and the approaches towards 
determination of responsibility under these modes are examined. So far, there has not 
been a completely separate treatment of each doctrine as the jurists have treated with 
them at times in an undifferentiated manner. In the next sections some of the 
approaches used by the ICC and the criticisms of these approaches in determining 
proof of these modes are examined. The discussion leads in with the Lubanga 
Decisions,911 which was the first conviction and application of co-perpetration. 
The facts surrounding this Decision centre on a very complex conflict. There 
was an ongoing power struggle in the Ituri region, a north-eastern province of the 
DRC that borders Uganda.912 In the factual matrix accepted by the Trial Chamber of 
the ICC, there was a noted deep ethnic divide between the Hema and the Lendu 
groups.913 From about 1999 to 2003, the Trial Chamber accepted that there was an 
escalation of this ongoing power struggle in the Ituri region following the 
assassination of Laurent Kabila in 1997.914  
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Thomas Lubanga entered the fray around September 2000. He was a 
founding member of the Union of Congolese Patriots and that year, there was a 
military overthrow of the military wing to the Uganda-supported rebel group the 
RCD-Movement for Liberation (one of the groups the Rally for Congolese 
Democracy fractured into). The eventual result was that by January 2002 Lubanga 
had assumed the position of Minister of Defence of this group.915 Later that year 
peace talks were held at Sun City and an agreement was reached by the head of the 
RCD-Movement for Liberation to increase efforts as Hema–Lendu integration. 
Lubanga disagreeing with the result of these talks, abandoned the group and 
reformed a new militia, the Force patriotique pour le liberation du Congo (“FPLC”), 
that continued to further the cause for separatism in favour of the Hema.916  
As a war lord, he was involved in several internal conflicts to advance these 
economic and political ends and was involved in copious acts in breach of 
international law. Of these, he was alleged to have been involved in the conscription 
and enlisting of children under the age of 15 and it is these acts which later grounded 
the charge against him at the ICC.917 These children, though recruited from the 
Congolese province in Bunia, were for the most part trained in Uganda and the arms 
supply emanated from there as well. He was thus able to perpetrate these crimes with 
funding and support from another State and in this way, it could be seen that the 
definition of the common plan was widened to include this transnational element. 
He was charged with being responsible as a co-perpetrator for enlisting and 
conscripting children under the age of 15 into the FPLC and using them to actively 
participate in hostilities within the meaning of Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and Article 
8(2)(e)(vii) of the ICC Statute. These charges were confirmed by the Trial Chamber 
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on 29 January 2007.918 He was convicted by the ICC on the 14 March 2012 and this 
was confirmed on Appeal on the 1 December 2014. 
According to the Pre-Trial Chamber, Lubanga’s contributions showed that 
there was evidence of control over the crime, even if that control emanated from a 
remote location.
919
 The determination as to whether the particular contribution of the 
Accused resulted in liability as a co-perpetrator was then further considered to be 
based on an analysis of the common plan by assessing carefully the role that was 
assigned to, or was assumed by the co-perpetrator, according to the division of 
tasks.920 The Pre-Trial Chamber found that co-perpetration as a mode of liability was 
established on the control over the crime theory and they placed much reliance on 
the scholarship of Roxin.921 This analysis of the common plan was viewed by the 
Pre-Trial Chamber as having to be proved by both objective and subjective elements; 
that is, the facts of the case demonstrated control and that the Accused was aware of 
its criminality.922 
The Trial Chamber elaborated on the issue of proof of the objective elements 
decided that the plan must include “an element of criminality”.923 Proof of this 
element was held to be sufficient if the under-mentioned areas were accomplished: 
(i) that the co-perpetrators have agreed: (a) to start the implementation of 
the common plan to achieve a noncriminal goal, and (b) to only commit the 
crime if certain conditions are met; or 
(ii) that the co-perpetrators (a) are aware of the risk that implementing the 
common plan (which is specifically directed at the achievement of a non-
criminal goal) will result in the commission of the crime, and (b) accept 
such outcome...924 
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The Majority found that both limbs were satisfied. Thus once more, it was 
not an excess or collateral act, but was considered to be part of the crime that was 
initially planned. 
Proving control was thus made easier. There was an implicit awareness of 
this by the Pre-Trial Chamber who stated that the Accused would not have to prove 
the “should have known” standard of control to this crime, and that a “mutual 
understanding among the co-perpetrators would be sufficient to realise the common 
plan’s objectives.”925 This was later endorsed by the Trial Chamber when they later 
found that Lubanga was guilty of the crime of child conscription as a direct co-
perpetrator. According to the Trial Chamber, the first port of call was to establish the 
objective elements of the crime. The objective elements were to be established by the 
common plan or agreement, the essential contribution of the Accused to this plan and 
proof of his knowledge or intent as described under Article 30 that his contribution 
meant to bring about the objective elements of the substantive crime, that is, the 
dolus directus.926 
In describing the elements, it was to be established that “there were at least 
two individuals involved in the commission of the crime” and this plan need not 
have been explicit for the “conduct of each co-perpetrator to be connected.”927 This 
essentially is a restatement of the requirement for a plurality of persons and proof of 
an agreement whether it be tacit or express identified in first category JCE under 
Tadić and that was referred to as co-perpetration in any event.  
On the second requirement that there be an essential contribution, the Trial 
Chamber required that in relation to the exercise of the role and functions assigned to 
him, the contribution must be essential.928 As to the mental element, it would be 
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proven once the Accused showed “an awareness that a consequence will occur in the 
ordinary course of events”.929 
In this vein, there was definition as to how the Accused could contribute to 
the overall enterprise and the level of knowledge required of him to prove he was 
aware of the criminal consequences of the act. This would put to rest some of the 
doctrinal fears as to imputation and inference of intent in an unrestrained manner. In 
utilising a formulation for contribution the Trial Chamber opined that 
[t]hose who commit a crime jointly include... those who assist in 
formulating the relevant strategy or plan, become involved in directing or 
controlling other participants or determine the roles of those involved in the 
offence. This conclusion makes it unnecessary for the prosecution to 
establish a direct or physical link between the accused’s contribution and 
the commission of the crimes...930 
In formulating the level of knowledge required the Trial Chamber opined that at the 
time the plan was agreed, the participants must have been aware of a reasonable risk 
that an adverse outcome “will occur in the ordinary course of events. A low risk will 
not be sufficient.931 This would involve consideration of the “concepts of possibility 
and probability.”932 
The value to this approach is that it expressly establishes criminal liability for 
recklessly participating in a common plan that inherently carried the risk that, in the 
ordinary course of events related to that plan, a crime would result. This recklessness 
addresses the role of the high-level perpetrators very effectively especially when 
they retain that transnational support. Such an individual would not be able to hide 
behind diffused power chains and plead that his contribution was not related to theirs 
or that their activities were remote from him, because was reckless as to its 
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consequences.933 It would furthermore prevent each co-perpetrator from pleading 
disconnection to the actus reus of the offence, where identifiable essential 
contributions to the actus reus of the offence was not possible, since each reckless 
participant could be implicated with guilt.  
Rebel groups such as the one Lubanga headed often start off their mission 
with a non-criminal plan: usually to establish military control of an area. Other 
groups would be operating with relative autonomy from each other, in some 
instances dealing with the securing of recruits and arming them. Although there 
would be a common plan among all of the group to achieve particular ends, no proof 
would be required that they were each integrated initially to a common criminal 
purpose. If there was a risk, for example, that such recruitment might involve the use 
of children and this was never the goal, but still a viable risk in light of the 
conscripting methods used by the group, then they should have foreseen that risk and 
accepted it. It is the same rationale used in Anglo-American law regarding criminal 
recklessness, but the utility here is not so much the rationale, but the ease with which 
it is amenable to be identified and applied.934 
Proving the doctrine through proof of these component parts offers more 
facility for the Defence to state his role and participation to a defined degree, thereby 
preventing allegations of collective guilt. This is a live issue and it has been used 
before in trials dealing with decentralised power chains. 
For instance, Pinochet in defending himself against attribution of 
responsibility as a commander, in regard to giving orders to the Chief of Staff to the 
Secret Police had this to say: 
there are many things I ordered him to do, but which things? I had to 
exercise power, but I could never say I was running the DINA [Dirección de 
Inteligencia Nacional, The National Intelligence Directorate]. [They] were 
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under orders, under the supervision of all the junta... And I would like you 
to understand the following. The Chief of the Army always asks ‘What are 
you going to do?’ The question of ‘How’, how am I going to do it? Is a 
question for the Chief of Intelligence rather than the Chief of the Army...935 
Such a defence would not work under a case charging the mode of liability as 
co-perpetration as the tests take note of the relationship between the different 
sections, focussing on the level of autonomy of each group over the crimes, not the 
relationship among the participants in determining if there was shared control. This 
mode of responsibility broadens the scope of accountability among all participants, 
in particular the remote and high-level actors who are connected to, and in fact exert 
control, over the criminal activities of the other participants. This mode of 
responsibility therefore, suggests a useful approach towards assessing the extent to 
which a State exerted control over the criminal activities of groups with which they 
initially associated, under apparently non-criminal plans, on the basis that the crimes 
they subsequently committed was both foreseeable and under their control. 
5.5.1.3 Dissenting Views at the ICC on co-perpetration 
In his Dissenting Opinion in the Trial Chamber Decision in Lubanga936 Judge 
Fulford took issue with the application of Roxin’s “control over the crime” theory 
into the law of the ICC.937 He went further to suggested that the ICC Statute was 
sufficiently clear on its text as to what method or approach could be used to assign 
criminal responsibility to individuals for participation in international crimes.938 His 
suggested approach was for an assessment that concentrated on the treaty text.939 
According to him, the doctrine as promulgated through the work of Roxin was 
focussed on domestic doctrine. He found that there was a direct transposition of the 
domestic concepts into the international context and this he described as 
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dangerous.940 According to him, this was regardless of whether the ICC and 
domestic doctrines mirror each other.941 Moreover, he found that the words of the 
Statute were plain enough and established the equality of culpability for co-
perpetrators, even those who were absent from the scene. The resort to the doctrine 
thus was unnecessary.942 
Judge Fulford thus laid out a check list based on the text of the ICC Statute 
which included the requirement of coordination of a plan either express or implied, 
direct or indirect contributions, intent to engage in the conduct and has an awareness 
that the consequences will happen in the ordinary course of things.943 
Judge Fulford was not alone in these views. Judge Van den Wyngaert in the 
Trial Chamber Decision Prosecutor v Chui944 also took issue with the grafting of 
domestic legal concepts and was very critical of Roxin’s theories being transposed 
into the method used by the Court to assign criminal responsibility.945 
The thrust of her critique was with the application of an objective test to 
determine whether the accused person was connected to the common plan. She took 
issue with Roxin’s plan on the basis that it emphasized connection to the plan as 
opposed to the crime.946 She further critiqued that this connection was to be assessed 
on an objective standard for two reasons. Firstly, in creating an objective standard, it 
would mean that instead of relying on Article 30 ICC Statute to determine questions 
of criminal intent, it relies on the rules attributing intent on the basis of 
recklessness.947 She noted that while the Trial Chamber II in Lubanga did not equate 
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recklessness with the dolus eventualis, they were nevertheless prepared to inculpate 
an Accused on the basis of recklessness and there was an inherent danger to 
assigning responsibility on this basis.948 
She agreed with Judge Fulford in his Dissent in Lubanga insofar as that 
reliance on risk is “unhelpful and confusing” and is nothing more than the “dolus 
eventualis being dressed up as a dolus directus in the second degree”.949 To her, 
there was nothing on the ICC Statute to allow this, and like Fulford, she advocated 
an approach that focussed more on the connection to the crime as opposed to 
potential dangers from engaging in particular plans. According to her, had that been 
the object of the Statute, conspiracy as a mode of responsibility would have been 
included.950 
She further took issue with the requirement for an “essential contribution” 
finding that this allowed unnecessary speculation and that for clarity the contribution 
must not be essential but direct.951 Realising the effects of her opinion on the 
questions of impunity as a result of these suggestions for modifications in the 
approach towards assigning responsibility, she suggested that there is no hierarchy to 
the modes of responsibility identified at Article 25. Thus accused persons could be 
convicted as accessories. She drew the example of Prosecutor v Charles Taylor952, 
whereby JCE was not proved but aiding and abetting was, and he was sentenced to a 
fifty-year term.953  
Her Decision did not factor in the complex nature of international crimes, 
whereby the heavy-handed arm of the State may institute a policy of forced 
displacement or separation of communities and work in conjunction with different 
groups. By addressing shared control in these circumstances, there is an obvious 
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control over the crime, made even more forceful with the clear risk that such emotive 
plans that draw on instinctive fears as to racial, religious, or political protection can 
escalate into something far worse. Thus there may be practical benefits to allowing 
reckless culpability.  
At the end of the day however, whatever the views on the doctrine for the 
purposes of this thesis, both the Majority Opinion and the Dissenting Views and 
Concurring Opinion further add to a growing repository of approaches towards 
understanding these questions of State responsibility for international crimes. It is 
not a choice of one or the other, as the checklist proposed by Judge Fulford suggests 
a cadre of tests that can work to assess these vexed questions of individual 
participation in complex, organised, large-scale crimes, as does Judge Van den 
Wyngaert’s suggestions. Taken as a whole, co-perpetration has much to offer for the 
proposals outlined at the start of this thesis. 
In sum, this approach by the ICC also effectively put to rest the long-standing 
arguments raised in the jurisprudence that sought to prove the culpability in an 
agreement by connection of participants to the physical perpetrator through a shared 
approach to responsibility. This mode embraces diverse and remote participants who 
operate from different locations and are screened by diffused power chains. Further, 
even though the test can embrace a large number of participants does not mean that 
there are broad imputations of guilt that could compromise fair trials. Inherent in the 
doctrine are sufficient safeguards as it will come down to an evaluation of the 
evidence. The scope of justice was never to provide a shield of impunity by devising 
obscure tests that did not situate in the social context in which it operates. The 
safeguard is that a test is simply a test; there must be evidence to support it and if 
that evidence is lacking then quite rightly the Accused will be discharged.  
Further modes of perpetration and their application in the jurisprudence are 




5.5.2 Indirect Perpetration  
This mode of responsibility assigns criminal responsibility where a person 
perpetrates or commits a crime through another.954 Commentators have identified 
that the “through” signifies a relationship between the “Hintermann” (the indirect 
perpetrator) and the “Frontmann” (the direct perpetrator) whereby the Hintermann 
controls the Frontmann, in as much as he uses or manipulates him as a human tool or 
instrument.955 There are two further categories here. In one category, the Frontmann 
has a deficit; most often he is seen to lack the requisite intention for the offence. This 
is exploited by the Hintermann.956 However, he is not to be likened to the “innocent 
agent” that appears in Anglo-American systems. Whereas under the doctrine of 
innocent agency, there is an exculpation of guilt based on the fact that the Accused 
was not in a position to know or do better (either he was not of capacity or suffering 
from a defect of the mind), here the principle operates differently.957 The Frontmann 
is still regarded as having control over the act, but this is overtaken by a domination 
over his will.958 Thus, although he is a guilty agent, he is but a mere tool in the hands 
of the Hintermann. Cryer criticises the exculpation of a guilty agent noting that to 
see a guilty agent “as a mere tool” is to “fail to respect the importance of her 
voluntary and intentional act.”959 Nevertheless, the mode allows for the assigning of 
criminal responsibility to the Hintermann on the basis that he maintained control 
over the act of the Frontmann. The areas in which this control is established is where 
there is a utilisation of a mistake on the part of the Frontmann or on the basis of the 
Hintermann’s superior knowledge.  
In the second category, the Accused maintains hegemony through control 
over an organisational apparatus, or Organisationsherrschaft.960 According to Jain, 
there are three elements that exist through this mode – “power,” ie there are 
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established hierarchical structures, “fungibility,” ie those directly committing the act 
can be exchanged and “detachedness,” ie the organisation must operate outside the 
law.961 
Due to these tests, the mode of responsibility is seen to be accurate. To some, 
the introduction of this mode of responsibility is not simply a regurgitation of 
Dogmatik into international law,962 as it has an intrinsic value. Thomas Weigend, for 
instance, finds that this mode has managed to solve some of the problems associated 
with the assigning of criminal responsibility for international crimes in an effective 
manner.963 So too, Gehrard Werle sees it as being directly amenable to international 
crimes because the doctrine 
tries to provide a solution to a problem that has been discussed since the 
very beginning of international criminal law, that being: how to ascribe 
criminal responsibility to political and military leaders who, without ever 
laying a hand on a single victim themselves, plan and set into motion the 
large-scale and systematic commission of international crimes…964 
This had led Werle to ask whether this mode of responsibility is “the perfect 
fit for international prosecution of armchair killers”965 as it puts to rest the search for 
identifying appropriate modes of responsibility in the commission of international 
crimes. He has gone even further to argue that this mode though new to international 
criminal law is well known in domestic legal systems966 and this is evidenced in part 
by the fact that it has been the basis of several indictments coming out of the ICC 
and also in Latin America and Spain.967 Some of these Decisions are examined here 
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to assess the different aspects of the test to determine their viability in being used to 
redesign the method of attribution of conduct to States. Within the international 
courts and tribunals, the doctrine was introduced into the jurisprudence again 
through the Stakić Trial Chamber Decision (albeit as a passing reference) and in the 
later Separate Opinion appended by Judge Schomburg in the Gacumbitsi case before 
the Appeals Chamber.968 It has been one of the modes through which several persons 
have been charged at the ICC. Although the so-called “Ocampo six,” eg President 
Kenyatta, Francis Muthuara, William Ruto, Henry Kogsey, Joshua Sang and 
Mohammed Hussain Ali969, had their charges withdrawn owing to insufficiency of 
evidence, their charges were initially confirmed. All three were charged with 
international crimes alleged to have been committed through this mode. 
Additionally, prior to this Katanga and Chui970 were charged pursuant to this mode 
as well. Katanga was convicted on the lesser mode as an accessory, but Chui was 
acquitted. The tests applied are now examined further in the subsequent sections. 
5.5.2.1 The Gacumbitsi Appeal  
While the Trial Chamber in Stakić viewed joint criminal enterprise as only 
one form of interpretation of perpetration, it focussed its consideration on co-
perpetration leaving indirect perpetration as another option that it simply referred to 
in a footnote.971 When the Prosecution attempted to argue its applicability in 
Milutinovic972 at the Trial Chamber subsequent to this, it was rejected outright on the 
basis that it had no customary status in international law.973 
It was only later at the ICTR in the Appeal Decision against Sylvestre 
Gacumbitsi that express mention of the doctrine was made and attention paid to the 
role of the mode in addressing collective crimes, in a Separate Opinion appended by 
Judge Schomburg. Gacumbitisi was charged for committing genocide, on the basis 
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that he participated in the genocide at the Rusomo commune by inciting individuals 
to separate themselves from their Tutsi neighbours and kill them. He further supplied 
machetes. He often was accompanied on his mission with Interahamwe milita and 
supervised some of the killings.974  
Judge Schomburg’s grievance with the Majority Decision was as to its 
method of determining responsibility. He argued that, if the Majority found as they 
did, that Gacumbitsi had a major role in the genocidal campaign, it should have 
convicted the Accused of genocide regardless of whether he had killed anyone or 
supervised any killings,975 the reason being that he exercised control over the other 
genocidaires. Thus, although Gacumbitsi was convicted of genocide because he was 
found to have actually supervised a massacre,976 that was a de minimis point in light 
of his overall role in the genocidal campaign. According to Judge Schomburg, 
[m]odern criminal law has come to apply the notion of indirect perpetration 
even where the direct and physical perpetrator is criminally responsible 
(“perpetrator behind the perpetrator”). This is especially relevant if crimes 
are committed through an organised structure of power in which the direct 
and physical perpetrator is nothing but a cog in the wheel that can be 
replaced immediately. Since the identity of the direct and physical 
perpetrator is irrelevant, the control and, consequently, the main 
responsibility for the crimes committed shifts to the persons occupying a 
leading position in such an organised structure of power. These persons 
must therefore be regarded as perpetrators irrespective of whether the direct 
and physical perpetrators are criminally responsible themselves or (under 
exceptional circumstances) not...977 
In this regard he posits that the doctrine overcomes the hurdles connected to 
the structural remoteness between the Accused and the physical perpetrators. 
Moreover, as he frames it, it allows for the high-level actor to be dealt with in the 
trial system more severely than the lower-level “cogs” and prevents the difficulties 
associated with proof of mens rea under JCE 3. 
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According to Judge Schomburg, although there are distinctions, “co-
perpetratorship and indirect perpetratorship differ slightly from joint criminal 
enterprise with respect to the key element of attribution.”978 It seems under this 
doctrine either responsibility is attributed for sharing causative roles or for 
controlling the acts of others. He suggested that the two approaches, though they 
overlap, should still be harmonised so that it would assist in defining “sharper 
contours” by “combining objective and subjective components in an adequate way” 
which will in turn facilitate the imputing of criminal responsibility on Accused 
persons in situations where the physical crime was committed by a non-member of 
the criminal enterprise. 
According to Judge Schomburg, with genocide it will be irrelevant whether 
the Appellant killed somebody by his or her own hand, because 
it would overlook that the persons most responsible for the killing of at least 
800,000 Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994 were those who acted behind the scenes, 
who organized and planned this genocide, and who instructed, ordered and 
instigated others to carry it out. They committed genocide on an 
unimaginable scale.979 
The doctrine of indirect perpetration allows for these “behind the scenes” 
actors to be addressed without the complexities of assessment of mens rea 
requirements.  
This form of liability was not novel. According to Judge Schomburg, it was 
used to prosecute the Argentinian Junta for crimes committed under Pinochet, and 
has proven to be especially effective with organised crime and State-induced 
criminality.980 Citing the cases brought against the Junta and the German cases 
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involving crimes by East German border guards, there was specific attention to the 
details of control.981 For instance, in the Politburo case the German Courts opined 
that in certain circumstances, it is the “man behind the scenes” who has the most 
significant contribution especially if the takes advantage of the the direct 
perpetrator’s willingness to bring about the actus reus of the crimes.982 
He further supported his case by noting that the provisions of the then 
imminent Article 25 of the ICC Statute provided straight away for this mode of 
liability.983 
While the opinion confirmed the entry of the mode into international criminal 
jurisprudence, it did not go further to discuss how the mode could be applied, ie what 
tests could be used, in what stages. According to Jain, although the judgment 
outlines the physical elements the judgment was not so clear on what states of mind 
were relevant,984 and moreover, the way the mode was presented was unclear as it 
conflated the two modes and they are separate forms of perpetration.985  
The exact contours of this mode and the more nuanced approaches towards 
application of the tests to establish with it are seen in the ICC jurisprudence and also 
in the approach by the Latin American Courts. 
5.5.2.2 Katanga and Chui; Kenyatta and others 
The doctrine entered into the jurisprudence with the Pre-Trial confirmation 
Decision on the charges in Katanga and Chui. The facts arose out of the Hema–
Lendu conflict addressed earlier in the Lubanga case. Katanga was the leader of the 
Patriotic Resistance Front, a combatant group, and Chui was a colonel in the 
Congolese army.986 Chui was later acquitted at the Trial Chamber, on the basis that 
the method outlined by the Pre-Trial Chamber for assigning responsibility according 
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to this mode and the reasons for this mode being used to address situations of 
collective criminality was discussed. 
According to the Pre-Trial Chamber, where two or more persons jointly 
commit an international crime, the case could be assessed either through, in their 
terms, “indirect co-perpetration” or through mutual attribution of the crimes to 
different accused persons.987 Reflecting a nuanced approach towards the question of 
assigning of responsibility, the Pre-Trial Chamber implicitly read perpetration 
through an organisation or Organisationscherrschaft, into the provisions of Article 
25(3)(a) provided in the ICC Statute.988 
The approach of the Court here was to firstly identify the “perpetrator’s 
control over the organisation.”989 This could be inferred or directly adduced from 
evidence of control over an organised apparatus of power. According to the Trial 
Chamber, the higher up the individual was in the hierarchy and the more detached 
the mastermind was from the physical perpetrator, the greater his blameworthiness 
would be.990  
The Pre-Trial Chamber went further to discuss what would constitute an 
organised apparatus of power. Firstly, there would have to be some sort of 
hierarchical relations between a superior and subordinates, but more than that, there 
would have to be sufficient subordinates so that they can be easily replaced.991 It 
further noted that for the position of the superior that there was “recognised 
leadership,” ie that orders will be carried out by subordinates.992 Further, the means 
of control could be demonstrated by the capacity to hire, train, impose discipline, and 
provide resources to these subordinates.993 
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Critically the Pre-Trial Chamber noted that “the leader” would use his control 
over the apparatus to execute crimes, which means that the leader, as the perpetrator 
behind the perpetrator, mobilises his authority and power within the organisation to 
secure compliance with his orders. According to the Court, “[c]ompliance must 
include the commission of any of the crimes under the jurisdiction of this Court.”994 
On this basis therefore, unlike the more familiar notions of superior 
responsibility, the Pre-Trial Chamber in their application of the doctrine equated the 
term superior with leader. The ability of the leader to control derived from the sheer 
mass of subordinates willing to do his will. His ability to control also did not simply 
arise from a position of command, but instead from a wide range of indicators such 
as the ability to fund, arm, hire and train.995 The Pre-Trial Chamber thus applied the 
mode in a sustained way fully cognisant of the modern-day face of warfare, 
suggesting the mode to be applicable in a wide range of control situations.  
The most recent cases involving charging of this mode occurred with the six 
cases brought against President Kenyatta, Francis Muthuara, William Ruto, Henry 
Kogsey, Joshua Sang and Mohammed Hussain Ali. All of the cases against these 
individuals perished – charges against Ali, Kogsey and Muthuara were never 
confirmed; cases against Ruto and Sang perished due to lack of evidence; the 
Prosecution had to withdraw the charges against Kenyatta owing to an insufficiency 
of evidence, with allegations being made in the media that witnesses were bribed or 
intimidated;996 Chief Prosecutor Bensouda confirmed this.997 The failure of these 
cases was not an indictment against the mode of responsibility but on an 
insufficiency of evidence. 
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However, despite this conclusion, the Pre-Trial Chamber Decisions regarding 
criminal responsibility of individuals who perpetrate international crimes through 
another, ie through the existence of an Organisationscherrschaft are useful. The 
finding in this case was instructive as it suggests another pathway for assigning 
responsibility in situations where a State official or agent satisfies the test of actual 
control over the paramilitary organisation, whose members are committing 
international crimes because there is a hierarchical organisation between them.  
According to the Pre-Trial Chamber, Francis Muthuara and President 
Kenyatta were responsible for the international crimes perpetrated in the wake of the 
post-2007 election violence on the proof of key elements, the existence of a plan,998 
the making of essential contributions to the plan999 and the use of hierarchical 
structures outside the State, whose members were changeable.1000 They were charged 
with several counts of crimes against humanity under Section 7 ICC Statute.1001 
They Court identified them as being “indirect co- perpetrators.”1002 However, an 
analysis of how the Court approached the assigning of responsibility was similar to 
methods described for the Organisationscherrschaft. 
On the objective tests, there was proof of a common criminal plan between 
the Mungiki and the Accused. This common criminal plan did not have to be 
explicitly proven, but could have been inferred from the acts of the co-perpetrators. 
This was demonstrated by: 
(i) the contacts between Mr. Muthaura, Mr. Kenyatta and Maina Njenga 
through their respective intermediaries for the purposes of securing the 
services of the Mungiki for the PNU [Party of National Unity] Coalition; 
(ii) the agreement reached between Mr. Muthaura, Mr. Kenyatta and Maina 
Njenga to the effect that Mungiki members would be used for the attack in 
Nakuru and Naivasha; (iii) the order given by Mr. Muthaura and Mr. 
Kenyatta to Mungiki leaders to commit the crimes in Nakuru and Naivasha; 
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and (iv) the activities performed by Mr. Muthaura and Mr. Kenyatta at the 
execution stage of the plan to commit such crimes…1003 
The Pre-Trial Chamber then determined the extent to which there was an 
essential contribution to this plan. According to the Chamber, “the essential 
contribution may consist of activating the mechanisms which lead to the automatic 
compliance with their orders and thus the commission of crimes.”1004 Critically the 
Chamber noted that this “essential contribution does not require that the essential 
character of the task be linked to its performance at the execution stage.”1005 Thus 
provision of weapons and coordinating activities can be considered essential 
contributions.1006  
On these facts there was evidence at the Pre-Trial Stage that President 
Kenyatta placed Mungiki members under the control of the local politicians, 
contributed funds for the group and established links through intermediaries to with 
the Mugiki for the purpose of effecting international crimes.1007 Further based on 
evidence of meetings with Mayen Jenga, the top leader of the Mungiki, they found 
there was the existence of such agreement.1008 As such, they found that there was a 
plan and that Kenyatta relied on the pre-existing organisational structures in the 
Mungiki to effect the crimes as well as the mechanisms within the group to ensure 
that the crimes would be carried out.1009 There was a fungible quality to the members 
of the Mungiki as in the situation where they were mobilised before entering 
Navaisha; it did not frustrate the common purpose, because the members were easily 
replaced.1010  
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To the Court this underlay the rationale of the mode of indirect 
perpetration.1011 During the course of its discussion, the Court also formulated the 
last objective requirement which was that the organisation used maintained a 
hierarchical structure and that compliance with orders was automatic.1012 These 
elements were inferred from the facts on the basis that 
the direct perpetrators were entirely replaceable and, as such, that the 
commission of the crimes was not dependent upon their will but was 
secured by the utilization of a pre-existing hierarchical and organized 
structure by Mr. Muthaura and Mr. Kenyatta. This is in line with the 
underlying rationale of the model of indirect co-perpetration, according to 
which the suspect must have “control over the crime committed”, in the 
sense that he controls or masterminds its commission because he decides 
whether and how the offence will be committed by direct perpetrators who 
are merely anonymous and interchangeable figures.
1013
 
In approaching this, the Chamber noted that when the group approached 
Navaisha, several of its members left, however they were replaced, thereby putting 
into question the assertion by the Accused that they could not control such an 
amorphous group.1014 The Chamber then outlined the subjective elements of the 
crime namely that there was a mutual awareness among the group that they were 
implementing the plan and that they were aware of the factual circumstances that 
allowed for a joint control over the crime.1015 In order to prove this, a former 
member of the Mungiki testified.1016 Thus without an internal member of such 
groups, proof is difficult. 
The Chamber offered a nuanced approach towards determining the mental 
intent to participate. In assessing intent under this mode, the Chamber suggested two 
gradations of the dolus directus: firstly, the Accused had a dolus directus, ie the 
express will to cause the consequences of the plan; secondly, the dolus directus in 
the second degree, ie that the consequences were predictable in the ordinary course 
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of things. Notably, the Court did not speak about a dolus eventualis, ie the 
reasonable prediction that the consequences could occur.1017 
This is far as the mode has developed so far. It has been criticised on the 
basis that it has the effect of watering down the requirement of personal 
responsibility.1018 By following this method, Judge Van den Wyngaert fears that the 
model “dehumanizes the relationship between the indirect perpetrator and the 
physical perpetrator.”1019 Yet, is this an error? Being part of an apparatus that is 
geared towards effecting either directly or as a consequence is already 
dehumanizing. At the root of Judge Van den Wyngaert’s fears is that there is a 
reluctance to approach the question of assigning responsibility on a unitary basis.1020  
By way of compensation, she states that the sentencing aspects could reflect 
the gravity of the offence. Although her critique is relevant to assessing the method 
of determining responsibility by advocating strict reliance on the treaty text, it turns a 
blind eye to the integration of Roxin’s work into the Strafgesetzbuch and that effect 
on the interpretation of the Statute which is designed along similar lines. The 
original notions derived from Roxin’s work are about this collective approach 
towards criminality where crimes are collectively perpetrated. In these situations, 
maintaining the distinction is unnecessary. 
Judge Van den Wyngaert’s approach has been imitated in some domestic 
trials implementing international criminal law. Munoz-Conde in discussing the trials 
noted the Buenos Aires Court found that upon the Junta seizing power in 1976, there 
were separate military zones created in which commanders operated autonomously. 
The Court found that their role in crimes were limited in comparison to the role 
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played by the individuals who controlled the system and subordinates were easily 
replaceable.1021 
As a result of this, several Junta leaders were convicted. Their convictions as 
indirect perpetrators were later overturned and they were instead convicted as 
necessary contributors, on the basis that they planned, organised and instigated the 
group.1022 This did not affect the sentencing, but it indicated a reluctance by this 
Court to hold an individual directly responsible when this level of control was 
evident. What these discussions show is that the detailing and approaching of the 
different relationships between individual agents are complex and require a unique 
method towards assigning responsibility. This method draws on three key 
approaches, a holistic review of power apparatus, the connection between power 
structures of the State and armed groups, and a realistic assessment of the 
consequences of a plan. 
5.6 Discussion 
Co-perpetration, indirect perpetration and JCE provide useful approaches that 
can be implemented in a proposed variation of the tests of attribution of conduct of 
individuals. Co-perpetration, and the first two categories of JCE are particularly 
useful in that the question of assigning responsibility is approached by analysing the 
extent to which an Accused controlled the crime through a combination of objective 
and subjective elements,1023 as “there must be both the appropriate factual 
circumstances for exercising control over the crime, and an awareness of such 
circumstances.”1024 The tests used for indirect perpetration and JCE 3 goes even 
further. Both elaborate an awareness that in circumstances where it likely or 
predictable that international crimes will occur, criminal intention can be inferred as 
in the application of JCE 3. Also, deviations from the common plan that are within 
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the range of the relevant acts with which one must normally reckon do not count as 
incidental crime. The scope of control is broader and this prevents the use of 
“fungible intermediaries”1025 to effect what can only be seen as something that will 
in the normal course of objective reasoning be seen as a necessary part of the 
criminal plan embarked on. 
While this may be perceived as a strength, there are some who find that the 
more objective approach towards the question of responsibility understates the 
importance of the mental states of an Accused in determining questions of 
culpability.1026 Some commentators also take issue with the conflated way in which 
the ICC has applied the domestic principles on perpetration treating them 
synonymously.1027 Yet to some “[t]he question is whether such doctrinal overreach is 
a natural outgrowth of the judicial application of the doctrine of indirect co-
perpetration or whether it is implicit in the doctrine itself.”1028 The application of the 
modes by the international criminal courts examines the relationship between State 
agents and paramilitary groups, and thus grafting these approaches into an 
assessment of the critical aspects of the tests of attribution of conduct to individuals 
may be useful.  
The modes of responsibility all form part of the quest to find the test to more 
robustly deal with the criminal implications that arise from these relationships, as 
State agents use non-State actors including armed groups to carry out their objectives 
that can only end in the commission of an international crime. Taken in combination, 
the different categories of perpetration of modes of responsibility and their tests for 
the assigning of criminal responsibility, provide a set of tools that further examines 
the nature of the relationship between State agents and armed groups, and 
particularly with the issue of control in a very nuanced manner. These modes pierce 
the veil of impunity by looking more qualitatively at any initial plan formulated 
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between State agents and members of armed groups and then relate the subsequent 
execution of that plan to the commission of international crimes, because the crimes 
were committed in the context of that plan. Moreover, under a unitary approach there 
was shared control or functional domination over each stage of the commission. It 
thus suggests that a State can direct an operation in which international crimes occur 
by participating in a dangerous plan in which international crimes will predictably 
occur. This approach towards understanding control might provide a means to better 






Chapter Six: The Case for Variation of the Tests of 
Attribution of Criminal Conduct to States 
6.1 The responsibility arising out of support armed groups in the 
commission of International crimes during conflict 
This thesis has identified that responsibility of armed groups for the commission 
of international crimes during armed conflict is addressed under positive 
international law on two bases. Firstly, individual members of armed groups can be 
prosecuted and therefore are personally responsible for the commission of 
international crimes. Secondly, States are responsible where the acts of these 
individuals can be attributed to it under the customary rules reflected in Articles 4 
and 8 ARSIWA, as interpreted in the case law of the ICJ in three main cases: the 
Nicaragua case, Armed Activities Congo case and the Bosnian Genocide case. Since 
the ICJ declined to discuss questions relating to attribution in the Croatian Genocide 
case, it does not assist in the discussion of attribution in any meaningful way; thus 
those three cases represent the defined ICJ position as to the circumstances in which 
the conduct of individuals from armed groups can be attributed to a State. 
As discussed in this thesis, the commission of international crimes by 
members of armed groups does not occur in a vacuum but more often than not there 
is a heavy element of State involvement. The regime of individual criminal 
responsibility has approached this question of State involvement by developing and 
applying innovations to domestic doctrines of liability based on participation in a 
crime. Thus, there have been a range of prosecutions in which the State element in 
the commission of international crimes has been recognised. These prosecutions 
against State agents were premised on the basis of a shared criminal intention with 
the members of armed groups.1029 Charges have been brought against State agents 
and members of armed groups under participatory modes of responsibility, such as 
joint criminal enterprise as in Tadić and Brdjanin. More recently, cases coming out 
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of the ICC have introduced new modes of assigning responsibility to individual 
members of armed groups, based on innovations to the German doctrines of 
perpetration, such as co-perpetration as was demonstrated in the case of Lubanga1030 
and also indirect perpetration as in the cases brought against the Kenya leadership in 
the wake of the 2007 post-election violence.1031 These modes of responsibility in the 
individual regime of criminal responsibility thus could address both the 
responsibility of the State agent and the members of the armed group on the basis 
that they were acting in pursuit of a shared criminal goal. 
This approach of “shared responsibility” is not maintained when it comes to 
consideration of the responsibility of States for the participation in international 
crimes. As discussed in Chapter Three, State responsibility for the support of armed 
groups who commit international crimes are limited to the circumstances in which 
conduct of these individuals could be attributed to the State on the basis that the 
State either directed or controlled the operation in which the international crimes 
were perpetrated or the armed groups were completely dependent on the State for its 
existence.1032 Anything short of this would be insufficient. Further, whereas 
international criminal law recognises degrees of complicity so that in some 
circumstances, as with the models of joint criminal enterprise and perpetration, the 
supporter or the encourager of the international crime is considered to be there 
equally responsible as the direct perpetrator,1033 as opposed to circumstances where 
they are merely seen as assisting the principal as an aider or abettor. There is no such 
gradation in the law of State responsibility.  
Two further points must be made in regard to this. Firstly, under the law of 
State responsibility, only State-to-State actors are seen as being enjoined in a 
complicit relationship; the rules reflected under Article 16 simply do not take notice 
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of State-to-non-State relationships.1034 Additionally, under the rules of attribution of 
conduct, the critical tests of “direction,” “control and “complete dependence” are 
interpreted literally. This is because the rules of attribution in the law of State 
responsibility originated in a unique context with a specific and formal approach that 
distinguished a State’s primary obligations from the rules of attribution.1035 
Consequently, the assessment of the tests are not based on inference of intentions in 
a manner parallel to that which obtains in the individual criminal law regime. 
6.2 The rationale behind the law for the current approach 
towards attribution under the law of State responsibility 
The current approaches towards attribution of conduct of individuals to States 
reflect the codification efforts of the International Law Commission to separate the 
“primary rules of substantive international law from the secondary rules of [S]tate 
responsibility [with]…the focus on the latter.”1036 There is a fear among some 
commentators, that adoption of new methodologies might risk creation of confusion 
of an area that was hard to settle into a reasonably clear framework by conflating the 
distinction between questions of obligation and secondary questions relating to 
determination of attribution of conduct of individuals. Thus the emphasis on 
maintaining the current methodology towards the rules of attribution stem from the 
fear that the rules have a distinct method and purpose that 
rose from the muddied waters of diplomatic protection and treatment of 
aliens, and should now try to resist being dragged back into the 
methodological mud made up of different substantive primary rules.1037 
The issue thus is whether this fear is well founded and whether this asserted rationale 
for leaving the current tests of attribution as it stands, is with merit.  
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The development of the law in the prescription of the legal tests for 
attribution of conduct of private citizens to the State has been part of a slow 
evolution.1038 The law on State responsibility evolved from a core set of primary 
obligations to keep citizens of other States safe on its territory. Where mobs, 
insurgents or the like injured foreign nationals, it was seen to be a violation of these 
obligations that arose in the field of diplomatic protection.1039 This was distinct from 
the secondary rules that developed in relation to the law on attribution and thus, even 
if there was a breach of the obligations to keep citizens safe, this did not affect the 
questions relating to the attribution of conduct of individuals to States. 
In the aftermath of the First World War, there was a crystallisation of this 
norm which created an overriding duty on States to protect individuals on their 
territory.1040 Even though a State was responsible for the actions of mobs or 
insurgents, the acts of these private groups were not attributed to States per se, but 
the State was responsible because it failed in its obligation to protect the foreign 
nationals.1041 This is distinguishable from the rules concerning the attribution of 
conduct of organs to the State.1042 This is why Milanović has been so strong in his 
mandate that there should be a resistance to the variations to current tests of 
attribution of conduct,1043 as there is this fear that variations to the tests of control 
will obscure this distinction. 
A response to his fears calls for an elaboration on his understanding of the 
underpinning reasoning for the law on the current rules of attribution. As has been 
discussed so far, on that separate set of rules, the attribution of conduct of individuals 
to States could only occur where the State had the capacity to control the individual. 
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A State as an abstract can only express itself through its organs.1044 Thus, a State 
imbues an individual with the authority to act on its behalf and so the acts of that 
individual become the acts of the State itself.1045 The rules as to how this could be 
done were classed as secondary rules under the ARSIWA and this instrument 
clarified and delimited the scope of operation of tests for attribution of conduct, with 
some provisions notably Articles 4 and 8 being referred to in the jurisprudence of the 
ICJ as being reflective of custom.1046 
Article 4 codifies the basic principle that the conduct of “any State organ 
shall be considered an act of that State under international law”.1047 It specifies that 
an organ is any person or entity that has that status under internal law whether the 
organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever 
position it holds in the organisation of the State and whatever its character as an 
organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of the State.1048 This is in 
keeping with the underlying principle that a State is indivisible.1049 The ICJ has held 
that acts of persons or entities who do not have formal status as organs, can only be 
attributed to the State for the purposes of international responsibility, “provided that 
in fact the persons, groups or entities act in ‘complete dependence’ on the State.”1050 
This complete dependence renders the groups de facto State organs.1051  
So too, under Article 8, the conduct of a person or group shall be considered 
an act of State under international law, if the person or group of persons are in fact 
acting under the instructions of, or under the “direction or control” of that State in 
carrying out the conduct.1052 According to the ICJ, this would require proof that the 
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State had “effective control over the military operations in the course of which the 
violations were committed;”1053 that is they controlled the operations in which 
violations, or to state it more generally, mass atrocities occurred. 
Therefore, Milanović’s argument suggests that these rules can be classed as 
sui generis and this prevents modifications due to the risk of conflation of primary 
rules and secondary rules. If this argument is to be pushed to its limit, the suggestion 
that it leaves is that methodological modifications or modifications to the test of 
attribution in general might be too great a risk in confusing the law in an area of law 
that fought long and hard to achieve the clarity it now has. 
This thesis takes issue with this, and has argued that modifications would not 
automatically result in a conflation of primary and secondary rules. While the test for 
control must remain as that of “effective” control, a more functional and purposive 
understanding of the core components to proof of “effective”can be modified so that 
a different approach is adopted towards examination of issues of “direction,” 
“control” and “complete dependence.” This approach could derive from the regime 
of individual responsibility as there seems to be a common rationale underpinning 
both individual regimes of responsibility. As was discussed in this thesis, both the 
regimes of individual criminal responsibility and State responsibility were part of a 
communitarian response by States to address the complex questions of 
accountability for international crimes. Inherent in that communitarian response was 
the driving Kantian notion of a moral legal order through which a universal law 
could apply to all moral agents.1054 In this regard one may consider the words of the 
preamble of the Charter of the United Nations1055, that strove to “save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war,”1056 or the comments of Justice Jackson in his 
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opening speech at Nuremberg1057 in which he asserted that guilt was charged on 
conduct that involved a moral and legal wrong,1058 and the host of other statements 
made on behalf of States affirming this high universal tradition that sought to embed 
this strong “moral” component to the creation of relevant treaty machinery to address 
the responsibility for atrocities committed during the Second World War through 
lawful process.1059 Since there is this deeper rationale of a communitarian search to 
use the law and legal methods to address responsibility, the two regimes are simply 
branches of the same tree and the better question to ask is how can the methods of 
one inform the methods of the other without creating confusion in the law or 
destabilising formal legal structures that have been put in place? 
6.3 The limitations of the current approach in international 
accountability 
This may be of more immediate concern than is currently acknowledged both 
at an academic and a judicial level. With the current focus on the formal distinction 
between the two regimes and the emphasis on current interpretations as being almost 
the final statement on the situation, it has unnecessarily given pre-eminence to a set 
of tests that were formulated in a different context that did not address State support 
of armed groups. The end result is that there is a gap in accountability, a legal hole, 
in which there seems to be no law in place to address the role of States in these 
circumstances.1060 The end result is that the way is being paved for continued State 
impunity in circumstances where they offer crucial and determining support at 
various levels, but fall short of actually giving the orders for or directing the 
operations in which international crimes occur or their support falls short, however 
minimally, of being enough to satisfy proof of complete dependence. 
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As was discussed in Chapter Three, Nicaragua1061 was decided upon facts 
that were distinguishable from those in the Bosnian Genocide case.1062 Although the 
United States provided the Contra rebels with considerable aid and support for 
operations, they were assisting the Contra rebels in their objectives. There was not 
the parallel level of influence in the decision-making that was evident as noted in the 
Bosnian Genocide case, where the armed groups operating in Bosnia–Herzegovina 
and their Serbian patrons shared the common goals for a Serbian State being created 
on the territory of Bosnia–Herzegovina.  
Evidence for the Bosnian Genocide case was obtained from independent 
findings from Dutch and Western intelligence that was of the opinion “July 1995 
operations were co-ordinated with Belgrade.”1063 In addition, there was evidence 
from Bildt, the EU negotiator, who noted that Milošević, post the massacre 
maintained strong influence over Mladić’s decisions. This was distinguishable from 
the situation in Nicaragua1064 where the only evidence of a US control in the 
operations in which international crimes were committed by Contra rebels was in the 
finding of “the Manual,” a circulation by a low-ranking officer with references to 
psychological warfare tactics,1065 which was condemned by US authorities. The two 
factual scenarios were markedly different in terms of the circumstances in which the 
international crimes occurred and the nature of the relationship between the 
supporting States and the armed groups. 
As was noted in this thesis, international crimes are situated against a 
complex interaction of historical and social factors,1066 and this was no more evident 
than in the SFRY. Since the 1930s, there were strong ethnic and religious tensions 
brewing, as with the disintegration of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the mid-1940s, 
and the further disintegration following Tito’s death there was a struggle to restore 
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what was perceived to be a dissolution of the Serbian identity.1067 Thus the 
assistance rendered by Serbia was in a different context to assistance offered by the 
USA to the Contras. Thus in the Bosnian Genocide case, the Nicaragua test was 
applied without consideration of a key aspect to the test as outlined in Nicaragua, ie 
that an assessment must be made of the “relationship between the person taking 
action and the State to which he is so closely attached.”1068  
As has been argued, examination of the tests of control without an 
examination of the social and political factors impacting on the crimes committed by 
Bosnian-Serb armed groups creates an artificial disconnection. As a consequence, 
reconsideration of the tests of attribution of conduct is necessary because the tests 
are not being applied with examination of the factual matrix in which these 
international crimes occurred and the result is that States can support and even fuel 
international crimes and yet remain beyond the pale of legal responsibility. Thus 
questions of State responsibility for international crimes has become a relevant topic 
in legal discourse.  
6.4 Current solutions to mitigating against these limitations that 
arise from the current tests attribution of conduct from the 
academic literature 
The proposals that have emerged from the academic commentary thus far to 
address State responsibility for international crimes committed by armed groups or 
their individual members have been varied and multidisciplinary. As noted in 
Chapter Two, while the criminal trial satisfies retributive impulses, in the human 
psyche, once the trial is completed there is very little than can be done to ensure 
sustained prevention of suppression of criminal acts beyond the deterrent effect of 
sentencing the international criminals and using that as a warning to potential 
offenders. Moreover, it is impossible to try all those implicated in the commission of 
an international wrong, so commentators have found that in the end the trial process 
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is selective,1069 partial1070 and unable to address juridical actors.1071 Thus even if 
States have participated in international crimes through varying degrees of complicit 
assistance to those members of armed groups committing international crimes, the 
capacity for redress under positive international law is limited. There is the further 
problem with States and State agents establishing relationships with armed groups as 
there is an increasing importance of armed groups in current conflicts and thus it is 
necessary that international law address State roles in these situations. 
With a view to discussing this, as noted in Chapter Two, the academic 
commentators have proposed some constructive solutions within which the clear role 
of States could be identified and more properly addressed. These solutions are based 
on three main schools of thought. Firstly, there is a suggestion that the two 
independent regimes of responsibility for addressing international crimes – the 
regime of State responsibility and regime of individual criminal responsibility – can 
interact with each other. In this way, each regime can mutually support the other, so 
that the deficiencies of one can be supplemented in the other.1072 The advocates of 
this school see all actors both juridical and natural, being addressed through 
concurrent application of process, so that in this way no one actor will escape the net 
of responsibility.1073 Secondly, there is the suggestion that the criminal justice 
system should look outside of the conventional judicial structures of individual or 
State responsibility and towards other reconciliation measures or even towards tort, 
restitution and contract law for appropriate redress.1074 Thirdly, others have 
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suggested that the complicity of States in the crimes committed by armed groups can 
be treated as a lex specialis, under the human rights regime particularly as regards 
addressing the question of accountability for armed groups.1075 This thesis focussed 
on situating itself in the first school of thought. The question of non-legal 
mechanisms though rich, must be fruitfully discussed elsewhere given the 
parameters that this thesis undertook.1076 Additionally, the creation or argument in 
favour of creation of a lex specialis to deal with State complicity in the support of 
armed groups has sought to address the lacuna in armed group accountability from a 
different angle to this thesis. The author does not see the role of the State as a direct 
participant, but, as with this thesis, is aware of the limitations involved in seeking to 
address State responsibility through the law of complicity because the law of 
complicity addresses State-to-State relationships only and has sought to provide a 
solution as well.  While that is one option, this thesis suggests another, that is the 
role of States is better addressed through subtle variations to the tests of attribution 
of conduct of individuals to States. 
Thus this present thesis has distinguished itself from these two latter 
approaches to the vexed questions of State responsibility for mass atrocities and 
concentrated on contextualising itself within the first school. 
With the first school the emphasis has been on concurrent application of 
institution of process. Thus, as Zegveld has so clearly presented the positive law in 
her work, there are three concurrent means through which the armed group is liable 
in international law. As outlined in Chapter Two, Zegveld1077 suggested, that 
accountability applied at three levels – that of the individual, the group and the State. 
According to Zegveld, 
[a]t the first and lowest level, individuals who actually committed the crime 
can be held accountable. At the second level, superiors are potentially 
accountable on the basis of command responsibility. At the third level, the 
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State itself may be accountable, in that it is responsible for the acts of its 
agents…1078 
Thus her suggestion is that there is no impunity as the members of the armed 
groups are prosecuted and personally responsible, but more critically her solution 
also identifies attribution of conduct as a potential solution.1079 Her suggestion is that 
there could be attribution under Articles 10 and 11 of the rules of international law 
reflected in the ARSIWA. As discussed in Chapter Three, both rules may be of 
limited assistance as Article 11 is only applied when the State adopts the acts of the 
armed groups as was demonstrated in the Tehran Hostages case1080 and Article 10 
can only be applied if the armed group later becomes the governing power of the 
State in which it was previously operating as a rebel group.1081 However, the 
likelihood of the armed group assuming power does not address the situation of 
groups, for example, those fighting in Bosnia–Herzegovina during the Balkan wars 
in the 1990s will never assume power. Moreover, State support can be insidious 
when it comes to armed groups, so an adoption of the acts, is unlikely. Other 
commentators1082 have even suggested further enhanced models of accountability 
whereby the organisational modes of responsibility developed after the Second 
World War under Articles 9 to 11 of the Charter of the IMT could be fruitfully 
deployed with appropriate modifications to address the group dynamic of armed 
groups and in this way the group would be treated along the similar lines of a 
conspiracy so that there would be an assigning of criminal responsibility on the basis 
of affiliation liability theories.1083 So too, there was the suggestion that crimes 
among multiple participants be approached as through a corporate model.1084 Thus 
those making decisions for the group or embodying the ethos of the groups could be 
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charged and their individual convictions serve as an indictment to the whole group, 
at least on a moral level. 
This can be further augmented through proposals such as those from 
Nollkameper1085 whereby enhanced use of particular modes of responsibility such as 
joint criminal enterprise or command responsibility can properly detect the role of 
State agents as the designers or main power partners in complexly organised 
international crimes and thus trials at the individual level can mean that there can be 
concurrent or dual attribution, ie there can be an assigning of criminal responsibility 
in the regime of individual criminal law and in tandem, a case can be brought on the 
basis of violation of international obligations at the ICJ.1086 
All told, these suggestions provide a useful set of solutions to address the 
question of State support. However, the fundamental piece of the puzzle that is 
missing is that without identifying the link between the criminal conduct of armed 
groups and the supporting State, there can be no mutual attribution. Therefore, as the 
law stands, the responsibility of armed groups falls to be decided by the regime of 
individual responsibility and there are copious limitations to this regime that have 
been discussed in Chapter Two. The most critical limitation is that the regime of 
individual criminal responsibility has no power to coerce States into appropriate 
action such as surrender or transfer of criminals, nor does it have the ability to 
monitor compliance.1087 
Thus the only way forwards is to reassess the tests of attribution of conduct 
because this is the hole in the net of responsibility and a considered approach 
towards a change of judicial policy towards the assessment of threshold of controls 
under the current tests is vital. So far the proposals for change of policy have come 
from judicial commentary as opposed to academic proposals. 
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6.5 Current solutions to mitigating against these limitations that 
arise from the current tests attribution of conduct from jurists  
The first proposal for a modification of the test of attribution of conduct of 
individuals to States came in the Tadić Appeals Chamber Decision of the ICTY as 
noted in Chapter Four. Here, the Appeals Chamber considered whether the conflict 
on the territory of Bosnia–Herzegovina, after the withdrawal of Serbian regular 
armed forces, still remained international in character so that the Tribunal could 
exercise jurisdiction over alleged grave breaches of Article 2 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention.1088 This prompted a necessary discussion on the question of attribution 
of conduct. 
The Tadić Appeals Chamber argued in favour of a flexible approach to the 
issue of attribution1089 and found that non-State actors can be regarded as de facto 
organs of the State in some circumstances.1090 In this regard, the Appeals Chamber 
also opined that control may be of an “overall character” and not merely emanate 
from financial or military assistance.1091 They further noted that, 
[t]his requirement, however, does not go so far as to include the issuing of 
specific orders by the State, or its direction of each individual operation. 
Under international law it is by no means necessary that the controlling 
authorities should plan all the operations of the units dependent on them, 
choose their targets, or give specific instructions concerning the conduct of 
military operations and any alleged violations of international humanitarian 
law. The control required by international law may be deemed to exist when 
a State (or, in the context of an armed conflict, the Party to the conflict) has 
a role in organising, coordinating or planning the military actions of the 
military group, in addition to financing, training and equipping or providing 
operational support to that group…1092 
The rationale behind this approach according to Judge Cassese was that it 
was legally correct to apply the test as formulated by the Appeals Chamber and also 
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that they were policy-bound to do so.1093 According to Judge Cassese, it was legally 
correct because the ILC in its Commentaries urged that each case be approached on a 
case-by-case basis,1094 and the Court was also bound to consider all rules belonging 
to other bodies of law with the purpose of construing a part of a corpus of rules it 
must consider.1095 Moreover, in light of the context in which the course of the 
conflict operated, this may have been the only way to perceive the true effects of the 
support rendered and help assess if that support was of such influence to be 
considered as control over the armed opposition group. He further argued that this 
would address the current trends in international law whereby States support armed 
groups both nationally and internationally and this has a potential to lead to conflict 
that can seriously threaten international peace and security. A modified test of 
control could create a legal Standard to hold States accountable.1096 
This proposed test of attribution was rejected by the ICJ in the Bosnian 
Genocide case, in which the Court noted that the ICTY had not been called upon to 
make such pronouncements.1097 The Court instead reaffirmed the tests outlined in 
Nicaragua, requiring proof that the Respondent State had effective control over the 
operation during which the unlawful acts occurred.1098 However as Judge Cassese 
noted, would the “oracular”1099 pronouncement by the ICJ be sufficient to exclude 
consideration of other methodologies towards the issue? Should there be more 
willingness to probe and consider other proposals? 
Judge Al Khasawneh supported this call for a renewed examination of the 
tests of attribution. He did not amplify further in this regard, but both his Dissent and 
the Decision of Judge Cassese have influenced the unique proposal suggested in this 
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thesis to accept the suggestion that the tests of attribution should be subtly varied and 
to suggest the variation. 
6.6 The variation of the tests of attribution of conduct of armed 
groups to States 
The proposal suggested by Vice President Al Khasawneh was for a subtle 
variation of the current tests of attribution of conduct. Taking this forwards, this 
thesis proposes in the next few sections a cadre of variations. These suggestions are 
set within the context that they must specifically only relate to the secondary rules of 
attribution and not venture beyond that parameter into the realm of positive 
obligations, so as to avoid the risk of conflation of the two distinct areas and thereby 
confuse that demarcation that was so long and so hard fought for.1100 
As outlined in the research question,1101 the variation suggested is not the test 
per se, but the approaches towards consideration of the critical components of 
“direction,” “control” and “complete dependence” within that test and offer 
examples as to how a less literal, more purposive interpretation of these critical 
concepts can be made so as to achieve a more nuanced and context driven approach 
to their assessment. This is not done with the goal that the threshold of proofs would 
somehow be automatically lowered and there would be subsequent findings of 
attribution of conduct. Indeed, the suggestion is far from that. Instead the thesis 
suggests that the different ways in which these critical concepts have been examined 
elsewhere should be applied to the future ratios at the ICJ, so that there is a more 
holistic examination of the true nature of these core components of “direction,” 
“control” and “complete dependence” with a view to assessing the extent to which 
armed groups can be considered de facto State agents. This would mean that the test 
is less under-inclusive and examines a wider range of control relationships between 
the supporting State and the armed group. 
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If at the end of the day, there is no finding that supports the attribution of 
conduct of individuals to the State, then at least there would be the ratio of the trial 
to show that the issues were examined in a less literal way and that the subtle power 
chains and forms of control or dependence did not go unexamined. The variation this 
thesis suggests is for an enhanced model of attribution that focusses more on 
complex examinations. There are four main ways in which these examinations can 
occur. The question of “direction” and “control” can be examined through the lens of 
joint criminal enterprise and the two main streams of perpetration doctrine – “co-
perpetration” and “indirect perpetration.” Further questions of “direction” and 
“control” and “complete dependence” can be examined through the lens of the 
human rights approach towards a finding of jurisdiction in cases where there has 
been an alleged violation of rights, on the basis that support of armed groups or 
private entities effectively established jurisdiction.  
If examinations as to proof of these core elements can be undertaken by the 
ICJ in a parallel manner to the approaches by these two different international courts, 
for assessment of these concepts arising on similar facts, that might provide a more 
thorough examination of the issues involved. These different “lenses” are now 
looked at. 
6.6.1 The joint criminal enterprise model  
As discussed in Chapter Five, this mode of responsibility operates on the 
premise that where international crimes are “pursued at the collective level by gangs, 
militias and criminal organisations, their intention to commit the crime and their 
culpability resides at the collective level.”1102 The responsibilities of all the 
participants are distributed equally under a unitary model of participation to all 
participants for the purposes of attribution or assigning responsibility, so that the 
individual who formulated the plan is equally guilty as the individual who executed 
the plan.  
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This emphasis on the collective aspects of international crimes was at the 
heart of the Dissenting Opinion of Vice President Al Khasawneh. In this regard, as 
discussed in Chapter Five, international crimes do not occur randomly but are 
embedded into a wider social policy that supports or encourages the action.1103 Thus 
the pursuit of crimes by gangs, militia and organisations cannot occur in a vacuum 
and there must be a controlling entity that has directed or controlled the acts in some 
form or the other. This was a point that was recognised as early as the 1940s when 
the Charter of the IMT was drafted. There, a decision was made to prioritise the 
assigning of criminal responsibility to powerful individuals. Article 6 of the IMT 
Charter provided for this assigning of criminal responsibility by ascribing fault for 
both the “formulation and execution” of international crimes.1104 This was 
notwithstanding that the execution of international crimes was carried out but by 
lower-order military officers. There is thus that awareness that large-scale crimes 
occur as a result of a clear plan and thus there was a link between the formulation of 
a criminal plan and its execution. Although there are no direct lines of command that 
are sometimes visible from the creation of a plan, the joint criminal enterprise model 
considers the more subtle forms that such control can take. 
Thus as was discussed in Chapter Five, JCE as a mode of responsibility was 
able to address “the complex relationships and deliberative structures”1105 involved 
in “[t]he use of the paramilitary group by the higher-level group of political and 
military leaders.”1106 Under this mode of responsibility, the complex and sometimes 
insidious ways in which a high-level perpetrator, such as a military or political 
leader, could control or effectively direct the commission of international crimes 
from a remote seat of power can be appreciated by examining that question of 
control through the concepts of collective participation. 
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In Chapter Five, the relevant tests for applying three categories of JCE were 
examined and some core cases were used by way of illustration of the point, but in 
the main the Tadić Appeal,1107 the Brdjanin Trial Chamber Decision,1108 and the 
Rwamakuba1109 and Gacumbitsi Appeals Decisions.1110  
Common to all cases was the discussion of the application of particular 
objective elements required to prove whether a joint criminal enterprise actually 
existed namely, that there was a “plurality of persons”1111, a “common plan which 
involved the commission of a crime under the statute or whether such plan could be 
inferred from the actions of the plurality”.1112 In determining whether there was that 
participation in a common plan, the Appeals Chamber distilled three categories of 
mental or subjective elements with a view to using them as a means of proving either 
expressly or implicitly the state of mind of the Accused when they participated in 
that common plan. With the illustrative cases that were used in Chapter Five to 
discuss the tests to determine the various elements, both objective and subjective, 
there was an emphasis on individuals who were in different positions of leadership 
and whose participation took the form of settling ideologies or plans for the creation 
of a Greater Serbia, ie a Serbian controlled territory, or as with the Gacumbitsi or 
Rwamakuba Decisions, a Hutu controlled Rwanda.  
The idea of the joint enterprise was distinguishable from the conspiracy that 
was a feature of the early trials at Nuremberg. While the conspiracy confined 
responsibility to be assessed based on the explicit terms of the plan, with joint 
criminal enterprise, responsibility could be further assessed on the basis of the 
foreseeable consequences that were logically predictable. The question then is how 
can this be applied when considering the requirements of direction and control under 
the present tests of attribution of conduct? 
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With regard to this, under the regime of State responsibility questions of 
“direction” or “control” are objectively analysed as they are assessed on an objective 
standard, ie from the perspective of an impartial third party, namely the ICJ or the 
Court applying the test. In international criminal law, the question of whether a 
remote high-level political or military actor shared a common intention with the low-
level paramilitary member executing international crimes, although a subjective 
requirement as it addresses the Accused’s state of mind, is nevertheless also assessed 
objectively by the Tribunal of fact. Thus an appreciation of the circumstances in 
which the more disconnected or remote actor can be considered to have had an 
intention to participate in the international crimes committed by lower-level 
paramilitary members on the basis of an objective inference of shared intent is 
relevant to the overall proposal in this thesis to suggest variations to the approach of 
assessment of “direction” or “control,” since the objective approach to the 
assessment of the situation is a common denominator in both situations. Thus the 
approach used to determine intention under this mode can usefully inform the 
approach towards an assessment of the evidence by the ICJ  
There were three ways of assessing intention. With JCE 1, intention was 
assessed on the basis that there was a sharing of intention or a common intention 
evidenced by a division of roles, with each role supporting the final commission of 
an international crime.1113 With JCE 2 intention is inferred from the knowledge of a 
particular situation and with JCE 3 knowledge is inferred on the basis that crimes not 
immediately planned but which were committed in excess of those actions that were 
planned, meant that there would be an automatic inference of culpability once they 
were foreseeable.  
Intention under JCE 1 is based on a shared intention evidenced by a 
distribution of roles in a common plan. As the case law discussed in Chapter Five 
showed, the distribution of roles was not formal as per an agreement between the 
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relevant physical perpetrators and those who formulated the criminal policy, but 
could have arisen naturally. As was discussed both in Chapters Two and Five, 
international crimes are ideologically motivated and driven. The unique nature of 
these crimes are that they are intensive in terms of scale and participation. A modus 
operandi that was noted in cases like Tadić, for instance, is that the crimes are 
committed by groups of individuals, who self-organise, as, for example, Tadić who 
on a spontaneous basis organised and executed the commission of the crime. 
However, unlike domestic crimes, which represent social deviance,1114 these 
spontaneous and violent crimes are condoned by the State. There is thus a point at 
which the State’s leadership formulates a particular policy and disseminates that 
information through different organs and this in turn allows a mushrooming of 
operations by either armed forces or paramilitary groups which either work 
independently or in conjunction with each other, but which subscribes to the policies 
articulated by that State. These policies can be formulated even on an extra territorial 
basis as, for example, with Serbia and the Serbian Republic of Bosnia–Herzegovina. 
To elaborate, although Milošević died before his trial completed, he was initially 
indicted on the basis that he participated with armed groups operating on the territory 
of Bosnia–Herzegovina.1115 Thus even though there is superficial autonomy to these 
armed group operations, in that they are executed by the groups separately, they are 
not truly autonomous, as they are controlled by the initial plan or policy that was 
devised by the leadership or relevant high-level perpetrators. Although it is an 
indirect form of control, it is still powerful as it is that initial plan or policy that 
guides or informs the operations in which the international crimes occur. 
In assessing this, the Appeals Chamber in the Brdjanin case was at pains to 
note that there does not have to be an agreement for the execution of the crimes 
between the relevant physical perpetrators and those who formulated the policy,1116 
simply a shared intention. Further even though there may be autonomous and 
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spontaneous criminal plans whereby different armed groups carry out international 
crimes they are still connected to a single controlling exercise by a collection of State 
agents thereby begging the question asked by Luban in Chapter Two, is there a 
Prince without a Denmark, ie if the State agents are responsible on the basis of an 
inferred intention by application of a similar process of reasoning their States should 
be as well.1117 
This autonomous execution of a centrally formulated plan amounts to what is 
described by van Sliedregt as the process of delinking. In by far one of the most 
elucidating explanations as to how international crimes are realised, van Sliedregt 
notes that there are ‘interlinked JCEs’, with policy makers on one hand and 
executors or foot soldiers on the other hand.1118 Inherent in her argument is that each 
group is linked to the other by a shared common goal directed by the State.1119 
Regardless of the conclusions that will be drawn at the end of such an assessment, 
this thesis suggests that a similar approach towards questions of direction and control 
might be able to discern the controlling hand of a State in the crimes perpetrated on 
this system-wide basis, by examining whether the policy goals and formulation  of 
plans by the Supporting State to effect such goals together with their support for the 
execution of those plans provided direction over the operations in which 
international crimes occurred. 
Intention is also assessed under this mode by the inference of knowledge in 
particular circumstances. Under the JCE 2 category, the so-called “systemic” 
category, knowledge of the criminal acts of a group inculpated the accused persons. 
While these cases concerned international crimes committed in the context of 
concentration camps, here knowledge of ill treatment and acquiescence or failure to 
control it allowed for an inference of intent.1120 
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Of the three strains, the way in which JCE 2 inferred intention, ie on the basis 
of acquiescence or failure to prevent crimes of subordinates, is not immediately 
useful in suggesting a parallel approach towards the determination of direction or 
control as the State responsibility regime views duties to prevent or punish under 
primary obligations and thus to suggest an approach that merges the two might 
conflate the distinction between primary and secondary rules. Where it can have 
potential to suggest meaningful approaches is to the extent that one State agent was 
aware of the system of criminality that was either ongoing in another State which he 
was supporting, or in armed groups under his patronage, or that of the State he was 
supporting. According to the test clarified in Kvočka, personal knowledge of the 
system of ill treatment inculpates an Accused, so that even if at the outset, the 
criminal activities within the system are not proven, once there is an awareness later 
on that is sufficient to consider intention.1121 For reasons discussed above, this 
approach might not be immediately useful as with this mode there were defined 
power structures and lines of command thereby assisting with questions of 
complicity through omission. With the questions of direction and control in the 
context of the regime of State responsibility under consideration in this thesis, there 
are not these defined lines of command so the inference of knowledge in a structured 
systemic environment might be an overreaching of the suggestions for subtle 
variations to the current tests of attribution. 
This is not so with JCE 3. Here, there has been a wide inference of 
knowledge on accused persons so that where they initially formulate a plan for one 
crime, eg forced removals, and a collateral crime occurs in excess of that, eg 
genocide, the intention to commit the genocide is automatically inferred and this 
occurs through the range of participants. Thus if State agents such as Stakić or 
Brjdanin were party to the initial plan for forced removals and were instructive in the 
formulation of that plan, they would be equally responsible for the collateral crimes 
that occurred during the execution of that particular operation. 







The reason for this inference of intent is that “the [crime] was both a 
predictable consequence of the execution of the common design and the Accused 
was either reckless or indifferent to that risk.”1122 Intention was thus not pre-
meditated but based on recklessness. Either the Accused foresaw the risk and 
continued with his action or he was indifferent to it. In both cases the assigning of 
responsibility under this head was based on an appreciation of risk.1123 Where 
therefore there is evidence based on the inference of intention that the Accused 
participated in a plan for one act, for example, forced removals and he promulgated 
the plan in his capacity as State agent, either through the media, sending supporting 
troops from the State army or provision of materials, the control exercised over that 
operation would be sufficient to support another finding of control over the excess 
crime along the lines of derivative or parasitic liability, ie the control in one instance 
supports the finding of control in the other. 
So far the ICJ has rejected that anything short of direct control over the 
operations in which international crimes were effected is sufficient. So this suggested 
inference of intention is problematic. The answer to this problem however lies in the 
following suggestion. In R v Jogee1124 domestic UK Courts, which have been 
consistently applying the idea of an extended category of JCE on the basis of 
foresight of consequence, modified the obvious harshness to such a rule by 
suggesting that the foresight of consequence be simply evidence to be assessed by a 
tribunal of fact as to whether there was intention for the further crime. In this way, 
the foresight of consequences can be productively integrated into a modified 
approach towards the questions of attribution of conduct thereby producing a more 
enhanced model for State responsibility in international crimes by examining 
whether the State role in the forumulation plans for forced removals, and the 
provision of aid or assistance to allow for execution can on the whole indicate that 
there was direct control over the operations in which international crimes occurred 
because the international crimes that occurred during the operations were an obvious 
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consequence at all times. This would allow for a less literal and more purposive 
interpretation of control. Further suggestions follow here. 
6.6.2 The co-perpetration model 
As with the joint criminal enterprise model the approach used to determine 
intention under this mode is done with a view to determining the extent to which it 
can usefully inform the approach towards an assessment of the evidence by the ICJ 
on the critical components of the attribution of conduct tests. As noted in Chapter 
Five, co-perpetration has two requirements: an objective requirement that there must 
have been the execution of a criminal act and a subjective element that there must 
have been a common plan for this execution.1125 This mode is particularly useful for 
three reasons. Firstly, a determination of whether there was an execution of a 
criminal act it is based on objective factual assessments of whether an accused 
person exercised control or joint control over particular crimes, through 
consideration of a “cluster of factors” as opposed to concentration of a single 
element in assessing this question of control1126 and secondly, consideration of 
control over the crime does not consider crimes that logically arise through pursuit of 
the original criminal plan as being collateral. Instead it assumes once a criminal act 
is a foreseeable consequence of that initial crime, that it is integrated into the notions 
of the common plan.1127  
All three factors hold particular usefulness for assessing the tests of direction 
and control under the rules of attribution. Since the approach under this mode 
suggests an assessment of “functional control,” more subtle ways of controlling the 
acts of armed groups are considered. With formal orders and commands control is 
evident, however, as has been consistently noted in this thesis there are different 
ways in which an operation can be directed and perhaps instead of overly placing 
reliance on formal expressions of direction and control a closer look can be made at 
more “functional” expressions.  
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Under co-perpetration, the language of this doctrine further, is addressed in 
terms of control and domination over the act, so that questions of derivative liability 
in the context of criminal law is assessed on the “functional control” the Accused 
had over the act. This has been done on the basis of an inclusion of Roxin’s theories 
of functional control that have been grafted onto the jurisprudence of the 
international courts and tribunals applying this mode. So that, for instance, where 
there is a division of roles, each co-perpetrator “simultaneously controls the total 
act.”1128 This objective assessment was reliant on an examination of the contributions 
of the Accused to the criminal act. This was on the basis of an “essential 
contribution.” While there may be critics as to the esoteric nature of the term, Ohlin 
suggests that the test examines conduct both ex ante and ex post perspectives.1129 Not 
only is there an examination of the importance of the contributions of the Accused 
before the execution of the criminal act, there is a further analysis of the 
contributions of the Accused after the execution of the criminal act, so that exactly 
how the contributions served the execution of the crime and those effecting the 
execution are examined. It provides a more rigorous examination of the effects of the 
contributions of the Accused. 
This was applied in Lubanga1130 as discussed in Chapter Five. Here, the 
contributions Lubanga made to plans to exclude the Lendu for Kibali Ituri, were not 
addressed as defined acts but involved an appreciation of the “cluster of facts” which 
showed that there was evidence of control over the crime, even if that control 
emanated from a remote location.
1131
 These plans impacted on a complex network of 
events involving the recruitment and training of child soldiers in Uganda and 
Bunia.1132 In this regard, he maintained a controlling role in this crime. 
Further to this, was that element of foreseeability of the crimes occurring as a 
logical consequence to the plan embarked on. As Chapter Five discussed, rebel 
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groups may start off with a non-criminal plan, in Lubanga’s case military control of 
an area. Even though no express plan existed to commit international crimes in 
pursuit of that goal, the nature of the common plan presupposed commission of 
international crimes as a logical consequence to acts of displacement, or forced 
removals. With Lubaga, recruitment was pursued to effect military control of Kibali 
Ituri. If that suggested that the operations could involve the use of children, although 
this was never the goal, then the risk was foreseen and thus accepted.  
As was suggested in the discussion as to the application of the approaches 
from the JCE modes, the suggestion here is that the approach towards the assessment 
of control be used in a similar manner when assessing the tests for attribution of 
conduct to States. Where plans for particular military operations are discussed and 
during the course of that plan, it is evident that there is certain risk involved that 
international crimes are likely to occur in the execution of those operations, where a 
State has been party to those plans, even if it did not through its agents direct the 
operation in which the international crimes occurred, considered look should be 
made as to the nature of its contributions to the operation. This should be done from 
two angles and assessment of the likely effect of the contribution at the time of the 
plan and an assessment after the crimes occur to determine the effect of that 
contribution on a qualitative basis. In this way, if there was a functional control over 
the operation in the absence of a formal one, it will prevent a State escaping 
responsibility on the basis that the acts of individuals under its control could not be 
established, since the proof of the essential contribution could render the individuals 
committing international crimes de facto State agents. As mentioned before, the 
variation will not automatically terminate in a finding of attribution but it will assist 
in a more realistic and context-specific examination of the facts under consideration. 
This also holds true for the suggested modifications via the mode of indirect 
perpetration. 
6.6.3 The indirect perpetration model 
The concept of indirect perpetration initially seems perhaps best suited 
towards suggested tests for variations to the current approaches towards attribution, 




of another organisation, for example, armed groups for the perpetration of 
international crimes.1133 As discussed in Chapter Five, it addresses the commission 
of international crimes through the control exercised over another and there are two 
categories under this mode, commission through the mistake of another or 
commission via an organisational apparatus.1134 The second category of this mode 
assigns criminal responsibility to the indirect perpetrator, ie the Hintermann, because 
he has the ability to maintain control over an organisational apparatus, or 
Organisationsherrschaft,1135 which he deploys to commit crimes because he is 
relying on the organisational structure of the armed groups to execute the crime. As 
identified in Chapter Five, there are three elements that exist through this mode – 
“power,” ie there are established hierarchical structures, “fungibility,” ie those 
directly committing the act can be exchanged, and “detachedness,” ie the 
organisation must operate outside the law.1136 
It apparently suggests a solution to the current problems associated with 
attribution of conduct of individuals who go on to commit international crimes to 
States who had a relationship with these groups but in a more remote sense from a 
detached seat of power. However, as noted in Chapter Five, the ability to assess 
control in this way allows for the persons who acted behind the scenes, who 
organised, planned, instructed or instigated others to carry out international 
crimes,1137 to be responsible. It thus maintains important features that could assist in 
working out the details of “direction” or “control” in complex situations along the 
same broad lines as the other two modes of responsibility discussed above. 
According to the interpretation of the doctrine in the Pre-Trial Confirmation 
of the Charges against Kenyatta et al, the Chamber introduced a more subtle 
interpretation of control, namely circumstances where there was use of a pre-existing 
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hierarchical and organised structure within an armed group,
1138
 so that although 
control is ceded to the group to act autonomously as regards to the execution of 
operations, in advance of that there is a common criminal plan and although an 
express command or order is not given to direct crimes in the course of operations, 
leeway is given to the groups to act freely, as the will of the group is subjugated to 
the control exercised by the original masterminds, ie those who formulated the initial 
plan. The thrust of this mode of responsibility is the use of a pre-existing 
organisational apparatus to effect the international crimes. 
The Pre-Trial Chamber Decision suggested that the intention to share in the 
crimes committed by the armed group existed where there was either a dolus 
directus, ie direct intention for the crime, or a dolus directus in the second degree, ie 
the crimes of the organisation can occur in the usual course of things. As noted 
before the questions of intent can be addressed, there must be proof of a criminal 
plan. Although there was evidence of this produced through a particular witness, 
who was a former member of the Mungiki, this witness was not available at Trial 
and the case ultimately collapsed.  
This mode of responsibility as discussed in Chapter Five was not tested 
further. It however together with JCE and co-perpetration maintains a key theme, ie 
they all address questions of control from a functional as opposed to formal 
perspective and they all relate control to an original plan that may or may not have 
identified the crimes committed by the armed groups, but which to any objective 
bystander was a natural and foreseeable consequence. In this regard the question of 
control, as regards determination of intent for collectively perpetrated crimes, is not 
based on simply direct expressions of control but contemplate the range of actions 
that are logically predictable on the initial common plan. This way an Accused is 
inculpated on an objective basis either due to his recklessness in the initial control he 
exercised or due to his understanding that such collateral crimes will occur. 
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Translating that into the regime of State responsibility, thus requires a fuller 
examination of the essential contributions States made to armed groups and whether 
there were initial plans that had the potential to escalate into international crimes. In 
addition, where the relationship between the State and the group evidences that that 
the relationship between the two was such that there was control through shared 
goals, ideologies, creation of infrastructure that created the right atmosphere for the 
international crimes, even if there was no direct evidence that the State controlled 
exact operations, this relationship of control should be a factor in assessment. 
What these discussions show is that the detailing and the approaching of the 
different relationships between individual agents are complex and require a unique 
method towards assigning responsibility. This method draws on three key 
approaches, a holistic review of power apparatus, the connection between power 
structures of the State and armed group and a realistic assessment as to the 
consequences of any plans arranged between the armed group and the State. Where 
international crimes are the logical consequence of these plans, further examination 
is required to assess the effect of contributions to the commission of those crimes by 
analysing the power network between the two either diffused or direct and bring to 
bear those concerns in the assessment of control or direction over the relevant 
operations. 
6.6.4 The human rights model 
As this thesis has argued, there are strong policy objectives behind 
consideration of the tests for attribution of conduct of individuals to States from 
Human Rights Courts, notwithstanding the distinction in the objectives of the tests at 
the ICJ and the Human Rights Courts at present. Crucially, the Human Rights Courts 
have been interpreting questions of dependence and control very differently to the 
ICJ as discussed in Chapter Four. Both the IACtHR and the ECtHR have attributed 
conduct of individuals to States on the basis of a different approach towards the 
evaluation of control.  
The international human rights regime is distinctive in that its aims and 
objectives are to protect the rights of individuals under its jurisdiction. Thus the 




of jurisdiction. There have been examples in the ECtHR whereby in circumstances 
where States have created and sponsored entities that the conduct of individuals from 
these entities were attributed to the State. In these circumstances, control and 
influence seem to be equated with each other. Thus whereas the distinction between 
the two obtains at the ICJ and influence falls short of proof of control, substantial 
levels of influence has been sufficient to attribute conduct of individuals to the State. 
In one example used in Chapter Four, Ilaşcu v Moldova, the ECtHR opined that the 
level of administrative control offered by the Russian Federation to the MRT, ie the 
level of military, financial and political support offered, led the ECtHR to conclude 
that the MRT survived by virtue of the Russian Federation.1139 The same principle 
applied in the cases brought by Turkey and as discussed in Chapter Four. 
While the test of attribution of conduct of individuals in international law is 
settled, the considerations used to prove the components of the test of attribution 
need to be reviewed. There are degrees to influence and there is a point at which 
influence becomes an act of control. The sustained manner of analysis used by the 
ECtHR in addressing the questions associated with determining the degree of 
influence that results from State support should not be underestimated and should be 
included as part of a revised agenda in considering how assessments of control or 
dependence under the current tests of attribution as defined by the ICJ should be 
approached. 
The question of jurisdiction as noted in Chapter Four was somewhat different 
under the IACHR as it specifically relates to obligations to protect the erga omnes 
obligations reflected under that Convention. In the cases examined in Chapter Four 
from the IACtHR, the questions of attribution of conduct to States thus related the 
questions of State connivance with paramilitary groups to these obligations and thus 
conduct of individuals from these groups were attributed to the State on the basis of 
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this connivance, or in some cases because the State acquiesced to the criminal acts of 
the armed groups or failed to guard against them.1140 
Application of this model to the regime of State responsibility has to be done 
carefully. With the regime of State responsibility, the question of obligations is 
distinct to consideration of the rules of attribution and in considering approaches 
from other courts that distinction should be maintained so that there is no conflation 
between questions of obligation and questions of attribution. Questions of State 
acquiescence could relate to the tests of control only insofar as it is suggestive that if 
a State acquiesced to international crimes being committed, then it had the power to 
control the situation and failed to exercise that power. Inherent in that is power 
control. Thus , the consideration of the effects of relationships among State agents 
and armed groups and whether arms supply or military training etc were forms of 
control over the operations in which international crimes occurred is important. 
These considerations allow a full, realistic account of the State’s role in the life and 
existence of the armed groups and submits all aspects of the relatioship to 
microscopy. 
6.7 The variation of the tests of attribution of conduct 
In sum, therefore, this thesis has argued that there is a lacuna in the current 
positive law, whereby the significant and determining assistance rendered by State 
patrons to armed groups that commit international crimes goes largely unaddressed. 
The conduct of individuals can only be attributed to States in very limited and 
exacting circumstances, ie it must have been proven that the State directed or 
controlled the operation in which the international crimes were committed or 
alternatively that the armed group was completely dependent on the State.1141 
Anything short of this would not be able to pass this exacting threshold. Moreover, 
even if one were to argue that a State should not be held directly responsible for the 
conduct of individuals by support or assistance, but instead simply for complicity, 
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even there, the State escapes the net of responsibility because the present rules on 
complicity only address State-to-State relationships. 
Thus, in an effort to mitigate against State impunity in these circumstances, 
this thesis suggests subtle variations to the current tests of attribution of conduct to 
States by consideration of appropriate approaches from the international criminal law 
regime and the international human rights regime to the current tests for attribution 
of conduct to individuals. While not seeking to destabilise the defined test 
established by the ICJ in Nicaragua and later applied in the Bosnian Genocide case, 
this thesis has suggested that a more enhanced inquiry could be made by the ICJ in 
how it assesses these critical tests of “direction,” “control” and “complete 
dependence.” This thesis suggests that the way forwards is to present a harmonised 
picture of what has been, up to now, fragmented areas of international law. Since in 
most instances these three areas of law – international law, international criminal law 
and international human rights law – can be applied in a parallel manner to address 
mass atrocities on a given factual scenario, this thesis suggests that perhaps the ways 
in which control is assessed in the individual criminal responsibility regime and the 
human rights regime could inform the approaches towards the assessment of these 
critical concepts in international law when these cases appear before the ICJ. The 
present thesis also proposes that the approaches used under the JCE and perpetration 
modes of responsibility to address the “complex and deliberative structures”1142 
between States and the armed groups they support, can be applied to augment the 
current approaches used by the ICJ in determining issues of attribution of individual 
conduct to States.  
Additionally, this thesis further proposes that the approaches by the Human 
Rights Courts towards assessment of the requirements of control to establish 
jurisdiction can inform the attribution agenda in international law by examining the 
ways in which “direction,” “control” and “complete dependence” has been 
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understood in those contexts and consequently can be applied mutatis mutandis to 
the present under-inclusive tests of attribution in international law.  
These suggestions build on the proposals of different scholars who have 
suggested that regime coordination or interaction might be better able to address the 
complex dimension of international crimes and the diversity of actors involved in its 
commission. The solutions offered in this thesis call for a novel way of addressing a 
familiar situation by determining what tests or approaches could have informed the 
suggestions for a modified approach towards determination of the questions of 
attribution of conduct. This was done with the hope that in some small measure it 
could start a conversation that others could carry on in this endless quest for better 
accountability for the commission and participation of international crimes. 
6.8 The challenges posed with these suggested solutions 
This thesis admits that the proposed variations to the tests of attribution are 
not without their challenges. The proposed variations do suggest a level of 
interference with an already established precedent from the ICJ. Also the suggestions 
for variation draw on the methodologies for appraisal of direction or control from 
markedly different courts and tribunals, which maintain different objectives to the 
determination of these questions to the ICJ. The challenge here is that so far, the ICJ, 
as seen with the application of the Tadić test, has been very adverse to the question 
of consideration of legal tests from these other courts. Moreover, some of the tests, 
particularly those from the regime of individual criminal responsibility, are driven by 
strong and convincing levels of evidence being provided so that the courts and 
tribunals can make informed decisions. Thus the success or failure of those 
approaches to some may not be due to the strength of the legal approaches, but 
instead are the result of appropriate evidence being adduced. Each of these 
challenges is now discussed. 
The main criticism of attempting to vary the approach is that to do so will 
create uncertainty in the law. In his 2007 treatise Precedent in the World Court, 
Judge Shabudeen identified some of the key guiding factors that shape the views of 




brought before it. According to him, “the desiderata of consistency, stability and 
predictability which underlie a responsible legal system, suggest that the Court 
would not exercise its power to depart from a previous decision except with 
circumspection.”1143 As a Judge of the ICJ, he noted that the Court in response to this 
pursues “a policy of not unnecessarily impairing the authority of its decisions.”1144 
As was already demonstrated in the outright rejection of the approach towards 
questions of attribution of conduct demonstrated in the Tadić Appeal,1145 the ICJ 
appears to not be prepared to consider methods or approaches outside its own 
jurisprudence.  
However, strictly speaking, the ICJ is not bound by doctrines of precedent in 
the same way a domestic court is and notwithstanding a policy to remain 
“consistent,” it has the potential to reformulate the tests of attribution, to the extent 
that it has the will to do so. Indeed, while the ICJ should, rightly, strive for 
consistency, its role is not only that of stating and restating the law, but also to 
develop it to meet the requirements of a dynamic international society.1146 
This is being done by other international courts. For instance, while the 
ECtHR in the cases analysed in Chapter Four was looking at questions concerning 
the existence of “jurisdiction” within the meaning of Article 1 ECHR, the finding 
that such jurisdiction existed in those cases was only possible due the European 
Court giving full effect to the reality of the relationship between the TRNC and 
Turkey (in Loizidou) and between the MRT and Russia (in Ilaşcu v Moldova) in its 
assessment of the nexus between the Respondent State and the self-proclaimed 
government it supported. In a similar way, the ICJ should also factor in a full 
understanding of the nature and effect of the relationship between the State and the 
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group and truly grasp the reality of the role the State played in the operations of the 
groups it sponsored.  
Perhaps the most compelling argument for modification of the test is this. In 
his 2014 publication on State responsibility, James Crawford placed a caveat on his 
statement that the Bosnian Genocide case effectively put an end to the debate as to 
the correct standard to be applied to Article 8 ARSIWA. Immediately as he noted 
this, he flagged up in his footnote that this position is in contrast to the position noted 
in the Dissenting Opinion by Judge Al Khasawneh.1147 Judge Al Khasawneh as well 
has himself commented that  
[u]nfortunately, the Court’s rejection of the standard in the Tadić case 
fail[ed] to address the crucial issue raised therein – namely that different 
types of activities, particularly in the ever-evolving nature of armed conflict, 
may call for subtle variations in the rules of attribution.1148 
Thus notwithstanding arguments to the contrary, at the judicial level, the tests 
are not unanimously accepted.1149 The law on attribution, as it stands, is by no means 
settled. From several legal standpoints as discussed in this chapter, the issue turns on 
the understanding of direction and control. While the ICJ has maintained that for the 
responsibility of a State to be engaged there must be evidence that the State in 
question directed or controlled the operation in which the international crimes 
occurred, the ICJ is approaching the question of direction or control by focussing on 
a very literal construction of direction and control and thus its assessment of 
evidence reflects that very high threshold. Other international courts and tribunals 
seem to be viewing the test of direction and control less literally and they suggest a 
different interpretation of these words. The quest for an enhanced model of 
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attribution is important as there is that loophole of accountability in the current law, 
but whether those applying the tests are willing to accept the enhanced model will 
remain an issue that has to be subjected to further academic enquiry. 
The other area of challenge lies in the relationship between the legal tests and 
the evidentiary requirements to prove them. For instance, although there was that 
optimism at the Pre-Trial Chamber in the case brought against President Kenyatta et 
al, that the mode of indirect perpetration was sufficient to address the questions that 
arose from State use of armed groups, all six cases have failed at the ICC. In part 
some of the failure has been the result of lack of evidence to go forwards. Thus 
seeking to transpose approaches that have set high evidential thresholds as to their 
proof could be problematic as the suggested variations do not make it any easier to 
secure a finding of responsibility and thus the scope for impunity remains. 
The response to this is that the suggestion for a reconsideration of the 
approaches identified under the current tests of attribution was never done with the 
intention that the modifications will make determination easier. Far from it, the 
intention was that the modifications will allow for more sustained and systematic 
analysis of the questions of “direction,” “control” and “complete dependence” so that 
applications of these concepts are examined with reference to facts and 
circumstances of the varying degrees of assistances, both ex ante and ex post to the 
commission of mass atrocities by armed groups. It is hoped that with an examination 
that looks beyond the surface and which is prepared to look at circumstances where 
inferences of facts can be supported or where the impact of predictability of the 
outcome of the plans and collaborations between the State and the armed group is so 
certain that logic would demand that in those situations, the recklessness of the State 
as to these consequences could be used as a marker in evaluating the question of 
attribution of conduct to the State. 
The challenge here is that some international criminal jurists are wary of 




introduce uncertainty through the back door.1150 The argument against this is that 
such tests are objective and have to be satisfied to the point that there are no 
competing inferences. In this way, it is not uncertain as it relies on intense judicial 
examination of the situation to determine the impact that obvious circumstances had 
on the questions of control or dependence. 
However, despite these challenges, it is hoped that this thesis has raised an 
inquiry that can start more conversations about the issues raised and thus spur on 
further research in the quest for dealing with this new actor in international law: the 
armed group and the level of State responsibility in supporting this violent entity. 
6.9 The scope for further research in this area 
The scope for further research is deep and wide. In order to take the issues 
raised on this thesis forwards there are some further areas that will have to be 
examined both for the legal and social sciences discipline. 
The context in which States usually offer support to armed groups as has 
been discussed, is against complex interactions of historical and psychological 
factors. Understanding why States support armed groups in these circumstances and 
whether that has anything to bear on an understanding of the questions of control or 
support of the group is important. This is because these armed groups cannot sustain 
a life of their own and the issue as to what motivates the supporting State can be of 
assistance.  
Further research can also arise on the issue as to whether non-legal methods 
namely those in the field of international peace and security might be of greater 
assistance to address the questions of State support of armed groups as these political 
mechanisms might offer more scope for monitoring and compliance. The non-legal 
methods will be able to stymie the gap of accountability where there are cases of 
armed groups which are outside the remit of this thesis, such as ISIS which started 
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out with both State and non-State support, now does not seem to have a clear State 
patron.1151 Nevertheless, they are effecting international crimes on a vast scale and in 
fact do not have clear State boundaries. The questions of how to address 
investigation and evidence gathering in these circumstances is crucial. 
Within the framework of the law, further work needs to be undertaken as to 
processes and procedures within international courts and tribunals as to investigation 
and evidence gathering. With the suggested modifications to the tests of attribution 
outlined in this thesis, there is heavy reliance on proof of common plans and the 
predictability of consequences from these plans: this can only be addressed through 
appropriate evidence being led. Thus an inquiry into use of immunities and 
protection to potential witnesses who were participants of the plan, relevant expert 
testimonies and commissioned empirical work would help in supporting the 
objective approach towards assessment of control identified in this thesis. 
Further study can also be suggested into continued investigation into the 
creation of a specific court to address armed groups or an expansion of jurisdiction 
under the ICC to address the armed group as a discrete legal person or any other 
suitable forum to deal with potential cases. This entails research into capacity for 
court creation.  
The scope for further research is thus manifold. The face of conflict has 
dramatically changed since the framework of international responsibility developed 
after the Second World War. The quest for determining the role of States in 
supporting, creating, organising, administering, collaborating and controlling these 
groups is important in the wider scheme of things as it might be the only way to 
address the responsibility of this rogue actor beyond the confines of individual 
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criminal responsibility and thereby suppress further use of them in the commission 
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